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4PREFACE
The term ’ethology’ was coined by John Stuart Mill in book six 
of his System of Logic. Since that time, it has come to designate 
the study of animal behaviour from a comparative point of view.
Any work, therefore, which proposes to deal with the etholog- 
ical roots of morality must necessarily place great emphasis on the 
comparative behaviour of animals and men. The core of this work is 
a review of that field of study as it relates to morality. small 
number of characteristics are examined which are undoubtedly moral 
but which can be seen in animal societies as well as our own.
By illustrating how these activities have emerged in the course 
of evolution, and how they owe their presence to the survival value 
(or ’functionality’) which they bestow upon the animal community, it 
is possible to obtain a far closer estimate of their true importance 
to and function in our own species, far closer than would be possible 
through a priori speculation. By revealing the limits of our natural 
abilities and showing the priority of our natural tendencies, this 
study can be of crucial importance to moral philosophy and to the for­
mulation of moral codes. In particular, the ethological point of 
view demonstrates the relation between individual moral action and 
the welfare of a group, and exposes the inadequacy of many rational­
istic explanations of human moral action, such as the Hobbesian or j
Rawlsian social contract, and ironically, the utilitarianism of John 
Stuart Mill himself.
I
Chapter 1
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT OF THE THEORY
Our morality has been shaped by the natural selection of our 
species. It is not commonly understood by ethical philosophers that 
such a process of selection with respect to morality is possible, but 
its recognition is of major consequence to their field of enquiry.
Since Darwin, it has been acknowledged that creatures possessing 
some physical characteristic which enables them to leave more progeny |
than others will tend to become numerically stronger. Where individu- J%als or families of these species compete against other species or spec- i|
ies members for vital resources, then the physically superior creatures 
may even drive the others to extinction. The theory of evolution by |
natural selection therefore gives us a hypothesis to explain the slow j
change of animal characteristics and numbers over time. It is less J
fully recognized, at least among those people imperfectly acquainted àj
with the biological bases of behaviour, that the same process of* natural |
selection can occur with respect to behavioural characteristics, as well |
as physical ones. Nor is it widely understood that the selection pro- 1
cess can explain the evolution of the behaviour of groups of individuals -I1*  Ias well as individuals themselves, I
1The logic of these selection processes, and their manifestation
*Notes follow at the end of each chapter.
in real-world animal species will be developed more extensively in 
the following chapter. For the moment, however, it may be said that 
social behaviour in general, and moral practices in particular, are 
subject to evolution by natural selection. Such practices are suf­
ficiently important to the life of a group of individuals that they 
might give it a selective advantage over other groups with a differ­
ent social repertoire. The social practices which survive over the 
generations, and the values associated with them, will tend to be 
those which improve (or at the very least, which do nothing to hin­
der) the survival prospects of their bearers. Groups in which social 
and moral practices are conducive to survival will tend to survive, 
and their practices will survive along with them. Groups in which 
the social and moral practices are, or become, harmful to the long­
term survival of their bearers will tend toward extinction, and the 
practices themselves will be extinguished likewise.
It does not take any grasp of Darwinian theory to recognize that 
this must be so. Hume, for instance, notes in his essay Of the Ori­
ginal Contract that a society cannot subsist without a measure of 
agreement or acquiescence upon certain norms and social practices.
Even a band of pirates, one might conclude, would soon disintegrate 
if its members had no norms of truthfulness to each other or respect 
for the persons and property of the other members. In the Treatise, 
Hume once more notes that our own species would be doomed to ex­
tinction were it not possible for members of each sex to live together 
long enough to raise children, and that the length of the period of 
child-raising in humans requires an advanced system of mutually
accepted rights and duties conducive to the subsistence of the family2unit. Other members of the Scottish School noted the same utility 
of civil duties and moral rules, even though they did not have a Dar­
winian insight into natural selection; indeed, had they been so 
equipped, the course of moral philosophy would have been markedly 
different.^
The natural selection of groups
Evolution is commonly regarded as being about the 'survival of 
the fittest*, a phrase coined by Herbert Spencer, Such a view mis-
takenly suggests that it is the individual furthest removed from con­
ventional morality who will survive at the expense of others; that it 
is the greedy, selfish and deceitful man who will prosper at the ex­
pense of the mild, generous and honest. This formulation of the theory 
of evolution was the foundation of the Social Darwinist view of moral 
conduct.
Although no Social Darwinist, Thomas Huxley has bequeathed us a 
neat formulation of this view that moral virtue will be supplanted by 
self-interest if the natural workings of evolution are allowed to con­
tinue. In his famous Romanes Lecture, Evolution and Ethics, he likens 
humanity to a bed of plants in an enclosed garden. Under the ’Cosmic 
Process' of evolution, the weeds will prosper, starving the more deli­
cate flowers of air and sunlight. Eventually, the garden turns into 
an unkempt jungle, and such is our fate under an unbridled process of 
natural selection. The strong will engulf the weak, and morality has 
little to do with the matter. But there is another process at work, 
says Huxley, a process of moral improvement.-, which can be conceptual­
ized as a gardener tending the flowers. He cuts the weeds and en­
courages the better blooms by watering, fertilizing and constant care. 
In much the same way, human beings encourage or discourage certain 
activities by approbation, disapprobation, praise and punishment.
This formulation of Huxley’s is, however, a gross misreading of 
the theory of natural selection, even as Darwin himself formulated it, 
and his extended analogy is unable to portray its finer details. The 
theory of evolution is a general theory; it covers not only all re­
producing individuals, but also all aggregations of individuals which 
reproduce to form a subsequent generation of new individuals. Although 
the transmission of any characteristic must be from individual to in­
dividual, there is no logical reason why the performance of the aggre­
gate system as a whole should not be an object, perhaps the main ob-' 
ject, of selection. Characteristics which favour the survival of a 
colony of bees, for example, are not necessarily favourable to the 
survival of a particular individual within the colony. Yet the suc-__ 
cessful performance of the colony as a functioning system promotes the
survival of the other members of the colony, and of the bee species 
as a whole. Indeed, the worker bees in a hive are sterile, and from 
the point of view of their individual 'fitness' as the Social Darwin­
ists understood i% they rank very poorly. In such cases, the social 
system is the unit of selection, not merely the individuals within it.
The evolution of species on the earth, which is a particular ex­
ample of the working of the general theory of evolution by natural4selection, has shown that it is frequently more advantageous for in­
dividuals to live in groups rather than live alone. In such aggre­
gations, mutual defense and interests can best be served, a point not 
lost upon the thoroughgoing egoist philosophy of Thomas Hobbes. Yet 
there are limits upon the activities of individuals in those aggrega­
tions if the survival of the aggregations themselves, and therefore 
the welfare of the individuals within them, is to be served. Were a 
group of greedy, selfish and untruthful individuals to come together, 
for example, it would not function efficiently as a group, and could 
be supplanted by a competing group whose members cooperated fully in 
mutual defense, could rely on each other to honour promises and ob­
ligations, and had well-established norms of justice, ownership 
and the like. The latter, 'moral' group of individuals could have a 
decided selective advantage, and were these moral characteristics 
transmitted to their succeeding generations, the comparative advantage 
of the moral system would aid..its long-term survival. Hence, evolu­
tion does not favour the selfish and deceitful individual at all times, 
as Huxley and others have supposed. On the contrary - and Huxley's 
analogy has no means of accommodating the fact - evolution can favour 
functioning systems of social conduct in which certain social prac­
tices traditionally accepted as 'morality' have their place.
The process of transmission
The fact that a working system of morality can be transmitted 
from one generation to another is a necessary part of the logic of the 
theory of evolution itself, as the following chapter will demonstrate. 
The transmission mechanism does not affect the validity of the theory; 
it might be based on genetic transmission, or might be founded on cul-
4
tural transmission, through teaching and custom, or in the third in­
stance, it might he a combination of the two in which genetic traits 
are developed to maturity by individual learning. Serious disputes ^  
in ethology have arisen over the method of transmission appropriate to 
various species, with the developmentalist school gaining most of the 
ground as regards the transmission of behavioural characteristics in 
the higher species. The question is not unimportant to a discussion 
of the evolutionary selection of moral practices, since genetic trans­
mission will be far less flexible than cultural transmission, and will 
apply with much greater force to related kin than to non-related indi­
viduals (although the latter will be affected, since the actions of : 
any one individual form part of the environment in which other in­
dividuals live, thus affecting their survival to some extent^).
Nevertheless, it would be pointless for us to get deeply involved 
in these disputes, particularly when the ethological discussions upon 
them have been so extensive. When discussing the evolution of systems 
of morality, a notion of the speed, invariability and extent of the 
transmission process can be gained from examining the actual evolution 
of particular moral traits and systems in real populations from an 
historical perspective. This evidence is sufficient for the purposes 
of the ethical philosopher, even though the biologist may require some 
more penetrating theoretical analysis. Hence, a large part of this 
work is devoted to examples of moral traits in animais and in the de^ 
velopment of the human species. The same examination will serve 
another purpose, to make it easier for us to pick out important char­
acteristics that might constitute a 'minimum content* of morality (if 
indeed there is such a thing) in societies far simpler than our own.
Thus we may be able to specify that content more accurately than the7excellent but non-empirical efforts of philosophers such as Hart. 
Inheritance and morality
Althou^ it would be fallacious to insist that human moral sys­
tems are transmitted by a process almost entirely genetic, when no 
firm evidence is offered for the assertion, it is still possible to 
show that human morality is at many points remarkably similar to cer­
5
tain parts of animal social behaviour.
To take an example, individuals in a herd of red deer such as 
that described in Fraser Darling's well-known book on the subject,^ 
display actions of self-sacrifice on occasions; they show obedience 
to higher-ranking individuals; maternal care and affection; mutual 
cooperation in defence of the herd; the maintenance of territory and 
the respect for it. In men, we would dignify such characteristics 
with the term 'moral*; and yet it stretches our imagination too far 
to suppose that animals have any concept of the overall welfare of 
their group, to which their duty calls them after a moment's reflec­
tion. The animals perform these’moral* ac,ts simply because, as animals 
and as members of a breeding group subject to natural selection, they 
have to perform them. Their performance is jart of the genetic con­
stitution of their kind: and if by chance there arose a species which 
for some reason came to end the performance of such acts, it would 
probably not enjoy long life. Consider, how many beehives would sur­
vive if half the workers stopped performing their everyday tasks of 
foraging, building and cleaning? What bird species would not be 
steadily eliminated were its members to fail to give warning calls on 
seeing a predator? What chimpanzee group would survive the attacks of 
the big cats if one or two of the males in the group were not prepared 
to create a diversion while the others made off? There would, quite 
plainly, be no survivors in these circumstances, which is why moral 
characteristics do yet survive, stamped on the genetic and cultural 
constitutions of successful species, human or otherwise.
The only difference is that we, as humans, can experience the 
moral action from inside; we know what it is like to be moved by moral 
considerations. Animals, we can view only from outside. To us, a 
moral action such as protecting one's family from a hostile animal, 
feels very much like the culmination of a rational process, in which 
the pros and cons, long-term welfare and short-term risk, are all 
weighed one against the other. After we have made the action, we ana­
lyze our behaviour and its ramifications, congratulating or castigating 
ourselves upon the wisdom or the folly of our actions, and possibly
6
ascribing a post facto rationalization to the actions we have made.
We rightly deny this ability to calculate in animals. Only we 
have reasoning power enough; but we are wrong to suppose that these 
rational calculations are the full extent of morality itself. Rather, 
they are a refinement of it, a rational superstructure built on in­
dividual moral values which are, ultimately, shaped by the process of 
natural selection. Reason itself is aimless and impotent when not 
directed by any desire, appetite, instinct or other motive. A simple 
analogy will illustrate. Were the programmer of a sophisticated com­
puter to programme the machine to 'begin working', very little would 
happen. The machine would have no information to begin working on.
It would have no instructions about how to process any data, nor how 
to present them. Lacking aim or direction, it is useless. Only when 
the programmer puts his own purpose into the machine will it,perform. 
So too with human reason; as Hume said, it is only the "slave of the 
passions" and although it may help us to resolve the precise nature 
of our desires in a complicated situation, it cannot by itself direct 
us to action. To the extent that evolution selects some desires and 
eliminates others, sois the foundation of our morality part of an 
evolutionary heritage which we share with other species.
Inheritance and values
The identity of function and the evolutionary common-source of 
certain animal behaviour and human morality will be established more 
fully when we consider examples of animal 'morality' in chapter five. 
Yet the notion that morality is 'something more' than animals could be 
capable of continues to exist, despite the work of the ethologists and 
sociobiologists throughout this century, who have made the study of 
animal social life into a new science. In the traditional view of 
things, morality and the 'moral sense' or conscience are supposed to 
prompt us to take one action instead of another, more self-centred 
one, and are alleged to be quite distinct from instinct or common ap­
petite. This somewhat metaphysical formulation is clearly hostile to 
the notion of the natural selection of moral behaviour and values. In 
its most concise form, it is elucidated by the theologian C.S.Lewis in
Qhis collection of essays, Mere Christianityr
Now I do not deny that we may have a herd instinct; hut that is not what I mean hy the Moral Law. We all know what it feels like to he prompted by instinct - by mother love, or sexual instinct, or the instinct for food. It means that you feel a strong want or desire to act in a certain way. And, of course, we sometimes do feel just that sort of desire to help another person; and no doubt that desire is due to a herd instinct. But feeling a desire to help is quite different from feeling that you ought to help whether you want to or not. Suppose you hear a cry for help from a man in danger. You will probably feel two desires - one a desire to give help (due to your herd instinct), the other a desire to keep out of danger (due to the instinct for self-preservation) . But you will find inside you, in addition to these two impulses, a third thing which tells you that you ought to follow the impulse to help, and suppress the impulse to run away. Now this thing that judges be­tween two instincts, that decides which should be encouraged, can­not itself be either of them.
The hypothesis of a 'moral sense' which distinguishes between in­
stincts of self-preservation and cooperation can be traced back to But­
ler, Shaftesbury and Hutcheson in its pure form.^^ Even in those 
writers, however, the characteristic was held to be instinctive, and as 
such, it.is presumably a fitting target for natural selection, Butler, 
Shaftesbury and Hutcheson were, of course, devoid of any evolutionary 
theory to explain the emergence of the moral sense, but today it would 
be impossible to maintain that the moral sense was indeed a part of 
human nature but that it was not shaped by evolution. Consequently we 
are forced to recognize that the moral sense arises in the same way as 
the 'herd instinct* of Lewis's hypothesizing, and that since it seems 
to produce broadly similar altruistic results in social animals and in 
human beings, it can be considered as merely part of a 'herd instinct', 
broadly defined. This latter view is perhaps more satisfying than the 
Lewis view; it eliminates the need for a metaphysical postulate, and 
reduces the act of making a moral judgement to the resolution of a
struggle between two conflicting sets of instincts, no third construct
■1being necessary. The outcome of the struggle is not necessarily im- I
mediate, and is accompanied by doubt, fear, guilt and possibly some ;1Irational calculation,which all tend to make us think that the whole 
process has been rational and the choice has been free. But those J
social groups, human or animal, in which the social instincts are event- i
ually dominant over the selfish instincts will be more likely to sur- |
s'
-"1
vive. The hypothesis of a specifically human moral sense, which decides 
between other instincts that we share with animals, is therefore un­
necessary and misleading. And when the further question of its anthro­
pological origin is raised without satisfactory answer, it becomes clear 
that it must be abandoned.
There is therefore an identity between certain human values, or 
the preference for some - actions (such as altruistic act^ over others, 
and human appetites. In the same way that we have an appetite for food, 
comfort and sleep, so we have appetites drawing us toward non-selfish 
acts that tend to enhance the survival prospects of a number of individ­
uals. The nature and limits of this identity will be dealt with more 
adequately in chapter three.
Biological imperatives
This view of the evolutionary emergence of values admits the pos­
sibility of constructing a naturalist theory of ethics. The naturalist 
can solve the problem of verifying moral propositions by means of a def­
inition; if moral statements can be reduced to statements of empirical 
fact, then the logical problem of transition between 'is* and 'ought* is 
solved. The fact that statements about our own desires, feelings of 
approval, or revealed preferences are empirical makes possible a defin­
ition of morality in those terms.
The problem of naturalist interpretations has been the persistent
disagreement of philosophers on the definition itself. The naturalist
would seem unable to resolve this difficulty, and is therefore bound to
a strong relativism. This is part of Moore's attack on naturalism and 11naturalists. If the naturalist defines 'good' as meaning 'possessing 
certain natural characteristics which rouse feelings of approval in 
men', then he must recognize that 'good* as well as other normative 
terms depend upon human feelings and would be different if human feel­
ings were different, as they often are between societies or even between12individuals. Such a relativism is defensible, of course, as Monro 
and others would insist. Nevertheless, it may come as a relief to the 
relativist to learn that those 'feelings of approval* cannot be in­
finite in their range; that because men have evolved as a social species
  . I
and from a common ancestry, there is to be expected a measure of agree­
ment on matters of approval and disapproval. The agreement is hardly 
complete, but must be sufficient to maintain the human group as a func­
tioning entity. However, it does inject a certain objectivity into 
ethics, which is ultimately empirical.
Being interested in the limits of human feelings and preferences, 
we can use an ethological approach to help us understand them. This in­
vestigation of the animal equivalent of what we call 'values' in men 
will take up most of the chapters from chapter four to chapter eight 
below. From such excursions into comparative social psychology, we 
should be more able to discern how our own values are constrained by 
circumstances, and when we consider a number of societies much simpler 
than our own, it is possible for us to gain a much clearer impression 
of the functional nature of certain values and practices.
Only since the 1940s has such a review been possible. Darwin 
himself made some highly illuminating observations on animal social life, 
and had a notion that social practices form a functioning system in 
animal and human groups*, but research into the precise forms and con­
tents of animal behaviour did not really begin to be pursued system­
atically until the work of the ethologists Konrad Lorenz, Niko Tin­
bergen and their many successors. Today, studies of the social biology
of animals, particularly of our near relatives in the primate world,
13are multiplying explosively.
Philosophical utility of the approach
This brief summary of the theory and method which is the subject 
of the following chapters calls for some small comment on the value of 
the theory itself to moral discourse and philosophy.
Clarity demands that the distinction between first-order moral 
discourse and second-order moral philosophy should be kept in mind. A14moralist who engages in the former is someone who (in Hudson's • words)
"engages in reflection, argument or discussion about what is morally 
right or wrong, good or evil. He talks about what people ought to do,"
A moral philosopher, on the other hand, thinks and talks about the 
way this language of morality is itself used, and about what people are
10 ' •'
actually doing when they deliver moral judgements. Both groups are given1<useful ammunition hy the ethological approach, Some of this can be 
described in outline below.
(a) The limits of moral debate
As far as the first-order moralist is concerned, the analysis is 
useful because it suggests possible limits to human morality. Human 
nature being what it is, there are a number of actions which we are un­
likely to perform, since to do so would disrupt the fabric of our social 
life and would reduce our selective advantage, and such disruptive be­
haviour has been displaced from our behavioural repertoire under the 
pressure of natural selection.
Consequently there are certain messages in the approach for those 
moralists who build ideal systems on conceptions of human nature that 
are scanty in their empirical content^or even completely erroneous.
For instance, it can be shown, after an examination of the ethological 
evidence, that certain tendencies normally considered to be unsociable - 
aggression or envy, say - do in fact have an important social function 
on some occasions. It is a credit to Kant that he recognized this, and 
to Adam Smith and Adam Ferguson that they were able to found a complete 
sociology on desires normally regarded as ’u n s o c i a b l e ' F o r  a more 
accurate picture of the importance of these 'unsociable desires', an 
ethological approach would seem to be of importance to moral philo­
sophy .
(b) Moral psychology
The approach, as has been said, gives us an insight into the 
source and function of the moral sense or conscience. Knowing how it 
arises and how it works, we may also begin to understand in which cir­
cumstances it can mislead us and what, if any, authority it has over us.
How the call of conscience may depend on other environmental or social 
conditions is another question which the ethological approach could 
help us to settle, since there is evidence that animal social behaviour 
can be changed radically depending upon such conditions, and that be­
haviour which would be conducive to survival in one set of circumstances 
would be detrimental in another.
11 ^
(c) Probability of outcomes
The theory provides us with a rough estimate of the outcomes of 
various actions under various c o n d i t i o n s F o r  example, we know that 
laboratory rats and other species in overcrowded conditions will often 
fight to the death until there are only one or two left. Under the 
crowded conditions, the normal moral inhibitions against attacking con- 
specifics break down. If we suspect that overcrowding in human beings 
would follow a similar general pattern, we would have a new basis for 
evaluating ethical codes which treat overcrowding identically to other 
conditions. Furthermore, if we thought that under overcrowded con­
ditions, violence and killing were as inevitable in our own species as 
they appear to be in others, then we would have an argument against 
moral codes which precipitate such conditions; were it possible to 
show that a proscription on contraception generated those conditions 
and made the violence inevitable, then we would have a powerful argu­
ment against that proscription, for example.
(d) The content of morality
By comparing values in different human societies, and those ap­
petites and drives which are akin to human values in animal societies, 
it is possible to delineate certain universal or minimum values, which 
appear to be necessary for the survival of the societies themselves.
The value of the ethological approach in this context is that it enables 
us to distinguish between those fundamental traits and others which con­
fuse our view of the fundamentals and cause us to generate mistaken 
ethical systems. For example, early studies in comparative ethics were 
overcome by the apparent diversity of ethical systems in human societ­
ies, and so assumed that an infinite range of moral action was possible; 
it is only with the development of a method which extracts the pattern 
of the functions of moral rules from the confusing array of less im­
portant practices that a functional similarity between the moral prac-
19tic es of human groups can now be distinguished.
The practical contents of moral systems do not necessarily corres-20 21pond with the guesses of some philosophers such as Warnock or Hart 
which are speculative and not empirical. Hence, the ethological ap­
12
proach may provide some important evidence on the subject of the mini­
mum content of morality, and some arguments against the purely formal22view of ethics taken by, say, Hare. This would be an interesting con­
tribution to the modern ethical debate.
(e) The source of moral obligation
The approach explains that the source of moral obligation is not a ' 
function of any non-natural property of 'goodness' which exists in cer­
tain things, but that it derives from our own biological disposition 
to pursue some ends and shrink from others, a disposition evolving over 
generations of natural selection. Some explanation can thus be given 
to the fact, which puzzled Bishop Butler and certain of his contempor­
aries, that self-interest is frequently coincident with traditional 
moral virtues. The process by which such coincidence occurs does not 
necessarily reflect the workings of a divine power, as Butler supposed, 
but the quite natural pressure of evolutionary selection.
When we understand the source of obligations, then we can recog­
nize what facts can be appealed to for the sanction and authority of 
our obligations. Under this heading, rather sweeping criticisms of the 
rational Social Contract theory follow from the ethological analysis. 
That non-rational groupings of individuals are possible, and indeed 
common, suggests a non-rational source of obligations and duties, a 
source which is prior to, and transcendent over, any written or agreed 
Social Contract. As we shall see, this difference in source enables us 
to make a criticism of legal positivism and leads to some major differ­
ences in the prescriptions for social policy derivable from the rational 
and non-rational systems.
(f) Questions of justice
Justice is one more construct which is founded deeply in human
nature, and cannot be considered without some reference to human nature,
even in Rawls's Theory of Justice, which is intended to be as value-23free as possible. The ethological approach, which in contrast to 
Rawls's work, is solidly empirical, reveals some unexpected facts about 
certain human characteristics normally associated with justice; for ex­
ample, that inequality can be vital to the functioning of certain social
13
groups, that punishment is an integral part of such functioning systems, 
that differences in obligations can be paired with differences in rights 
in many functioning systems, and that these differences can proceed from 
acquiescence as well as by force. Social Contractarians may have dif­
ficulty in accepting some of these conclusions. In addition to the 
points mentioned, the ethological approach and the application of a 
small dose of genetic theory can give us an understanding of how factors 
such as age and sex are important for judging the social and moral act­
ions appropriate in given circumstances.
(g) The resolution of relativism and objectivism
If evolution has left men as part of a functioning system of norms 
of conduct, then there are certain limits to the bounds of human action 
and possibly human belief. Understanding this is a contribution to the 
debate between relativists and others. It saves the relativist from
being completely unable to criticise those moral systems which are not
his own by allowing him a criterion of functionality. He is able to 
ask, 'is this moral system the most efficient one for achieving the aims 
of those who practise it?* and he can appeal to ethological evidence for 
his answer. The objectivist, on the other hand, will realize that cer­
tain 'objective' norms are required for the survival of the moral sys­
tem, but the ethological evidence suggests that the form of expression 
of these norms is much less important than their functional content.
Therefore, the objectivist will be able to admit some flexibility in his
ethics without losing the force of his position, and may thus be -- 
brought somewhat closer to a relativist standpoint,
(h) Cooperation between philosophy and biology 24"Scientists and humanists," says Edward 0. Wilson, "should con­
sider together the possibility that the time has come for ethics to be 
removed temporarily from the hands of the philosophers and biologicized.” 
The statement is symptomatic of the overvaunting belief of many biol­
ogists that they are in certain respects more able to study ethical 
questions than philosophers; and yet, the attempts by some of them, 
such as Hamilton^-^ and Maynard S m i t h h a v e  been somewhat unsatisfying 
from a philosophical standpoint, as criticism in chapters two and three
14
will serve to show. If there is to he a full appreciation of the bound­
ary between biology and ethics, it must be a joint enterprise, as Raph­
ael points out, with philosophers setting out the points of interest 
and biologists showing how they can be treated as evolutionary con­
structs. There is scope for cooperation to mutual advantage, a potential 
which is not being realized at present.
FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER ONE
1. The term 'group' is not used here in its strict biological mean­ing of a subset of a 'society* with certain characteristics,, (for definitions, see Edward 0. Wilson, Sociobiology, Part I, Chapter 2) but in a loose way for ease of explanation. Here, the term covers almost any social aggregation of whatever size and rel­ationship, but in chapter two, the definitions will be sharpened.
2. Hume, Treatise of Human Nature, Book III, Part II, Section II.Sir Solly Zuckerman is credited with the first unifying theory of primate social aggregation when he hypothesized that sex was the principal agent (see Zuckerman, The Social Life of Monkeys and Apes). With respect to human beings, Hume seems to have antici­pated him. Today, however, these unifying theories of social life are generally regarded as inadequate; the binding force of social life is multidimensional. See Ardrey, The Social Contract, chapter 1, and Lancaster & Lee (I965),
3 . Smith, for example, approaches a theory of natural selection of moral traits in his Theory of Moral Sentiments. On this question, see the excellent paper by Coase (1976).
4. This important distinction will be elaborated in chapter 2, See also the comments of Hayek, The Theory of Complex Phenomena.
5 . For example, between Lehrman (1953) Lorenz (I966) .
6. This point is overlooked in the approaches of most geneticists.CL Hamilton (197O), Maynard Smith (1964).
7 . Hart, The Concept of Law, chapter 9, for instance,
8. Frank Fraser Darling, A Herd of Red Deer.
9 . C.S.Lewis, Mere Christianity, chapter 1.
10. (a) In less recognizable form, it can be seen as far back as Plato's division of the soul in The Republic, in which the Reason (but also, to a lesser extent, the Spizit) is alleged to have a moral-choice function.
(b) in this chapter, 'instinct' is used as a shorthand expression to cover any permanent part of human nature, not merely that part which is genetically determined.
11. The classic statement is G.E.Moore, Principia Ethica.
12. D.H.Monro, Empiricism and Ethics, chapter 10.
13. Lionel Tiger, Men in Groups, chapter 2^  expands on this point,
14. W.D,Hudson, Modern Moral Philosophy, chapter 1.
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15. Much of the work which has served to "bring the su"bject to the attention of the public is of a first-order sort, in the writings of popular authors such as Ardrey, Morris and Lorenz, Even those authors, however, set down far less first-order material than has been alleged by their critics (such as Montagu, Man and Aggression)
1 6. See chapter 11, below. On Kant, see his 'Idee zu einer allgemein- en Geschichte in Weltburgerlicher Absicht' (idea of a Universal History from a Cosmopolitan Point of "View), in Berliner Monats- schrift, November 1784, pp.386-410, quoted by W.H.Walsh, 'Kant',The Encyclopaedia of Philosophy (London: Macmillan, I967) vol.4. Also quoted in W.H.Walsh, An Introduction to Philosophy of History, chapter 6, page 123, and by Eibl-Eibesfeldt in Ethology, chapter 20. Adam Smith's opinions are stressed in his Wealth of Nations; further quotation from these sources can be found in chapter 11 below. For Ferguson's view, see his Essay on the History of Civil Society. Perhaps the original contribution to this line of thought was that of Bernard de Mandeville, in his Fable of the Bees.
1 7. This is the main thesis of Wynne-Edwards* s Animal Dispersion in Relation to Social Behaviour, which prompted a great deal of bio­logical speculation on the mechanisms of group and kin selection.
18. This point is made by Raphael (1958).
1 9. On these techniques of so-called 'pattern analysis', see Walter Goldschmidt, The Ways of Mankind and Exploring the Ways of Mankind.
20. Cf. Geoffrey Warnock, Contemporary Moral Philosophy, chapter V , sections (ii) and (iiijl
21. H.L.A.Hart, The Concept of Law, chapter IX, section 2.
22. R.'M.Hare, The Language of Morals, sections 1 and 2.
23. For a piercing critique of Rawls along these lines, see Warnock's essay 'Kant and Anthropology* in R.S.Peters (ed.). Nature and Con­duct.
24. Edward 0. Wilson, Sociobiology, chapter 27.
25. W.D,Hamilton (1970) is perhaps weakened by concentration on gen­etic transmission through kinship \^ see note 6 and text above).
26. John Maynard Smith (1964); although transmission of characteris­tics through kinship is important, so is selection of groups of individuals which are not necessarily closely related but whose behaviour is integrated. Another approach which is unsatisfying to the philosopher is the 'reciprocal altruism’ notion of Trivers (1971) and others. Although highly instructive, the approach is based on a one-dimensional view of morality and is therefore weak­ened.
27. Raphael (1958).
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Chapter 2
THE EVOLUTION OF SYSTEMS OF BEHAVIOUR
"Those groups practising the most advantageous customs will have an advantage in the constant struggle with adjacent groups."
Sir Alexander Carr-Saunders^
To portray the mechanism of the natural selection of social be­
haviour is no mean task, since it operates on so many levels. The 
first target of selection is, of course, the individual, and it is in 
terms of the differential survival of individuals that the theory of 
evolution is most commonly understood. Nevertheless, there are other 
levels; closely related kin, because of their sharing some similar 
genes, can also be taken as a unit upon which evolutionary selection
operates. Where the frequency of genes shared by common descent in2relatives is selected, we may speak of kin selection. On an even 
larger scale, a breeding population may be the unit of selection, that 
is, a local population in which breeding is random (and therefore 
where notions of 'kinship* do not really apply to most members of the 
population). In this case, where the populations survive or colonize 
at different rates depending upon their different genotypes,* interdemic* 
or*interpopulation*selection is the normal label. The situation becomes 
even more complicated when one allows the possibility that transmission 
processes other than the genetic are possible, and that learning or 
cultural factors influence the behaviour of groups or populations.
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Selection can also be seen to operate at the level of species or even 
clusters of related species, although the working of such a process is 
slow and depends on changing conditions over time. This process is, 
however, of less importance to the evolution of moral and social be­
haviour. ^
There is no clear line of division between kin selection and 
interpopulation selection; anywhere between about ten and about one 
hundred members are the upper limits of family size (and therefore kin 
selection) for most species. In social insects, of course, the whole 
colony is related and might number many hundred individuals. In the 
primates most closely related to man, however, related groups number 
only between ten and twenty individuals in general; beyond that limit, 
the kinship unit begins to split apart and new units are formed.
4The notion of group selection was introduced by Darwin in The 
Origin of Species to account for an observation of "special difficulty, 
which at first appeared to me insuperable, and actually fatal to my 
whole theory," namely, the existence of sterile worker castes of social 
insects. These individuals leave no offspring, so how can they have 
evolved? To salvage his theory, Darwin introduced the clever hypothe­
sis of selection working at the family level. "Hence we may conclude," 
he remarks, that slight modifications of structure or of instinct, 
correlated with the sterile condition of certain members of the com­
munity, have proved advantageous; consequently the fertile males and 
females have flourished, and transmitted to their fertile offspring a 
tendency to produce sterile members with the same modifications,"-^
For our purposes here, we should remember that the same principle will 
hold if we substitute 'altruistic* or 'self-sacrificing' for Darwin's 
'sterile'. That is, that the selection of a family unit may be con­
trary to and more powerful than the selection of individuals, and hence 
that it is perfectly possible for altruism and other moral character­
istics to emerge under evolutionary pressure.
The logic of evolution and group selection
The modus operandi of this selection can perhaps be understood 
most easily if we consider first an abstract situation of hypothetical
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organisms and groups of organisms before moving on to consider the sel­
ection of actual kinship groups in terrestrial species. It may come as 
a surprise that such an abstraction is possible, because the theory of 
evolution is so often depicted as an assertion about the historical de­
velopment of earthly species. This is, however, merely one application 
of the theory to particular events on Earth, and not the 'theory of 
evolution* itself.^ For the study of ethics, this distinction is of 
importance; fraudulent claims for the historical inevitability of cer­
tain social systems, such as the claims of Needham or in a weaker form,
De Chardin, rest upon the confusion of the theory with its application 
to terrestrial history.
The theory of evolution is based on a very simple hypothesis, namely 
that "a mechanism of reduplication with transmittable variations and 
competitive selection of those which prove to have a better chance of 
survival will in the course of time produce a great variety of struc­
tures adapted to continuous adjustment to the environment and to each 
other." Those 'structures' may be organisms, or groups of organisms, 
quite unknown to us on Earth, provided that they are the products of the 
mechanism of reduplication with transmittable variations specified in 
the theory.
Take, for example, a collection of individuals which can be so 
described. They could even be self-replicating machines, and not living9creatures at all. For the moment, it does not matter how their be­
havioural characteristics are transmitted, although it may be noted that 
transmission must be from individual to individual. Selection, however, 
we will take to be a function of the efficiency of the behaviour of the 
group as a whole, which we might describe as the social 'pattern'.
From this abstract example, several general comments on the relation 
between individual action and group performance emerge.
Firstly, it can be seen that the individuals may be unaware of the 
social pattern they produce, and may be unaware of the restrictions on 
or constancies in their own actions which are generated through the 
pressure of group selection upon them. In colonies of social bees, for
20
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example, it is unlikely that each worker has a conception of the over­
all state of the hive and works to improve that end. True, some in­
formation about what tasks need to be done is transmitted through the 
hive by secretions on food particles,but this does not constitute 
individuals' knowledge of the state of the whole. Similarly, we can 
assume that individual members of the defensive formations of starlings,
where the flock can be very large, or of herd animals such as bison or 12musk oxen have no awareness of the whole formation, but respond to 
the immediate environment in a way which produces the formation. Under 
the pressure of selection, it is unnecessary that the individual should 
be aware of the overall nature of such formations.
For ethics, this point suggests three conclusions; first, it is 
possible that we are equipped with a morality which is conducive to the 
survival of groups rather than the individual, but that we might be un­
aware of the pattern produced by what seems to us to be specific rel­
ations between individuals only. Second, it is likely that our moral 
conduct is, in general, limited; that there are certain activities that 
evolution has selected against in us because of their disruptive nature 
when taken as part of the social pattern. Hence, even activities which 
we might believe to be moral may be outside the power of most men to 
perform and may, indeed, generate quite unforseen consequences. Third, 
the adequacy of conventional morality to.support the survival of groups 
of individuals should be noted. Even where conventional morality is 
strange and confusing to us, in the moral sy stems of primitive human 
communities, for example, it may produce a social pattern which is in 
continuous adjustment with the environment, though it would have
been difficult for us to trace the pattern from the individual actions, 
and even though it might be impossible for us to formulate new codes. 
of individual action which would fulfill the same function so efficiently. 
This is, perhaps, an argument against an over-vaunting confidence in our 
construction of moral systems.
The second point to notice in our abstract example is that the 
social pattern is not necessarily the conscious aim of the individual. 
There might well be "establishments, which are indeed the result of
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13human action, hut not the execution of any human design," as Adam 
Ferguson called them. As an example, one might take the successive 
wearing of a path by persons whose sole objective is to walk from one 
point to another. The operation of the stock-market, which is an effic­
ient system for the transference of property and the equation of supply 
and demand, is possible only through the personal interest motives of - 
hundreds of individual stockbrokers and their many thousand clients.
Or again, in the economy as a whole, Adam Smith's famous dictum is 
appro pri ate, that:
It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own self-interest. We address ourselves not to their self- love, and ng^er talk to them of our own necessities but of their advantages.
This point deserves some further comment, because it is in direct 
opposition to the methodology of Hobbes and of the Cartesian rationalism 
which dominated much seventeenth-century thought. It is, Indeed, still 
assumed widely today that orderliness or pattern in social activities 
is impossible without conscious control and without the individuals who 
make up that pattern cooperating for the good of the whole. Nor is the 
mistake an old one. The sophists of the fifth century B.C. had con­
sidered the problem and had mistakenly concluded that practices and in­
stitutions must be the products either of nature (physei) or due to 
artificial convention (thesei), with no third alternative. Through his 
acceptance of this dichotomy Aristotle laid the foundations of an error 
which confounded European thought for two millènia and^  made impossible-- , 
a social theory which took account of the unintended regularities often 
found in human societies. Those foundations were rebuilt principally 
by Bernard Mandeville, in his Fable of the Bees^^ where each individual 
acts out of motives of greed and narrow self-interest, and yet finds 
that his actions are.part of a functioning social^pattern which benefits 
the bee-hive as a whole. Unwittingly, these 'knaves* are 'turned 
honest*, since The worst of all the multitude Did something for the common good. -
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A more extensive and rigorous treatment of the subject, however, is
found in the works of Hume, Montesquieu, Tucker and particularly in
low18
17Smith and Ferguson. Modern forms of the principle have been set d n
by Carl Menger, Friedrich Hayek and in economics, Friedman and others.
It is being widely recognized in animal social biology.
This point is of importance to philosophy, since it demonstrates 
the inability of rationalist constructivism to arrive at a social 
theory that accommodates a satisfactory criterion of justice. Perhaps 
the most dominant school of thought in jurisprudence at the moment is 
legal positivism, the doctrine that all rules of justice are a product 
of design and of conscious human invention. Indeed, such theories seem 
to have the greatest difficulties with ’natural law’ and allow it only 
the most moderate mention in their e n q u i r i e s F r o m  their position 
that a law creates justice, and is wholly the deliberate action of a 
legislator, our concept of justice is eroded; for what the legislator 
deems to be just, is just, and what he deems to be unjust, is unjust. 
Such a philosophy forgets that the whole authority of legislation rests 
upon a prior set of beliefs and conceptions about justice, accepted 
within the community and not necessarily the products of rational re­
flection or design. The development of laws which embody this non­
ratio nal justice, the interpretation of laws and criticism of laws on 
grounds of justice would become quite impossible without this found­
ation, - ' . .
Furthermore, the possibility of there existing social patterns 
widely accepted as being for the benefit of the members of the pattern, 
but which are founded on Individual actions of self-interest (like 
those of Mandeville's bees)^ forces us to acknowledge the possibility 
that similar 'unsociable' or 'immoral' tendencies may in fact serve a 
function greater than the individual. Accordingly, it may be impossible 
for us to discuss moral rules and moral acts without reference to the 
social pattern they produce, and such discussion will require some 
understanding of the elements of human nature as revealed through the 
ethological method. In any social order corresponding to that of our
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abstract model, individual action is not a function solely of relations 
between individuals, but it is in some way related to the outside en­
vironment, however indirectly and abstrusely. Moral relations will, like 
any part of social activity, have this external component, and therefore 
cannot be described with reference only to other individuals.
The third point to emerge from the model is that the social pat­
tern is formed by the multifarious actions of all the members of the 
society, and that those actions can be motivated only through appetites 
and drives acting on individuals. For the regularity of a whole society 
to emerge, there is no requirement that the action of the individual 
members of the society should itself be regular or uniform. To take the 
example of bee colonies again, the tasks performed by any individual 
worker change over its lifetime; its role in the society is a function
of many stimuli operating upon it and also of its particular age and20sex.
Similarly in ethics, it does not necessarily require the uniform 
or regular action of individuals for a social pattern that is capable 
of surviving to come into being. The actions guiding individuals must 
be complementary, not necessarily uniform. Attempts to devise a soc­
iety founded on uniform moral rules with respect to determinants like 
age, sex, or status (that of Bawls, for example, ) may therefore 
have no practical content because of their inability t o describe func­
tioning wholes.
The fourth point worthy of note is that the survival of the group 
will depend on external environmental conditions and the ability of 
its members to act appropriately to these conditions. Therefore, dif­
ferent responses by the members may be required under changed environ­
mental conditions. Furthermore, the adjustment of the whole group to 
the environment will also depend on each of its members acting approp­
riately to the behaviour of the other members.
Where morality is concerned, this principle suggests that different 
moral actions may be required under different external circumstances, 
and that the appropriateness of one action will depend upon the actions 
of other members of society. This may seem a trivial observation, but
 ^ - 2^ ‘
it rejects the possibility of uniform moral rules that are applicable 
in every set of circumstances.
Group selection in real-world societies
So far we have been considering the relationship between individual
action and the social pattern of actions in a hypothetical group of
self-duplicating structures, where the unit of selection is the group
as a whole. Some rather general observations have been made upon22that part of their action constituting 'morality', Now it is time 
to consider group selection in terrestrial species: what it is, how it 
comes about, what patterns of action emerge and how they are transmitted 
through the generations.
Here we will consider what has been called interdemie or inter­
population selection, where the unit of selection is a set of or­
ganisms of the same species and occupying a clearly limited space at 
the same time. Naturally, kinship and individual selection will be 
going on simultaneously, but our task here is to extract the principles
of interdemic selection alone. Study of interdemic selection with re-
23spect to moral behaviour was really begun by J.B.S .Haldane, although .he 
overlooked the importance of differential population extinction in the 
establishment and survival of moral traits ; that step was left to the2kecologist Kalela and its elaborations were documented by Wynne-Edwards. 
The latter's contribution. Animal Dispersion in Relation to Social Be­
haviour, is a series of illustrations of the theory that animals sacri­
fice individual interests, personal survival and fertility rates in 
certain circumstances where this is required for the survival of the 
group, particularly for the control of population growth in the light of 
a fixed food supply.
The concept of interdemic selection in animals must be approached 
in the knowledge that there are two circumstances in which extinction 
of a population is most likely. These are when a colony is being 
founded, which biologists call 'r-extinction' and when an established 
population is in danger of exhausting the scarce resources upon which 
its life depends - 'K~extinction'. In the former case, communal defence
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and foraging, and other measures which increase the average fertility of 
group members will be the most important factor in selection. In the 
latter case, however, the opposite is true; restraint by individuals 
upon their fertility rate and use of resources will be at a premium. 
Selfish behaviour tending to reduce the reproductive capacity of the 
group may even be selected, provided that it is not sufficiently incap- . 
acitating to engender population collapse. According to Wynne-Edwards, 
appropriate behaviour under such conditions may include the abandon­
ment or killing of offspring as well as the purely individual sacri­
fices of reduction in fertility or migration, for example.
As for the general traits which we might expect interdemic selec­
tion to produce, a mechanism for the avoidance of population crashes, 
or indeed of any major population fluctuation, would be expected, and 
it is one of the firm tenets of Wynne-Edwards's theory that successful 
species do indeed show social-behaviour which tends to keep such fluc­
tuations to a minimum, thus preserving the continuous adjustment of the 
population to environmental conditions in a 'homeostatic' system. In­
stances of particular behaviour patterns which constitute this general 
mechanism will be discussed in chapters four and five below.
Does the theory of interdemic selection have any application to 
real species? What are the conditions for it to occur? Are those con­
ditions easily achieved in terrestrial species? These questions can be 
answered satisfactorily only, upon application of advanced techniques in 
population genetics; the presentation of those techniques is beyond our 
scope here. Nevertheless, at least two of the most extensive theoretical 
models are agreed that the conditions for the evolution of what might be 
called an 'altruist gene' are fairly precise. They are, firstly, that 
in order for the altruism (or any characteristic promoting group sur­
vival) to become predominant in a population, most of the competing 
populations are likely to become extinct. Secondly, the rates of ex­
tinction of competing populations in terms of populations per gener­
ation must be comparable with the rate of individual selection in terms 
of individuals per generation in order for the group selection to out­
weigh the effect of the opposing individual selection. Thirdly, popu--
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lations must be partially isolated from others, so that the 'altruism' 
genes are not wasted on other populations, and so that the altruistic 
population is not corrupted by intrusions of non-altruistic characterist­
ics from other populations. Although these conditions appear stringent, 
it is likely that they have applied to the historical selection of many 
terrestrial species. Certainly, the condition that breeding populations 
should be partially isolated from others is "commonly and indeed norm­
ally found in animals" according to Wynne-Edwards. Salmon or trout
returning to their natal streams, is an illustration of breeding iso-27lation. The learned 'dialects' of bird-song or the dialects and 
languages of human populations are other factors promoting breeding iso­
lation.
Kin selection
Another way in which moral attributes may be selected is the pro­
cess of kin-selection. If a population contains related members, then 
these relatives share some of their genes, and were they to cooperate 
in. such a way that one or two individuals suffered a diminution in fit­
ness, but the genes common to them in other members of the kinship 
group were to be improved in fitness as a result, then genetic charac­
teristics of the sacrificed individuals would continue in subsequent
generations and their bearers would increase in number. Hence, as28Hamilton has pointed out in a number of important articles, the in­
clusive fitness of a kinship group, that is, the sum of the individual's 
fitness plus the fitness of the portion of his genetic constitution 
shared with relatives, is more important to the survival of any gene 
than the individual fitness of the principal bearer of that gene.
In the absence of inbreeding, an animal and its brother have half 
their genes An common; an uncle has one quarter in common; first cousins, 
one eighth, and so on. If an individual who left no offspring were to 
increase the fitness of others at the expense of his own fitness - which 
we call altruism for our purposes here - then he would have to increase 
his brother's fitness twofold, his uncle's fourfold and his cousin's 
eightfold to equal the loss of his own extinction. If his sacrifice 
improves the fitness of his relatives by more than these amounts, then 
the inclusive ■ fitness of the kinship group is raised, and the survival
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of the genetic basis of that altruistic trait is made more likely, 
since (it can be assumed) many of the genes shared by the individual 
and the relatives whose survival he promotes will be the ones that 
encode the self-sacrificing traits themselves.
Here again it may be seen that we have an evolutionary model to 
explain the existence of moral characteristics. Although the bio­
logists and geneticists have kept their version of the model artifici­
ally simple, dealing only with the single trait of 'altruism*, it 
would be no overwhelming task to extend the analysis to cover other 
moral traits -and values in addition to this single one. That would 
seem to be a prime objective for future dealings between philosophers 
and biologists.
Nevertheless, the kinship selection model is troubled with a cer­
tain weakness. An altruistic individual need not necessarily be able 
to calculate exactly the proportion of genes shared by him and relatives 
before he makes a sacrifice for their benefit - this we have seen in 
the abstract evolutionary model described above, where it is the per­
formance of the whole system which is important for selection, and 
not the recognition by an individual that he is a functioning part of 
that system. An individual need not know or be able to formulate the 
regularities of his action in order to function as a member of the 
social group. But for kinship selection, it would be necessary for an 
individual to be able to recognize his relatives and act appropriately 
towards them. In most species this may not be a problem, but biologists 
have questioned the appropriateness of kinship selection to certain 
animal aggregations or flocks.
For the moralist, there is another problematic feature of kinship 
selection; it suggests that nepotism, a general favouring of one's own 
blood relatives, is a necessary feature of the evolution of morality. 
Without nepotism, altruistic tendencies would not arise, according to 
those who believe in the primacy of kinship selection; and yet favour­
ing one's own relatives is, under certain circumstances at least, com­
monly regarded to be an 'immoral' characteristic. If it is indeed im­
possible to separate one from the other, then this model shows how far
28
our traditional moral notions may need revision.
It should he noted parenthetically that this mode of selection 
could favour selfish behaviour if the selfish individual enlarges his 
own fitness to an extent which more than compensates the loss of fit­
ness in his relatives. Unprovoked harm to non-relatives may also be 
selected under this mechanism, even though it might reduce the fitness 
of the individual perpetrator, provided that the fitness of a relative
is increased (for example, because there are fewer non-relatives around29to share scarce resources) by a more than compensatory amount. Exam­
ples of this latter behaviour, while common in humans, are very difficult30to find in animal societies,
A detailed application of the theory of ’selfishness' spread by 
kin selection is contained in Richard Dawkins's recent book, The Self­
ish Gene. His intentions are to displace the theory of interdemic se­
lection by explaining apparently cooperative groupings in terms of in­
dividual and kinship selfishness, and to demonstrate how these selfish 
tendencies come about. For example, he considers a society of doves.
Such a society will be highly susceptible to attacks from hawks. The 
hawks will be so successful, indeed, that they will increase in num­
bers much faster than the doves on whom they prey until the hawks largely 
dominate the doves, and a natural balance will be achieved when the 
proportion of doves to hawks is exactly that at which the dove popu­
lation sustains the appetite of their predators. Or in human societies, 
truthful individuals will be at the mercy of those who are prepared to 
lie for personal gain. Eventually, the liars and their lying descend­
ants will become relatively more successful because of their superior 
fitness. Their rise will stop at the point where the proportion of 
liars to truth-tellers is high enough that it becomes worthwhile to call 
someone's bluff. Thus, he concludes, selfish behaviour is strongly se­
lected; and while some social actions appear to be altruistic, this is 
no more than selfish individuals improving the inclusive fitness of 
their kin.^^
Were this principle to be valid for the evolution of human societ-
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les, it might seriously change our views on ethics; hut some arguments 
can he advanced to show that while kin selection undoubtedly does have 
a role in shaping the social behaviour of many terrestrials, inter­
demic selection based on purely altruistic traits is also possible. 
Dawkins seems to ignore the possibility that an increased proportion of 
'liars* in a population will diminish the fitness of the whole popula-' 
tion in contrast to populations which are, for one reason or another, 
more perfectly altruistic. The population with a high proportion of 
liars will suffer many difficulties because its members will not be able 
to rely on one another or make agreements with one another in confidence, 
whereas the altruists will have no such problems and will therefore tend 
to be more fertile. Secondly, one way purely altruistic populations 
could arise would be by descent from a single altruistic individual (or 
pair) under conditions of breeding isolation. It would not be difficult
for these populations to become established and to become an increasing32proportion of the species as a whole. Thirdly, Dawkins takes a one­
dimensional view of animal nature, and ignores the possibility that other 
characteristics may be selected along with his 'selfishness' and 'altru­
ism', One may_suppose that cooperative defence against selfish indi­
viduals is always present in altruistic individuals, in which case the 
'truth-tellers' in a population would take measures against the 'liars' 
or that the 'doves' have sufficient courage to ward off attacks by the 
'hawks', while remaining altruistic to each other. For the study of 
the natural selection of human morality, we can conclude that while Daw­
kins's principles no doubt apply to some extent, they are by no means 
a definite .substitute for the group selection mechanism.
Dawkins is unwilling to admit group selection as a possible mechan­
ism for the selection of moral traits partly because he feels that if 
a population were a unit of natural'.selection, then we should have to 
admit whole species, genera, orders and classes. If 'survival of the 
group' is acceptable, then what about 'survival of the vertebrates' or 
'survival of the mammals'. Fortunately, these jibes can be met without 
much difficulty. In the first place, the theory of evolution is about 
self-duplicating structures. 'Vertebrates' or 'mammals' are not a
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self-duplicating structure, since only the individual species within 
those categories can reproduce themselves, except in comparatively rare 
cases when fertile offspring are possible through inter-species mating. 
Although it may be possible to speak of 'mammals* displacing 'reptiles' 
over evolutionary time, it is really the various species of mammal and 
reptile which are the elements of change. The information about how to 
adjust to the environment that is encoded in each species cannot be 
transmitted to other species, so to apply the theory of evolution to 
larger categories than species is mistaken. In the second place, the 
rates of extinction of species, and the larger, arbitrary categories 
we divide nature into, are very slow compared with individual or popu­
lation extinction. Individual, kinship and interdemic selection are 
clearly the quickest and most effective way of duplicating or extinguish­
ing traits and their bearers, and will have much more force in shaping 
individual behaviour than any other sort.
The theory of reciprocal altruism
Kin selection theories will never be useful to the philosopher un­
til they depart from the uni dimensional view of animal nature we de­
tected in Dawkins's m o d e l , O n e  concept of evolutionary selection34-has been formulated by Robert Trivers and can be used to explain a 
wide number of moral traits even though it concerns moral action of 
a single sort.' .Trivers calls this action 'reciprocal'.altruism', with 
altruism being defined as behaviour that benefits another organism, not 
closely related, while'being apparently detrimental to the organism, 
performing the behaviour, benefit measured against a criterion of in­
clusive fitness. One human being leaping into a stream to save another 
would be an example.
Trivers asserts that under some circumstances natural selection 
favours these altruistic acts. If the chance of the drowning man act­
ually expiring were one half, while the chance of his rescuer drowning 
is much smaller, say one in twenty, and if the drowning man always dies 
when his rescuer does and always lives when his rescuer does, then in 
this singular case, the rescuer would have been at risk for no ad­
vantage to himself. But if the drowning man reciprocates at a future
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time, under comparable survival prospects, then each man will have 
traded a one-half chance of dying for a one-tenth chance, and each has 
benefitted. A population exposed to many such risks over the course of 
a lifetime would therefore enjoy increased genetic fitness if its mem­
bers are altruistic.
Failure to reciprocate ('cheating*) may be discriminated against 
in selection if cheating has later adverse effects, for instance, if 
altruists confined their altruism to other altruists or took severe 
action against the cheaters.
The principal conditions allowing this type of selection to occur 
are less stringent than those for interdemic selection. The length of 
the individual's lifetime is an important factor, since the greater the 
lifetime, the more chance of an individual needing assistance and being 
able to reciprocate for assistance given. Second, a low rate of dis­
persal during the lifetime of the individuals in a species will increase 
the chance of reciprocal altruism being possible. Third, a high degree 
of mutual dependence, since this will tend to keep individuals near each 
other, would have à similar effect. The degree of rationality possessed 
by members of a species may enhance reciprocal altruism, but selection 
would favour those populations showing the trait even where reasoning33and foresight were a b s e n t . T h e  emergence of moral characteristics 
and the performance of moral acts,, therefore,' is -not dependent -on the 
existence of any rational faculties.
As will be argued in chapter six, the conditions for the emergence 
of reciprocal altruism have been met in human evolution and it is 
reasonable to assume that this mode of selection has indeed been im­
portant to our own evolution. Given that assumption, we may follow 
Trivers and make the following predictions.
(1) Because cheating is of advantage to individuals, individual selection 
will encourage cheating, but group selection will favour a complex 
psychological system for the detection and elimination of such behav­
iour,
(2) Selection will favour our liking, and being more altruistic towards,
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individuals who are themselves altruistic. (in the human situation we 
can take 'altzuism' to cover many activities such as sharing of food and 
resources, cooperation in defence and at work, helping injured or in­
firm individuals, and many others). A number of writers from Darwin 
forth have recognized the importance of friendship in promoting recip­
rocal altruism, although it is not a prerequisite, as those writers be- • 
li eved.
(3) Hostility toward cheaters, attempts to change their ways through 
disapprobation, punishment, exile and the reward of altruism, will be 
selected.
(4) Emotions such as the sympathy which forms the base of Smith's Theory 
of Moral Sentiments, and gratitude for aid given, have been selected as 
part of the mechanism of reciprocal altruism, and motivate us to al­
truistic acts by becoming stonger when the plight of the recipient is
37the most dire.
(5) Guilt, if it deters cheating or prompts a cheater to change his 
behaviour towards altruism, may also have been selected as part of the 
system. So too with feelings of distrust for those who perform altru­
istic acts without the emotional basis of generosity, because the al­
truistic tendencies of such ..individuals may be less reliable in future.
(6) The establishment of friendships with strangers, if they enhance 
reciprocity, may be selected. (This cannot be accounted for in a purely 
kin-selection model of behaviour).
(7) The elaboration of norms of reciprocal conduct is possible through 
the use of language. Particularly, individuals may be expected to aid 
not merely those who have aided them before, but other members of the 
society in a complex entanglement of 'debts* and 'credits'.
(8) Learning and the development of emotions concerned with these debts 
and credits may be selected, since it contributes to the flexibility of 
the social arrangement.
(9) The strength of the altruism deemed appropriate to any individual 
is likely to vary according to physical qualities in. actor and pat­
ient. For example, young’individuals who represent a potential con­
tribution to fertility and future altruism, and chronically infirm in­
dividuals who are incapable of future altruism, may be treated quite
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differently.
(10) Although rationality, like language, aids the natural selection of 
a group in many ways, its emergence will be made more likely by the 
effects it has on making the system of reciprocal altruism a more effect­
ive instrument in the promotion of group fitness. If intelligent re­
flection enables us to perceive more accurately the costs and benefits 
involved in any proposed act of altruism, then it will help us to be 
able to raise the inclusive fitness of the group through appropriate 
action.
It can be seen that this analysis accounts for many subtle emotions 
associated with morality, including guilt, sympathy and what Trivers 
calls 'moralistic aggression' towards individuals who do not participate 
in the system of reciprocal altruism. Furthermore, Trivers's analysis 
can be extended to cover the practice of altruism over a whole popu­
lation, and not merely between individuals. If each of the individuals 
aided by an altruist incurs a 'debt' not only to the altruist (although 
point (2) above suggests that this bond will be stronger than most 
others) but to any other member of the population, then the same increase 
in inclusive fitness is enjoyed by those members. Indeed, in larger 
populations, the increase will be much greater if the 'debt' is due to 
all others as well as the altruist, because in the two-individual form 
of reciprocal altruism, the opportunity for reciprocation might be lim­
ited by the distance between the two individuals. Therefore, when taken 
in its broadest sense, the theory of reciprocal altruism can explain 
how complete social systems requiring altruistic behaviour on the part 
of their members can come into being through the forces of individual 
selection.
There is no reason why the theory should not be used to explain 
other features of social life besides the sharing and mutual aid which 
is included under the definition of altruism. Restraints upon personal 
conduct in many matters may be selected by this mechanism. Adherence to 
certain laws, for example, would be selected if the individuals observ­
ing them enjoyed greater fitness.. Not merely the tendency to aid others 
at some risk to one's own fitness, but the tendency to restrain cneself
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from harming others at the same risk would he selected. The obligation 
of promises, since they often increase the fitness of one individual at 
negligible risk to the other, will be selected as a principle of high 
value. Cooperation in many endeavours will be promoted by nature in pre­
cisely the same fashion.
The consequences of this theoretical model are remarkably similar 
to those emerging from the interdemic selection models. Each model 
has its limitations and its advantages, but it is fair to say that the 
reciprocal altruism model, extended as it has been here, gives us a 
clear explanation of the growth of morality within a group, and suggests 
that such growth can be remarkably rapid, moulded as it is by the emo­
tions of the actors and the emotional displays of other members of the 
population. The interdemic selection model, on the other hand, reminds 
us more strongly that it is the social order of actions which decides 
the fate of the individuals in a population,more so than their individual 
actions at any time.
Once more it must be stressed that the individual does not necessar­
ily act with any notion of the relevance of his action for the social 
pattern of actions. He will, for the most part, respond in his own 
way to particular local circumstances and to the behaviour of other in­
dividuals around him. If his actions promote the continuing adjustment 
of the whole population to the environment, then that population is more 
likely to survive and its members will enjoy increased fitness. If his 
actions disrupt the social pattern, then everyone will suffer reduced 
fitness. Nevertheless, his actions, like the operations of buyers and 
sellers in the market, may be purely selfish and still contribute to the 
stability and efficiency of the whole pattern.
Conclusion
These then, are the models we use to explain the emergence of moral 
actions under the pressure of natural selection. Selection of whole 
populations, selection of kinship groups and selection of individuals 
who act in certain regular ways are all possible. Often it would be im­
possible to separate out the effects of these various forces. Common 
to them all is the understanding that it is perfectly possible for a
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complex network of moral relations to be the product of evolution by 
natural selection. Each mechanism of selection - interdemic, kinship 
or individual - may pull in opposite directions from time to time. 
Certainly, the different mechanisms would seem to promote slightly 
different moral principles; kinship selection theory predicts nepotis- 
tic traits, interdemic selection theory predicts traits for breeding 
isolation and indiscriminate altruism within a breeding population, 
reciprocal altruism theory suggests complex moral mechanisms to pre­
vent non-reciprocation by individualso
The general nature of the theory of evolution by natural selection 
insinuates that the moral networks moulded by the various selection 
processes are no more than quantitatively different between animal and 
human societies, although in the latter case there is much more scope 
for complexity, given the reflective and calculating abilities of human 
beings. Nevertheless, if our species is indeed subject to evolutionary 
selection, then it is easy to believe that there are evolutionary limit­
ations upon the possible scope of our morality. Consideration of the im­
portance of such limits to the formulation of moral systems and the 
conduct of moral philosophy is unnecessary here, but will be developed 
more fully in chapters 10 to 14 inclusive.
One problem of this theory which should be resolved immediately, 
however, is that of the heady naturalism which it seems to entail, and 
which many schools of philosophy find disagreeable. If morality evolves 
through the natural selection of particular patterns of action and par­
ticular values within organisms, then our highest moral values assume 
a status akin to animal appetites. Questions of morality may therefore 
become mere questions of empirical description about what our values in 
fact are, and how they affect our 'perception* of the so-called 'non­
natural qualities' of good and evil. This naturalism will be described 
and defended in the following chapter.
36
FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER TWO
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2. The term was coined by John Maynard Smith (1964).
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4. This term can be used to cover selection of any unit greater than one individual.
5. Darwin, Origin of Species (1859) page 238.
6. Hayek, in 'The Theory of Complex Phenomena' discusses the importanceof this point. He notes that even Popper makes the confusion when he says that "the evolutionary hypothesis is not a universal law of nature but a particular (or, more precisely, singular) historical statement about the ancestry of a number of terrestrial plants and animals," (The Poverty of Historicism, p.10?) Since the first pub­lication of Hayek*s essay. Popper has repeated his comment, saying that "There exists no law of evolution, only the historical fact that plants and animals change, or more precisely, that they have changed," (Conjectures and Refutations, p.340) In a.more recent chapter based on a 196l lecture, however, he qualifies this view somewhat: "There are no Darwinian laws of evolution. In fact, it was Herbert Spencer who tried to formulate universal laws of evo­lution.. .. but they are vague, and... almost devoid of empirical content." (Objective Knowledge, p.26?)
7. Needham, History is on Our Side is a classic statement of such a mistake. See discussion of Needham inlAhtho'ny Flew.', Evo­lutionary Ethics, chapter III (iv), and of Needham and De Chardin in chapter nine, below.
8. Hayek, *The Theory of Complex Phenomena', section 5*
9. See L.S.Penrose, *Self-Reproducing Machines', Scientific American,
1959.
10. See M.Lindauer, Communication Among Social Bees, and discussion in Manning, An Introduction to Animal Social Behaviour.
11. Mohr (i960).
12. Tener (1954).
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21. A Theory of Justice; Rawls may not attempt to extinguish all human differences, but he makes a strong try.to'limit their effect.
22. The correctness of applying this term to animals is discussed in chapter five, below.
23. Haldane, The Causes of Evolution.
24. Kalela (1954, 1957).
25. These are the models of Levins (I97O) and Boorman and Levitt (1972, 
1973) . For these and other models see Wilson (1975) « By. ''altruism' here is meant the definition accepted among biologists, that is, behaviour Increasing the fitness of others while risking or dimin­ishing the fitness of the agent.
26. Reply to Maynard Smith in Nature, Aarch 14, 1964, page 1147.
27. Nottebohm.(1967)* See also Tinbergen (I951)» Manning (1967) and Thorpe (I961) for similar or related mechanisms of display leading to breeding isolation in birds,
28. W.D'.Hamilton. (1964, 1970, 1971, 1972).
29. Hamilton (l970) calls this 'spite'. For another model of the evo­lution of 'spite', see G.R.Price (197O).
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30. Hamilton (19?0) asks; ""why, if the model is correct, are more con­vincing examples of spite hard to find?" Wilson observes'that'"Examples of spite in animals may be rare and difficult to dis­tinguish from purely selfish behaviour.” (Sociobiology, p.119)
31. Dawkins gives many examples, but all are open to question. See, for example, my discussion of the defensive mechanism of the Thom­son's Gazelle, chapter five below.
32. For a model of the spread of a gene under these conditions, see Maynard Smith (1964).
33- Other biologists make the same mistake. Maynard Smith (1964) forexample, notes that avian breeding colonies are often regulated in number because the too-aggressive birds will spend time on acquiring and defending a territory, to the detriment of their young, while too-timid birds will be unable to defend a nest area sufficient to meet their need for food and space. Hence, he concludes, population "jcontrol such as this can be explained without recourse to group ;selection. However, it is possible that in every generation, agg­ressive and timid birds are bred, like the infertile worker castes {of bee colonies, because of the usefulness of their other qualities Jto the fitness of the group. Smith is confusing an individual's response to the social environment with individual selection. j
34. Robert L. Trivers, 'The Evolution of Reciprocal Altruism, ' The ]Quarterly Review of Biology, March 1971. j
35- Wilson (1975, page 120) notes that there are few examples of true jreciprocation in animal societies, partly because of short memories |and casual animal relationships. However, altruism between all 4members of a population is common in animals (see chapter five) |even where the animal lacks much intelligence,
36. See Darwin (I871), quoted in Williams (1966). See also Hamilton
(1969).
3 7. For studies of the dependence of gratitude and sympathy on the cost/benefit ratio of altruistic acts, see Gouldner (I96O). and Aronfreed, Conduct and Conscience.
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Chapter 3
VALUES AS CONSTRAINED BY EVOLUTION
"whatsoever is the object of any man's Appetite or Desire; that is it which he for his part calleth Good; and the ob­ject of his Hate, and Aversion, Evill... For these words.,, are ever used with relation to the person that useth them; there being nothing simply and absolutely so; nor any com­mon Rule of Good and Evill to be taken from the nature of the objects themselves." ^Thomas Hobbes
"The theory of group selection," says Edward 0. Wilson, "has
taken most of the good will out of altruism. When altruism is conceived2as the mechanism by which DNA multiplies itself through a network of 
relatives, spirituality becomes just one more Darwinian enabling de- 
vice." It would be timid to stop there, however*, for the theory of 
group selection also takes the metaphysics out of human values and fal­
lows them to be treated as empirical and biological facts. The-ethi­
cal naturalism implicit here requires some detailed supporting argu­
ments in view of prevailing philosophical opinions on the subject, but 
the usefulness of our being able to provide an empirical foundation for 
human values justifies the effort.
Values as an instance of appetite
The evolution of any structure depends upon its ability to remain 
in continual adjustment with the environment. In terrestrial species,
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the resources necessary for personal life (such as food and water) are 
obtained in quantities coimnensurate with the needs of the individual 
through his search for and acquisition of them according to internal 
drives or appetites. Other things necessary to maintain the continued 
life and adjustment of the species (such as sexual mating) are also 
acquired on the prompting of appetites. Not only the resources them­
selves, but the type of resource (the kind of food, for example) that. . 
an animal consumes is also moderated by appetites which - ignoring 
solipsistic objections for the purposes of this argument - we call 
'likes' or 'dislikes®. Avoidance of stimuli that are harmful to or­
ganisms is explained'by•emotions complementary to appetites which we 
often call 'aversions'. Likes, dislikes, appetites and aversions are 
subject to evolutionary selection, since the fitness of individuals 
and of groups,''■families and populations depends upon their acquisition 
of some resources and attraction to some stimuli, and upon their aver­
sion to others.
It is very commonly supposed that 'appetite* describes only the 
hedonistic, individual appetites of bodily comfort, food, thirst, 
sex, sleep and so on, and that 'aversion* describes only personal 
avoidance of material things. Where structures larger than a single 
individual are the units of natural selection, however, more complex 
appetites and aversions may emerge. For the survival of some popula­
tions, for example, individuals will have to be attracted not only to 
feeding, drinking and the like, but also towards cooperation in defence, 
care of infirm individuals, and other acts necessary to sustain the 
social pattern of the population. Similarly, individuals in some popu­
lations will have to be averse to selfish activities which would dis­
rupt the social pattern of actions and would diminish the selective4fitness of the population or society.
The likes and dislikes of individuals in human societies selected 
with respect to reciprocal altruism, for example, are complex indeed 
according to Trivers*s analysis. Liking persons who are themselves al­
truistic would be of selective advantage. Disliking those who are not 
altruistic or who do not reciprocate acts of altruism would also be se­
lected. Acts of altruism themselves will require the disposition, in
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individuals, to commit them. Selection should favour the detection of 
cheaters and the attempt through punishment or disapprobation to dis­
courage them, and it will favour the positive valuation of such attempts 
by other individuals. Those attracted towards cooperation with others 
in detection and punishment of cheaters will promote the fitness of the 
whole society by their efforts. Those averse to transgressing rules or 
norms which embody the recognized duties of each individual to act in 
altruistic ways will do likewise. All of these traits can be regarded 
as appetites and aversions without too much difficulty, although they 
are far removed from the simple somatic appetites and aversions we nor­
mally associate with the use of those terms. It appears, then, that 
there are desires which are 'sociable' in that they affect and promote 
the fitness of idividuals other than the agent, and that these are se­
lected in evolution along with the somatic appetites.
These complex tendencies can, of course, be in the self-interest of 
the agent. Where reciprocal altruism occurs, the altruist who rescues 
a drowning man at some personal risk is merely trading a small risk now 
for a large gain on some other occasion. Even in those species where 
the calculation of costs and benefits is impossible, the altruistic 
behaviour could be selected because of the increase in fitness it be­
stows on the individual. The difference between these tendencies and 
the somatic appetites, which we also regard as 'self-interested', becomes 
steadily more invisible. Those traits which we value most highly can be 
regarded as no more than the expression of tendencies implanted in us 
through the long process of natural selection.
We have to be somewhat careful about our use of language, however. 
There are clearly some actions which are not in the 'self-interest* of 
an individual as this is commonly understood, even though they are val­
ued by others, and even though individuals are drawn to their performance 
by powerful psychological forces that have been shaped by group selec­
tion, The soldier who, in Urmson's example^, accepts certain death to 
save his fellows, has not gained as an individual, although it may well 
be that the inclusive fitness of other individuals who share some of his 
genetic endowment is much increased, - Such actions cannot be properly
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regarded as 'self-interest'; they are moderated by group survival and 
not individual survival.
The concept that there are groups larger than the individual which 
are the basic units of altruistic actions is, of course, highly damaging 
to many social contract psychologies, particularly the egoistic psych­
ology of Hobbes. To the latter an acceptable excuse for giving alms to 
a beggar outside St.Paul's was that "it makes him pleas'd, and it pleases 
me to see him pleas'd." This psychology is esoteric, and was recognized 
to be extreme in its own time, since other individuals are regarded as 
mere data to be reckoned with in calculating the welfare of the self.
Even this extreme psychology supposes some connexion between the pleas­
ure of the beggar and the pleasure of Hobbes, so that Hobbes is driven 
to altruism even for selfish motives. But this hardly stands up to close 
scrutiny, Hobbes ignores the fact that we pursue our internal drives 
and motives, follow our values and affections, whatever they are called, 
simply because they are our drives and motives. We do not pursue them 
because we derive consequent pleasure or consequent avoidance of pain; 
pleasure and pain may be consequences of an action, but they are not to 
be confused with the motive force of the action itself in all circum­
stances, I cannot be said to enjoy my visit to the dentist, even though 
I know that it will spare me future pain; and I do not always act al­
truistically out of pleasure.
The sociable traits are, then, examples of motives that have been 
the objects of group selection,^ They are, of course, also those things 
upon which we place the highest valuation and esteem, and those values 
are in themselves a functional part of the selection process. -Group 
fitness would be imperilled if we did not value and strive toward some 
things and find ourselves repelled by others, including the relatively 
complex phenomena of social interaction and mutual assistance.
Moral judgements as relative
One question which must be settled (and to do so is the principal 
aim of this chapter) is whether human appetites, and statements about 
them, constitute good reasons for action. When appetite is taken in its 
limited form, then there will indeed be strong objection to any notion
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%that appetites can he so employed; it is difficult to see the morality 
of following one’s appetite for food when other people are hungry. But 
if we extend the term to cover personal valuation not merely of bodily %
necessities but also of social and moral actions which promote the wel- 
fare of a social group or population, then the case is very different.
Here, it seems that personal desires and social welfare could very well, 
be in complete harmony.
To reduce ethics to a field so dependent on relativistic prin­
ciples would, of course, be anathema to those who, from Plato's theory 
of Forms through Moore’s Principia Ethica, have made the mistake that 
normative terms signify the presence of non-natural qualities in the 
abstract nature of actions or things, and have busied themselves in at­
tempts to find out what these qualities are and how we 'perceive' them.
We can see, given the theory of group selection, that some agreement on 
moral questions is highly likely; successful societies will have a high 
measure of concurrence on moral issues because it is upon the regular­
ity and"reliability of moral actions that their life, to some extent, 
depends. If groups are to function smoothly, certain norms of indi­
vidual behaviour are necessary: societies in which social learning 
takes place will solidify these norms in the minds of their members 
through teaching and emulation, for if they did not, the social pattern
of actions would be disrupted and the fitness of the society would be 7diminished.
The existence of agreement on values does not mean the existence 
of incontrovertable qualities within objects and actions themselves, 
as a few detailed examples will show. For instance, with Aristotle,^ 
we know what is expected from 'a good knife* or 'a good soldier* or 
'a good midwife*. A good knife must be strong and keen, because it is 
the function of a knife to cut. A * good ' knife is. one which will be 
efficient when applied for this function. Similarly, a 'good soldier' 
must be courageous, disciplined and accurate with his aim, so that he 
too can perform his function efficiently. Likewise with other uses of 
the word 'good'. Note, however, that each of these evaluations of ob­
jects depends on a notion of efficiency, certainly empirical, with re-
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spect to the nominated end of the object. That end has to he speci­
fied before any judgement is possible. Yet individuals may disagree on 
what the standards appropriate to an object actually are. An army 
captain might be looking for a 'good sword' to use in a ceremonial 
parade, for example, in which case the normal qualities of sharp cut­
ting edge or strength will count for nought, and size, decoration and ' 
brilliance will be the ruling standards against which swords are 
judged.
Thus is it that in ethics there is no incontrovertible way to re­
cognize a 'good* action; the question is about what standards we choose 
to specify actions, and not (for.the most part) about how we measure an 
action against those standards when chosen. There may well be some 
general agreement through chance or through evolutionary necessity; but 
the estimation of moral goodness depends upon individual notions of the 
good. It is misleading to talk of normative principles as if they werejnon-natural 'qualities', because this suggests that they are wholly 
without relevance to the perceptual or evaluative constitution of the 
perceiver or valuer.
In fact, not even physical qualities enjoy this status, A simple 
example would be that of colour perception. By and large, there is 
agreement about what things are red, which are green, which yellow; but 
there are some people who are partly or wholly colour-blind and who say 
with full conviction that a certain object is red when the majority of 
others perceive it as green. When asked to pick out the green figuré 
from a field of red ones, they might be unable to do so; but the colour­
blind person would insist that there simply is not a green figure to be 
detected. Or perhaps on another test, he would insist that there simply 
is a difference between the colours of certain objects which other 
people cannot see. Can we they say that things are really red or really 
green in the light of such objections? Were the situation reversed, and 
were the colour-blind people in the majority, could normal people still 
insist that they were mistaken in their perceptions? Of course not, for 
our notions of perception are founded in convention, and what is conven­
tionally accepted become linguistically 'the correct' perception.of 
'the quality' of any object.
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Colour perception may be too easy a case to illustrate the ulti­
mate relativity of judgements of quality (physical or moral),and critics 
may argue that it would be impossible for men to disagree about other 
qualities, expecially the 'primary qualities' of figure, extension, mo-9tion, number and solidity. They would be wrong, because even these 
things depend upon the perceptual equipment of the perceiver. There is, 
a schoolboy game where you cross your fingers, close your eyes, and then 
feel the end of your nose with the crossed fingers. It is unnerving to 
find that it feels as if you have two noses instead of the familiar one. 
Or again, it is quite possible for a person to be mistaken about whether 
he is being pricked by two pencil-points or only one if the points are 
set about an inch apart and applied to a relatively insensitive part of 
the body, say the upper arm or t h i g h . W e r e  a particularly malevolent 
neurosurgeon to mix up our nerve-endings, we would probably remain com­
pletely confused about size, shape, number and motion for ever more. If 
he mixed up our optic nerves as well, we would find it even harder to 
say how many sides there were on a matchbox or how many noses we really 
did have. And were we to meet an individual whose perceptual equip­
ment was completely different from ours, say an alien creature, 
and were we able to communicate with him at all, which is doubtful, then 
we would find that his view of qualities we take to be definite would be 
novel and strange. His notion of number could be quite contrary to 
ours. He might see the most marked differences in snowflakes that we 
take to be identical. He might be unable to distinguish philosophy books 
from bananas, and may proceed to gorge himself on even the most indi­
gestible scholastic tomes.
The 'qualities' which we take to be in the nature of things are, 
then, dependent upon individual perceptive capacities, however similar 
those capacities may be. Ethical values likewise cannot be called 'non­
natural qualities' unless we remember that they do not derive from any 
unimpeachable a priori characteristics inherent in actions or objects 
themselves.
On what seems altogether inconceivable
Some characteristics we recognize as being quite distinct and in-
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admissible as a definition of others. The colour ’green', for example, 
cannot be used to desribe 'white' or 'red*, nor can it be described in 
terms of those colours. To attempt to make a definition of one such 
characteristic in terms of a different one would be what Prankena 
calls the 'definist fallacy'The particular case of this fallacy of 
most interest to philosophers is, of course, the definition of ethical 
terms by non-ethical terms which G.E.Moore called the 'naturalistic fal­
lacy*, although it is by no means original to him,^^ An analysis of 
human ethics which attempts to describe moral actions and values in 
empirical, evolutionary terms must face this problem directly, and some 
brief remarks are appropriate here before we continue the question of 
whether some statements about appetites (and other nonmoral things) do 
in fact constitute a foundation for ethical action.
The naturalistic fallacy is less of a problem for real-life nat­
uralists than has been commonly supposed. In the first place, the fal­
lacy is not a logical one, but a material one. Not even a naturalist 
sets out to define one characteristic in terms of other characteristics 
which he recognizes to be different. Rather, he insists that when we 
examine both characteristics carefully, they amount to the same thing. 
Utilitarians, for instance, define 'good' as 'producing the greatest 
happiness*, and insist that there is no context in which the ethical 
term 'good* can be used without the new phrase 'producing the greatest 
happiness* being equally applicable and causing no change in meaning.
So when Moore says that ethical terms cannot be defined in terms of 
natural characteristics, he is putting forward a personal opinion, and 
not a logical contradiction. The naturalist will disagree with him 
and will insist that his own terms are. completely synonymous with the 
ethical term. Provided that he accepts all the consequences implicit 
in such synonymity, he is logically free so to do.
Furthermore, the formulation of the fallacy rests on the assump­
tion that the characteristics being confused are in fact different. But 
as we have seen from the consideration of apparently objective qual­
ities, the difference between any two characteristics rests upon the 
perceptual equipment of the perceiver. The colour-blind person may 
feel himself quite able to define one colour in terms of another, to
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take an example. For him, a statement such as 'red is a type of dark 
green' would he intelligible and would describe just what he perceived; 
or again, he might recognize a difference between two colours which most 
other persons detect as identical. Likewise in ethics, if a naturalist 
is convinced that there is an identity between two characteristics which 
non-naturalists have overlooked, then he is logically entitled to ex­
plain that identity. He is not making a mistake, necessarily; he is 
merely pointing to something which he claims others have overlooked or 
(like Moore) have excluded from consideration without sufficient cause.
Lastly, the objection of the 'naturalistic fallacy' does not fit 
most naturalists, as we have, seen, and it certainly does not cover the 
liind of naturalism developed here. For ethical terms are not simplist- 
ically defined in terms of a natural quality: rather, all ethical terms 
such as 'good' or 'ought' are deemed in this analysis to contain im­
plicit reference to the feelings of approval for the object or action 
which are experienced by the user of the term and possibly (depending on 
the scale of agreement between individuals) his audience. 'Good' is not 
held to stand for a simple quality, but for a complicated relation be­
tween objects or actions and individual appetites and aversionsbroadly 
defined. Therefore, it is quite possible to define 'good' in terms of 
a number of statements which contain a prescriptive element founded on 
principles which we, as human beings and products of natural selection, 
commonly recognize to be good reasons for action. Let us now go on to 
consider such possibilities.
Appetitive utterances and values
There is a revealing debate on the subject of whether certain
statements about human appetites do in fact constitute a good reason
for action. This is the discussion between Anthony Quinton in his
short but lucid and intelligent essay 'Ethics and the Theory of Evolu-13tion', and Anthony Flew in his book on the same subject,
Assuming the naturalist position, Quinton leads off by saying 
that if a thing is subject to an appetite, and is desired, then that 
constitutes a reason for pursuing it. So an 'appetitive utterance' 
about some object or action is not merely a description of empirical
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fact, but a reason for action. If I tell you, for instance, that of 
all the hotels in town, you will most enjoy the Red Lion, and if you 
believe that my advice is likely to be correct, then my statement, which 
is really a statement about your appetites and how they may be satis­
fied, would constitute a good reason for your staying there rather than 
anywhere else. My advice might even be couched in highly evaluative 
terms ; I might say that the Red Lion is the 'best* hotel, and provided 
that my terms 'best', 'good' or whatever have this appetitive portion, 
then they do have this prescriptive nature. At the same time, though, 
(says Quinton) they are statements of fact, because they are concerned 
with the facts of your particular appetites; and so the traditional 
dichotomy between normative and factual statements is broken and the 
naturalistic fallacy can be circumvented.
Examination of the debate between Flew and Quinton shows that it 
is possible to maintain this novel position, but reminds us that we 
have to be very careful with the naturalistic use of language if are 
to avoid replacing the unnecessary 'is/ought' dualism with an unworkable 
'schizophrenic monism*.
Quinton considers the situation in which you ask, "Where should I 
stay?" and are told "The Red Lion is the best hotel," meaning, roughly, 
that you will most enjoy the Red Lion or that the Red Lion will most 
effectively satisfy your desires. Therefore the statement "The Red Lion 
is the best hotel" does indeed afford you a reason for going to the Red 
Lion and not another hotel. But in reply. Flew claims that the facts of 
the case show that an 'appetitive utterance* such as "You will most en­
joy the Red Lion," which is contained in the statement "The Red Lion is 
the best hotel,” does not, in fact, constitute a reason for action. As 
evidence for this claim. Flew cites the various personal motives which 
might prevent or preclude action, "You may, for instance, not be able 
or willing to afford the best, just as you may have some special reason, 
moral or other, which forbids indulgence on this (or any other) occa­
sion. "
Flew' s argument illustrates how the naturalistic approach can be 
misinterpreted if the term 'appetite' is not sufficiently defined. Flew
is correct that there are an infinite number of possible reasons why 
you would not in fact enjoy the Red Lion at this particular time. You 
might indeed find that it is more expensive than you are prepared to 
accept; or it might be a long way from your work and you dislike walking; 
or you might be on such good terms with the landlord of the Frog and 
Peach that you get much better than the normal service there. But all . 
that these factors amount to is that the original advice, and the assump­
tion in it that "you will most enjoy the Red Lion," was actually mis-^ 
taken. On balance, given all these other whims of yours about which your 
advisor was ignorant, you would not enjoy the Red Lion at all.
So for you to act on a piece of advice such as "The Red Lion is 
the best hotel," you must be confident that the person giving the ad­
vice has taken into consideration your own particular desires and aver­
sions, There is sufficient agreement on such questions that advice of 
this kind is usually taken without serious question; Quinton claims that 
"no special knowledge about your particular tastes is necessary to pre­
dict the action which will follow upon your sincere acceptance of this 
advice," For most people, the sincere acceptance of the advice would be 
a routine matter, because there is agreement upon what is meant by a 
'good hotel* just as there is agreement upon what constitutes a 'good 
knife*, But personal differences do colour our judgement of these 
things. Where there is agreement, Quinton's resolution of the dichotomy 
between normative and factual statements is indeed valid,
Flew's further question, "ought these things to be desired?" is, 
then, strictly meaningless. Whether some desires are morally superior 
to other desires is a problem that can be solved only by appeal to 
some value transcending those desires, a possibility which we have al­
ready excluded. Logically, then, there can be no court of appeal 
higher than the individual. Appetites and aversions are manifold, cover­
ing far more than simple bodily drives. You may, of course, weigh one 
desire against another, for example your desire for comfort against your 
desire to save money, or your desire for good food against your aversion 
to extravagance. When that has been done, then a statement of advice15which correctly diagnoses your appetites is a good reason for action,
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The resolution of relativism
A relativist position such as this requires some futher comment, 
because it might be construed as having no prescriptive possibilities. 
The problem is analogous to the strict relativism which we noted with re­
spect to our perceptions of physical qualities’} if there is a dispute, 
it is difficult to say that one perception is 'right* and another is 
'wrong*. For the most part, however, there is much agreement on the 
perception of physical things, and we use the term 'objective* when 
agreement is substantial. In coming to such agreement, two factors are 
relevant. The first is the organizing power of our perceptual equip­
ment, which is remarkably similar between individuals. We all perceive 
squares, circles and other figures as sui generis and not simply the 
sum of the experiences which would arise if the various portions of 
our perceptual equipment were stimulated independently, for example.
By and large we judge extension uniformly; we find it hard to be in 
dispute about the reading of a pointer on an instrument scale, except 
from a distance; motion is obvious to us. In these things, our percept­
ual abilities are very similar. The second factor promoting agreement 
is social pressure and learning, A boy learns to classify bird songs, 
for example, and on subsequently hearing a particular song he can iden­
tify the species of bird; in fact his perception will be permanently 
changed by the learning, because he will always perceive song as rep­
resentative of a particular species once that learning has taken place. 
Our perceptions are subtly changed'by learning in this way.
The debate between Balguy and Hutcheson on relativism is a good17summary of the problems of ethical relativism. According to the lat­
ter, to say that something is 'right* or 'wrong', 'good* or 'bad* is to 
say no more than that it is commonly approved of or disapproved of. 
Balguy is then able to note that if human nature happened to be differ­
ent, then we would have to say that some things which are 'right* now 
would be * wrong * then and vice versa. If we came across a society with 
values completely foreign to us, we would simply have to accept them 
as different, immune from our criticism. Hutcheson's escape is to 
argue that the standard of morality is indeed relative to the observer,
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but that insofar as there is agreement on moral questions, we possess 
a convention by which to judge other individuals and other communities.
Regrettably, Hutcheson's defence suggests that morality can be 
consciously chosen because of its conventional nature, when in fact it 
would seem that like questions of physical perception, moral values 
are founded partly in human nature and partly in learning and only to a 
limited extent in conscious choice. ' ' .
The uniformity in human values is not a convention, but an impor­
tant and functional part of social life. Because of that uniformity, 
concerted actions of many sorts are possible, such as cooperation in 
defence and employment, sharing resources and caring for the infirm; 
and all of these actions promote the fitness of the society displaying 
them. More refined values are also functional, such as the preference 
of altruistic personalities to selfish, the common indignation felt 
against untrustworthy or selfish characters, and the feeling of the 
appropriateness of punishment or exile as a response to acts of selfish­
ness, Uniformity of opinion on these matters allows large social aggre­
gations to prosper, since any individual has a better notion of what are 
the likely responses of other individuals in any circumstance, and so 
these responses can be anticipated, and social life can begin.
Through the ethological method and the examination of social pat­
terns in human and animal societies, we are able to discern the rel­
ative importance of behaviour and values to the continuing life of a 
society, and to learn which actions and values do have a wide basis of 
support in human nature. Hence our relativism can be tempered, and our
18desire for objectivity in ethics partly satisfied.
The next few chapters will consider many examples of functioning 
social systems in animal and human societies. So great is the wealth 
of data on such matters that a full treatment is impossible; but the 
examples will serve to show that there are many instances of behaviour |
directed toward the welfare of groups larger than the single individual, 
behaviour which in human societies we call moral or altruistic. Simul­
taneously, we will be searching for those traits which under the analy­
sis in chapter two would be expected in societies shaped by the process
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of evolution by natural selection. Specimens of animal traits that 
are identical in content to human morality will be considered and will 
serve to reinforce the view put forth here that moral sentiments are 
indeed a.Darwinian device necessary to most species, that they do not 
require rational faculties for their emergence, and that the evolution 
of the human species would have been impossible were it not for their 
prior existence in our earliest ancestors. If this takes the good will 
out of morality, then we are that much poorer; but if it substantiates 
a more accurate picture of human nature with respect to morals, then 
our gain will greatly meliorate the situation.
53
FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER THREE
1, Leviathan, Book I, chapter 6.
2, The non-biochemist may visualise DNA as the fundamental self-reproducing chemical basis on which terrestrial life is founded,
3, Wilson, Sociobiology, p.120
4, A society can be taken as a group of individuals of the samespecies, organized in a cooperative manner, while a population is a set of conspecifics who occupy a clearly limited space at the same time and amongst which breeding is more or less random. Formost cases treated here, an identity between the two may be assumed,but there can be populations within a society (India and South Africa, say) and several societies within one population,
5, Urmson, 'Saints and Heroes',
6, Group selection covers both kin and interdemic selection, and re­fers to the selection of any unit greater than a single individual,
7, For a discussion of factors..promoting the constancy of behaviour within societies, see Lorenz, Behind the Mirror, chapter 10,
8, Nichomachean Ethics, Book I, and Book X (6-8)_,
9, Use of the term 'primary qualities* does not imply acceptance of its validity, (For initial introduction of the term, see Locke's Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Book 11, chapter 8; see also criticism in Berkeley. Principles of Human Knowledge, section 9 - 20), ' -
10, For a description of this experiment, see Woodworth and Schloss- 
berg (1954)
11, For an exposition of the notion that the mistake is a general fal­lacy of which the * naturalistic fallacy* is a special case, see W.H.Frankena in Mind, 1939, reprinted in W.Sellars & J, Hospers, Readings in Ethical Theory,
12, G.E.Moore, Principia Ethica. See also Hume, Treatise. Book III,Part I, Section I on the is/ought question,
13, Quinton's essay appears in I,T.Ramsay's Biology and Personality.For Flew's response, see his Evolutionary Ethics, chapter IV.
14, The phrase is from Kenneth Hanly, 'Zimmerman's is-is: a schizo­phrenic monism*, in W.D.Hudson (ed) The Is/Ought Question.
1 5, It can of course be challenged, e.g.; "It is your moral duty tostay somewhere cheaper and give the money to the poor," Even this proposition, however, would not give the individual a reason for acting unless it was in fact in accordance with his system of value.
16, The so-called Gestalt theory of perception. For details, see K.Koffka, Principles of Gestalt Psychology.
17, Richard Balguy, Foundations of Moral Goodness; Francis Hutcheson, Illustrations upon the Moral Sense, section I,
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18. Cf. Joseph Wood Krutch; "Standards are imaginary things, and yet it is extremely doubtful if men can live well, either spiritually or physically, without the belief that they are somehow real." (The Modern Temper) The same principle guides Duncan Williams's thought­ful book. Trousered Apes.
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Chapter 4
SOCIAL ORDER IN THE ANIMAL KINGDOM
"....social life is not an accident which appears sporadi­cally among a few highly developed animals. It is a nor­mal and basically widespread phenomenon,"
W.C.Allee^
A theory must explain our observations, and a theory of ethics 
phrased in terms of the evolution of altruistic and cooperative tenden­
cies in group-dwelling or related animals would be idle if cooperation 
were never found and group-dwellers nowhere existed. The purpose of 
this chapter is to give examples of social cooperation in animals, and 
to emphasise the point (which contractarians such as Hobbes or Rousseau 
did not have the power to detect and which they would have found very 
damaging to their theories) that social life is found in a multitude 
of species whose rational powers are decidedly limited.
The ubiquity of animal social patterns is almost as great ‘as the 
diversity of their forms. Accordingly, animal social behaviour can be 
of interest to philosophers only if these manifold varieties of pattern 
can be presented as the various expressions of behaviour which, by and 
large, has the same functional importance in each species. It is the 
content of social behaviour which is under scrutiny here, and not the 
multiplicity of its forms. For the sake of simplicity, ‘ we will treat 
here a small number of particular characteristics prevalent 'dn animal 
social life. In this chapter we will be concerned with aspects of
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group organization, and in the following chapter we will consider 
traits of cooperation and self-sacrifice more usually associated with 
morality.
Traits to he considered
The study of the determinants of animal social life is a recent 
one, hut it has already filled libraries. Only the most superficial 
coverage of the subject is therefore possible here. In particular, we 
will be restricting our attention to the following determinants;
(a) The structure of animal social groups, including aspects of behav­
ior conducive to social'aggregation itself, systems of rank and domin­
ance within groups, and the importance of characteristics such as
age and sex in the determination of social roles,
(b) The maintenance of the group, including cooperative defence, iso­
lation from other groups, and traits influencing dispersion of the 
members of the group.
(c) Altruistic behaviour, parenthood, sharing of knowledge and re­
sources. These factors will be discussed in the following chapter, 
while (a) and (b) will be discussed here.
The structure of social groups
(l); Widespread nature of social life
Social aggregation seems to be an advantageous state, even in2the simplest animals, W.G.Allee suggests that even protozoa, minute 
creatures with very little learning ability and apparently no facul­
ties for rational calculation, thrive best together.; In conglomer­
ations of a certain optimum size, they are able to survive the effects 
of toxic substances which would be fatal if administered in proportion­
ate quantity to each separate individual, Allee concluded that the 
survival advantage of many forms of social life made it "inherent in 
living organisms."
At the other end of the size scale, Darwin himself observed the 
strength of social bonds in cattle,A herd he found in Uraguay num­
bered many thousand, although they were clearly assembled in small
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groups of between fifty and a hundred, as the herdsmen knew. One 
night, violent electric storms caused the cattle to bolt and panic, 
breaking up the small groups. Psyche would have had an easier task 
sorting the seeds than attempting to restore the associations. Yet 
within another day, the cattle had found their old groups and were back 
with their fellows. The forces binding such companies seem to be of 
considerable power.
Between and beyond these extremes there are thousands of social 
species. The colonies of microorganisms, of social insects; the 
schools of fish and flocks of birds ; the small social groups of mam­
mals, including representatives from the carnivores, the herbivores, 
the primates, the ungulates, the land-borne and the water-borne. In 
each, a definite pattern of social life can be discerned, different 
for each species and even between varieties from each species, but 
nevertheless structured and regular; often highly cooperative and 
quite unlike the 'state of nature' upon which the classical social con­
trac tari ans founded their ethical systems.
(2) Cohesive forces
In 1932 Solly Zuckerman proposed that the binding force of pri-4mate sociality is sexual attraction. In the cages of London Zoo, the 
males fought for possession of females, and there was to him no indi­
cation that the sexual stimulus was ever absent. Two centuries before, 
Hume had come to the same conclusion about human societies, that they 
were founded in the biological necessity of family life. Since the 
1950s, however, the explosive growth of field studies has required 
biologists to abandon this unifying theory of social organization. : 
Primates in the wild have sharply defined breeding seasons, and yet 
they remain in social groups : as Jane Lancaster and Richard Lee re­
ported, "It:\is clear that constant sexual attraction cannot, be the 
basis for persistent social groupings of primates."^ The same obser­
vations would undoubtedly apply to many other social animals, and cer­
tainly to our own primate species.
What is it then, which makes species form their social aggrega­
tions? There is probably no single factor which will explain it-, A
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great variety of behaviour seems to require the presence of other mem­
bers of the species, whether feeding, sexual behaviour or even sleep­
ing, The appetites for these and other behaviour need the stimulus of 
conspecifics for their satisfaction, it appears, in addition to the 
other stimuli. Social life is often secured by bonds_6f apparent aff­
ection between individuals. In many species, sexual pairing is for 
life, and in many more it is annual but very firm. Bonds between par­
ents and offspring may be broken only by death: although animal rela­
tionships are generally more limited in scope and duration than human 
ones, it is nevertheless common to find members of a social group re­
maining together in that group for their lifetimes. Hence it seems 
that social life is not only highly prevalent in animals, but that ani­
mal societies are often powerfully cohesive.
The advantages of social life are many, and it is no surprise that 
natural selection has favoured it so broadly. The possibility of de­
fence against predators is greatly enhanced by aggregation, as will be 
shown later in the chapter. Competition with other species for food or 
territory is made easier. The chance of finding new food sources is 
improved. Learning from successful individuals becomes a feasibility. 
Adapting the environment to suit species needs can be a reality. In­
creases in reproductive rates and early survival are also common out-9comes of social life. So advantageous-is this*state, indeed, that se­
lection ihas apparently favoured mechanisms to prevent the emergence and 
spread of nonsocial tendencies; for instance the infant monkeys separ­
ated from all others by the Harlows had difficulty mating and neglected 
their own offspring.Participation within the social group was an im­
portant ingredient in personal fitness; were a nonsocial tendency to 
arise naturally in this species, it would be unlikely to survive a 
second generation.
(3) Dominance and social structure ■'
The backbone of many social organizations is the so-called domin­
ance, rank, or pecking order. The latter name was coined by Schjeld- 
erup-Ebbe to describe the phenomenon in domestic hens, although the 
concept is o l d e r . I f  a number of hens are placed in an enclosure,
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antagonism and fighting commonly occur. Gradually, however, the overt 
aggression decreases and each individual assumes a place in a 'pecking 
order* such that he is dominant over those below him and submissive to 
those above. Sometimes this means that an individual is able to peck 
others without retaliation, but in other animal societies the pecks go 
both way^ although predominantly in a single direction. The rigidity 
of the order also varies in different species and circumstances.
The dominance concept has been useful in the study of many animal12societies, from social insects up to the higher primates. While ir­
regularly distributed among species, dominance is found mostly.among 
vertebrates and some invertebrates of large size, possibly because the 
degree of memory required to sustain any dominance relationship is to be 
found only in the more highly evolved forms.
Although sometimes linear, dominance orders are prevalently rather 
complex. Altman has noted from his field observations that rhesus mon­
keys engage in what Lionel Tiger calls "quasi-political coalitions and 
pacts" within the dominance order, and it is known that challenges to
a dominant individual are frequently made by such concerted efforts by
13two or more less dominant ones.
Factors influencing dominance position are many. Intelligence is 
certainly one, as Jane van Lawick-Goodall suggests with her story of 
the rapid rise in dominance of .a chimpanzee with a clever way of scar­
ing rivals.Masculinity may be another factor - the lowest-ranking 
female gull of one experimental group, injected with the male hor­
mone testosterone^rose ' to the primary rank over all the males, in 
a matter of days. Rank orders nevertheless do exist between females 
in common cattle, where order is followed with 93^ regularity, in 
Fraser Darling's red deer^ in common sheep and many other species,^
The greater the cohesiveness and durability of a social group, the 
less pronounced are dominance differences, but in the unnatural sur­
roundings of zoo enclosures, dominance disputes are morenumerous and 
often much more violent. Additionally, the breeding season may see an 
increase in dominance disputes. Age is another factor; adults are 
dominant over juveniles, ---
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Dominance relationships, then, are settled by inequalities. Al­
though the philosopher may find such a system far removed from conven­
tional notions of social welfare and unacceptable as a foundation for 
any system of morality, there are certain advantages of dominance or­
ders without considering which it is impossible to appraise them.
The first is that the order, once settled, makes it clear where 
the leadership of the group lies. One can imagine that in the absence 
of this, there would be repeated conflicts about where to feed, when 
to sleep, what ranges to defend, and so on. Continual squabbling be­
tween individual for mates, food or space would be the norm. The domin­
ance order offers an alternative, probably more peaceful way of settling 
such questions, so that they do not disrupt daily life. Dominant ani­
mals of some primate societies use their position to terminate fighting 
between lower-ranking individuals, an obvious aggression-reducing func­
tion of dominance orders, Although the order might be sustained by 
force, it reduces the need for force as a whole.
Second, a rank order is a powerful and unified barrier to out­
siders, A chicken being introduced to an established flock, for ex­
ample, represents a threat to each one, and so they all behave aggres­
sively toward it, often until it expires. This is clearly a way of 
maintaining a partial breeding isolation of a society which, as we have 
seen in chapter two, can be necessary for the emergence of altruistic 
traits within that society.
Third, defensive formations are made more possible. Human armies 
are founded on strict observation of rank, and animal societies are of­
ten similar. It is often the dominant animal who determines the di­
rection of group movements, particularly in the primates, and in sys-' 
tems where everyone knows his own function, defensive cooperation be­
comes highly efficient.
Fourth, the didactic nature of dominance and leadership assists 
the spread of new and improved practices throu^ a society,. When in­
troduced to a new food (sweet potatoes), the Japanese macaques studied
6l
by Kawamura copied the example of the dominant troop members and 
quickly accepted it. The opportunity for the spread of such innova­
tions is probably larger in hierarchical societies with high levels of 
emulation than it would be in more uniform societies.
Fifth, the dominance hierarchy offers compensations even to those 
of subordinate stature. Often they move up in rank automatically on 
account of age. Females and juveniles are outside the male rank com­
petition and are rarely the objects of aggression; they are, in fact, 
protected better by the efficient defensive systems of the order than 
they would be in an unstructured group.
Lastly, the hierarchy usually enables the more intelligent,
stronger individuals to oust others for mates. Consequently, there is
an improved chance that these individuals will pass on their genetic
19characteristics to future generations.
It is evident that the dominance order confers positive advantages 
on many species. Were we to discover a similar arrangement in human 
societies, we might be inclined to believe that these advantages are 
so powerful that the system could only be the product of rational cal­
culation and the voluntary acceptance of that product by intelligent 
and foresighted people. And yet, here we find a similar system in the 
social groups of animals to which we ascribe no capacity for calcu­
lation, and certainly no ability to form contractual agreements. In 
the light of such observations, there is no alternative but to recon­
sider the foundations of human society and to question the extent to 
which they are in fact rationally derived,
(4) Age and sex in animal societies
As already pointed out, juveniles are usually at the bottom of 
animal rank orders, and very young individuals are outside them. Char­
acteristically in primates, they are the object of defence; Hall and 
DeVore have noted that a baboon troop moves in an orderly way with |
females and infants at the centre of the troop and the males at the 
outside, except for the more dominant males who will be close to the 
centre,
As far as group fitness is concerned, this arrangement is clearly
62
advantageous to species where each sex is about equally represented in 
a social group. The younger males are less important to the inclusive 
fitness of the society, since one male could fertilize many females 
(particularly in the promiscuous society of, say, baboon troops). The 
very young infants and the females, however, would be much more crucial 
to group survival, since they represent the future generation of the 
society and continuing contribution to it. In free-ranging primates, 
it is broadly true that infants are protected, adolescents guard and 
explore, dominant males lead and keep order, females raise infants and 
keep order among them, and more senior males serve as useful and exper­
ienced members of the troop, while posing no threat to the dominant in­
dividual .
Again, the parallel with human society is striking. We also put 
a high value on the protection of women and children, "Women and child­
ren first" in times of danger is such a widespread conviction that any 
system of ethics has to take account of it. Our human: adolescents, 
particularly adolescent males, are widely recognized to be rebellious, 
even reckless, and it is they who we send (or who volunteer) to fight 
our wars, just as in other primates they occupy a position at the bot­
tom of the dominance order, and are to be found at the edge of a troop 
where they are in most danger.
Maintenance of the society
(l) Cooperative defence
Defence is probably one of the most important factors that has 
led to the evolution of group-dwelling, Konrad Lorenz in his celebrated 
book On Aggression notes that the simplest social aggregation is the 
anonymous flock, but that even in these gatherings, defensive mechanisms 
are often impressive. Starlings, for example, fly in close formation 
when a hawk threatens above them; a diving hawk would be in great dan­
ger of personal damage if he tried to attack one, because he would al­
most certainly hit others. Similarly some predatory fish find it dif­
ficult to catch school fish because of their rapid movement in all di­
rections, A dog in a rabbit warren (unless trained to follow only one 
rabbit) suffers the same problem and is rarely successful,
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In some social insects, defence depends not only on "behaviour hut
on caste. The termite-hi 11 is guarded "by a caste of soldiers, much
larger than other individuals and equipped with large serrated mandi"bles.
The term 'caste* is, according to Manning, "well suited to describe the
division of labour within insect societies. It implies a rigid, lim-21ited role... largely determined by one's upbringing." . Defence in many
insect societies relies on this division of role. On occasion, other
cooperative ventures are possible only because of the morphological dif-22ferences, and cooperation based on behavioural distinctions are common. 
Furthermore, the defense of social groups can be regarded as highly al­
truistic in many animal societies. The reputation of bees as an ill- 
natured species hinges on their willingness, despite loss of individual 
life, to sting large animals near the hive.
Defensive formations can be developed more highly in those spec­
ies where individual recognition and dominance relationships are pos­
sible. Allee in The Social Life of Animals notes that baboon troops 
are often ordered in the distinctive way outlined by Hall and De"Vore, 
and that when a warning cry reaches the ear of the dominant member of 
the troop, he acts swiftly to assemble the other dominant males, arrange
the males on the outside and the females with their young inside a de- 23fensive ring, As already mentioned, the success of such formations 
is a function on the differences in behaviour shown by individuals ac­
cording to age, sex, and other factors. Were it not for those factors, 
defence would be difficult,
(2) Territoriality
A 'territory' is an area of space, whether earth or water or air,
which an animal or group of animals defends as an exclusive preserve.
The importance of the territoriality trait in animal societies is hotly
disputed by ethologists and psychologists, many of the latter insisting
that territoriality is learned rather than acquired genetically, and
disputing the inevitability of territoriality and the aggression which 24sustains it. Whatever the origin of the phenomenon, however, there
are a number of fiercely territorial species; and whether inevitable or
not, the history of mankind must have convinced us of the predominance25of territorial and aggressive conflict,
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The defence of territory by individuals or breeding pairs can take 
quite different forms from one species to another. It may be more or 
less aggressive, more or less widespread, and more or less seasonal. 
Territoriality is, however, normally a male function either in these 
cases or in the case of group territory defence against other groups.
The overriding importance of territoriality in animal social reper­
toires can be illustrated by the single example of Tinbergen's studies 
of nesting fulls, where the male is easily distracted from his mating 
activities if his territory is threatened by another male,^^ Like 
dominance orders, individual territories serve a number of subtle 
functions.. The defence of breeding territories can give each pair a 
sufficient range for foraging to feed themselves and their offspring; 
feeding within territories may require less energy and involve less ag­
gression than unrestrained competition; the number of species members 
on any particular foraging site is regulated by territorial defence so 
that over-utilization of the site's resources becomes less likely.
Examples of group defence are well documented. Not all the areas
visited by any particular group are defended in such an arrangement,
however; baboons for instance seek a specific sleeping place in the
trees, which is defended against others, but waterholes are commonly27shared between groups without fatal conflict. Territories can be 
rather flexible, and the territory of any group may change from time 
to time depending on many conditions and upon the internal state of 
the group. Their extent is settled by fighting (though rarely by fatal 
fighting) with neighbours, and their limits are often marked by scent 
or other secretions which warn others.
All this is defence against conspecifics» By contrast, on a 
tropical reef, several dozen different species may exist side by side, 
but each species defends its own portion of the reef against other mem­
bers of the same species, identified by the bright markings typical of 
coral-feeders. Other species are tolerated in an individual's terri­
tory, and this gives us the clue to the function of the intraspecific 
defence. Territories serve to space out a species, ensuring that popu­
lations do not grow to be too concentrated for the available food supply.
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If other species do not compete for the same food (and the diet of most 
coral-feeding fish is highly specific) then they can he tolerated 
without harm "being done. Territorial defence is a non-Malthusian mech­
anism of population control.
(3) Other dispersal mechanisms
There are many other instances of mechanisms to achieve the same ' 
results through different means. One is the migration of lemmings, 
springboks, the American grey squirrel and other mammals. This lat­
ter species grows to such huge numbers that periodic thinning increases 
the survival prospects of the species as a whole. The swarming of bees
is another example of a disperal mechanism. Parameters'such as preda-28tion and disease limit the concentration of many species.
When overcrowding occurs, sexual and parental activities are
among the first to suffer. Sexual abnormalities arise in crowded rodent
populations, so compensating population growth. Infant mortality soars29under these conditions, due largely to maternal neglect.
In some species, such as the magpies observed by Garrick and the 
red grouse studied by Jenkins, Watson and Miller, the animals unable to 
establish sizeable breeding territories do not settle for very small 
ones, but often do not breed at all. The advantage of this for the 
fitness of the group is clear; their attempts to raise nestlings in 
overcrowded conditions would be futile. It has already been noted that 
there is discussion in the literature about whether such behaviour is 
conditioned by individual selection or group selection; whatever the 
source, the fitness of the population as a whole is certainly improved 
by the restraint of the non-breeders.
Violent behaviour is often associated with severe overcrowding,
althou^ this is commonly found only in the laboratory, where species
members have no possible route of escape from a crowded enclosure.
Experiments by Steiniger and others on rats and Chi tty on field voles
have recorded the upsurge of fatal conflict at these times in startling
detail. Eventually, of course, the violence leads to a reduction in 30the population.-^ In normal conditions, however, animals have inhib­
itions against seriously injuring other members of the species (except
66
in some fish and avian societies, where predation on the eggs or 
small offspring are common, but where the numbers of offspring born 
and hatched are sufficiently large to compensate). In normal con­
ditions also, escape would be possible; but under artificial crowd­
ing, the usual inhibitions against seriously wounding conspecifics evap­
orate, Indeed, were the inhibitions retained in such conditions, the ‘ 
results as far as population survival is concerned could be much worse 
than they are. If similar behavioural mechanisms exist in human soc­
ieties, then the prospects are ominous; most ethical systems would have 
difficulty when faced with a trade-off between violence and annihilation.
(4) Aversion to other species and groups
Aggression between neighbouring groups may be found in those
species which defend group territories, and several examples are given
(with full documentation) in Holloway's book Primate Aggression, Terri-31toriality and Xenophobia', so that little more than marginal comment 
is needed here. 'Xenophobia' seems common to territorial species; mon­
key groups, for example, will move when they encounter higher-ranking 
groups. Macaques hold group territories of 20 or more square kilo­
meters and show aversion to other groups. In human children, fear of32and aggression toward strangers is well k n o w n . I n  the latter case, 
ritual shows of aggression against the outgroup individuals appear- to 
increase the cohesion of the group itself. Xenophobia is not restricted 
to the primates; even invertebrate societies such as bees take precau­
tions against intruders from other social groups.
Sometimes the xenophobia serves an obvious function, namely to pre­
vent mating of different species or varieties whose offspring would be 
infertile or inadequately adjusted to the environment. Bird species 
which flock together have distinctive species colours, as individual as 
the national flags of human societies, which perhaps mark.-' them as in­
appropriate for breeding one with the other. When two avian species 
share a dwelling-place, they commonly inhabit different parts of it, 
which helps to avoid interbreeding; in Britain, the chiff-chaff and the 
willow-warbler inhabit the same woodlands, but the chiff-chaff feeds in 
the higher trees. When combined with morphological differences, this
6?
is sufficient to debar interbreeding. In other avian species, it is
necessary for the calls of one partner to be answered by the other if
mating is to occur; hence species-specific bird calls are a powerful33mechanism for breeding isolation.
The illustration of the case of lovebird behaviour quoted by 
Dilger is an interesting one, and it shows the importance of partial • 
breeding isolation with respect to the effective performance of be­
havioural traits. It is possible that altruistic behaviour could be 
affected in the same manner. Dilger cross-bred two varieties of love­
bird, one in which nesting material was carried in the bill, and another 
which tucked nesting materials in the back feathers to carry them to 
the nest site. The hybrid offspring displayed confused behaviour. Oc­
casionally they tried to carry and tuck; sometimes they tucked and then 
removed the materials, being unable to succeed in carrying anything 
at all. Similar maladaptive confusions appear in the bees cross-bred34by Jones and Rothenbuhler. Given such effects, it is easy to see
why the American geneticist Theodosius Dobzhansky should declare that
"The biological function of all reproductive isolating mechanisms is
essentially the same - inhibition and eventual stoppage of the gene
exchange between populations... Without reproductive isolation, spec-35ies would disappear, submerged in a mass of genetical debris." Per­
haps this explains why in human societies, xenophobia remains a persist­
ent feature of life, despite the attempts of reasonable men to demolish 
it. There is no problem of infertility when members of different races 
or cultures combine; but there may be real problems of cultural values 
and habits that would be difficult to reconcile. Even in the most in­
tegrated countries, inter-racial marriage is rather rare; and it is not 
altogether absurd to postulate a potent xenophobia with some beneficial 
effects, despite its appearance.
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Chapter 5
MORALITY IN ANIMALS
”o,oiiobody with a real appreciation of the phenomena under discussion can fail to have an ever-recurring sense of ad­miration for those physiological mechanisms which enforce, in animals, selfless behaviour aimed towards the good of the community, and which work in the same way as the moral law in human beings," ^Konrad Lorenz
This chapter is devoted to a series of examples showing that cer­
tain overt patterns of behaviour which fall within the scope of moral­
ity (as traditionally accepted and broadly defined) are exhibited by 
social animals as well as human beingSo In particular, the traits 
which were outlined at the beginning of chapter four will be cons id-» 
eredo Because of the fact that these tendencies are displayed by ani­
mals, it seems plausible that we should speak of morality, without in­
verted commas, in animalso Let us investigate the point.
Moral action from inside and outside.
Perhaps the most penetrating criticism of our considering mor­
ality as a set of overt activities would come from one such as War'-
2nock, who says that "it seems that, when moral issues come up, there 
is always involved, more or less directly, some question of the doings 
or non-doings of rational beings," This, he says later on, is a nec­
essary condition, since, "For one's doings to be a proper or possible
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object of moral evaluation whether by others or by oneself,” it must 
always be the case ."that one should have at least some ability to per« 
ceive and consider alternative courses of action, to appreciate what 
is to be said for or against the alternative, to make a choice or dec­
ision, and to act accordinglyo*' It is a simple fact that we do 
not normally ascribe such faculties to most animalso
The dispute, then, between Warnock's position and the one I wish
to develop here is one of definition; Warnock starts from the point of
view that morality requires rational powerso He believes that the
definition of morality does not rest on a question of what overt be--
haviour is to be considered, but upon the necessity of conditions of
free choice for the agent, power to consider alternative forms of
action, and the ability to evaluate the possibilities on some ground3associated with the advancement of the general we Ifare„ Such a pos­
ition has been characteristic of moral discourse, with the exception 
of the anti-rationalists of the Scottish School, perhaps, since the 
time of Plato, It has common-sense, even the evidence of introspec­
tion, to support ito Can this view be challenged?
To some extent, these contrasting positions are a matter of op­
inion, It is, I think, perfectly possible to brand certain kinds of 
actions themselves as moral without necessarily considering motives; 
indeed we do say that someone Mid the right thing' when he acted in 
a certain way, even though he may insist that he 'did not think about* 
his actions and, at the time, did not take questions of the general 
welfare into consideration. Further, it is possible to maintain that 
a commitment to the general welfare does not presuppose any rational 
faculties; a school of philosophy was founded on the notion that mor­
ality could be 'intuitively' recognized. -Perhaps the most serious 
point, however, is that our introspection, as psychologists know, can 
be wildly inaccurate. It seems altogether probable that a man, in 
a situation where conflicting motives of self-preservation and altru­
ism are resolving themselves, might confuse this momentary conflict 
with a rational decision process. If the altruistic tendency was
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superior, as could well be the case because of the natural selection
of altruistic traits, then the man might pride himself on doing what
was 'against his own best interests' and will assume that this is the
product of a rational choice based upon a high morality. Considering
such situations from the inside as we do, it is difficult to avoid
such self-flattery; but suppose that for once, we consider the sameAsituation from the outside. It is under such a consideration that 
the identity between our own morality and the "physiological mechan­
isms which enforce, in animals, selfless behaviour" can be most 
clearly appreciated.
Let us say that a martian visitor came to our world, but
that, unbeknown to him, his appearance is very frightening to our 
earthly species, his odour is repulsive and his breath is poisonous.
At first, wishing to make contact with our species, he approaches a 
lone family who are enjoying a picnic in the corner of a meadow. He 
does not understand the motives of the family, but he will observe that 
the head of the family, being immediately concerned for the welfare 
of the others, will probably push them behind him, pick up a stone or 
any other weapon which is to hand, and make advances towards the '.in­
truder, albeit rather gingerly. As he gets closer, he might even at­
tempt to hit the martian with his weapon, until eventually, the mar- 
tian's poisonous breath overcomes him, I imagine that our visitor 
would be rather disappointed at this outcome, and might try to con­
tact some other species, say a group of baboons who are a short trip 
away by flying saucer. As he steps from the vehicle, however, the 
same thing happens. The females and the young retreat behind the big 
males, who make threatening sounds and noises. Perhaps one or two 
of the larger animals will lurch toward him with the obvious intention 
of scaring him away, but again, they are overpowered.
What can the alien conclude? On the evidence of his senses, he 
would conclude that these two species are just alike; that automat­
ically, an intruder like himself (whom he now realizes must be quite 
frightening to earthly creatures) is met by the large males in the 
family or group, while the others retreat under their protection. If
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the martian is in the habit of handing out praise or blame, he would 
probably record in the log of his flying saucer that both acted very 
courageously and that both seemed to share the same moral ideals of 
self-sacrifice in the face of danger. But human beings would be less 
likely than he to call the baboons heroes.
Where two such similar pieces of behaviour are concerned, it 
would be unnecessarily complicated to choose the most difficult ex­
planation - that one was the result of rational reflection, while 
the other was an innate behavioural trait - when a far simpler one 
- that in both cases, inherited altruistic behaviour accounted for 
the corresponding actions in both species - would suffice. We have 
already noted that the principle of natural selection would tend to 
produce altruistic traits in social species; why should we suppose that 
our own species should not be so? Why should we require any more com­
plicated explanation for what we call morality?
Other reasons for the identity between moralities
Before turning to illustrate further cases of morality in ani­
mals, let me give some further reasons why the identity should be 
acceptable between animal and human morality.
Firstly, we recognize that animals have physical organs similar 
in function to our own. Most animals have eyes to see with, ears to 
hear with, noses to smell with. The same function is served by the 
corresponding organs, even though the dog may be insensitive to col­
our but can hear high-pitched whistles that we cannot. We still do 
not hesitate to call the animal's organ of sight an 'eye' nor his aur­
al organ an 'ear*, nor his olfactory organ a 'nose', even though these 
features may look quite unlike human ones. The same comparisons are 
used concerning behaviour; an animal is said to 'run' or 'jump' or 
'bite'. When a dog is left on its own, it is said to 'pine®, and 
when it has misbehaved, we often say that it 'looks guilty* as if it 
understands that it has committed a transgression (an appearance 
which does not suggest any element of fear of punishment, and which 
cannot be explained on those grounds). If these morphological and
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behavioural descriptions are used for animals as well as human'beings, 
then there can be little ground for objection that behaviour which in 
men we call 'moral® should not be so called in animals.
Secondly, a part of human morality is popularly visualized as a 
set of 'restraints® upon our 'base n a t u r e T h e  moral man is the one 
who is able to override his /self-interest® and help others, to repress 
their desires, however strong, to act selfishly. Precisely the 
same phenomenon can be detected in many animal species, as Lorenz 
has noted in detail,^ For instance, a chicken will attack any small 
animal which approaches her brood, a reaction which protects.the nest 
from many predators. However, a deafened chicken will even attack 
her own brood; it is the characteristic 'cheeping® of the chicks which 
restrains the attacking urge in normal chickens. This, although it 
is a simple example, seems to be rather analogous to the notion of 
morality as a 'restraint* upon other motives.
Thirdly, moral behaviour in human beings in normally reckoned 
to be learned (at least in part) and to respond to praise or punish­
ment. There can be no doubt that animal behaviour toward species 
members, including the response of the individual to the relations 
of age, sex and dominance, is learned in the social situation, at 
least in those species where instinct alone would be unable to sup­
port the life of the community.
In summary, there are sufficient points-of comparison that cer­
tain animal behaviour which is similar to human morality should also 
be called moral. This point has deserved some detailed exposition, 
because its acceptance allows us to assert that the relevance of an­
imal behaviour for human morality is not that the one has evolved 
from the other; for although this is certainly the case, the many ev­
ents and forces which have shaped the evolution can never be Imown 
perfectly. Rather, its importance is as a direct analogue to human 
behaviour and a way of observing, in societies far simpler than our 
own, the selective advantage of certain modes of conduct that are the 
subject of human ethical enquiry,
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Altruism and sharing in animals
Do animals show traits that are easy to accept as being ’moral'?
The familiar example of avian 'distraction displays' seems to answer in 
the affirmative, A distraction display is a pattern of behaviour used 
to draw a predator (or any enemy) away from an object which the animal 
is trying to protect - usually eggs or young. One exemplar is the be­
haviour of the female nighthawk; when a predator is spotted, she deserts 
the nest, flying low and erratically, feigning injury : the prairie 
warbler flies from the nest and settles just in front of the predator.
Many other distinctive displays are known. There can be no doubt that 
the individual performing this display suffers a greater chance of in­
dividual harm from the predator than if she merely made off. Certainly 
she exposes.herself.to-the opportunity of the predator striking; and 
it may be that even if the parent stayed on the nest, quietly and in­
conspicuously, that she would be in a safer position. The success of 
her offspring, however (and hence the success of her own genetic con­
stitution in future generations) is much benefitted from her distraction 
activities.
It might be objected that this is scarcely a case of what we call 
'morality' in humans. These distraction displays are merely demon­
strations of parental care, outside the scope of morality as such.
Nevertheless, there are other cases where relationship seems to have 
little to do with the practice of altruistic activities. Many avian 
species have characteristic warning calls; when sighting a predator 
(say, a hawk) members of-several species such as robins, blackbirds, 
and thrushes will utter the characteristic cry which encourages the 
other species-members in the vicinity to take cover or to take flight.
Yet the utterance of the cry makes the individual who gives it more 
discernible to the predator; it makes him much more likely to be at- k
tacked and even killed. Although it is certainly true that many rel­
atives of the caller might be within range of him, the degree of rel­
ation within a large avian flock is probably rather small. Very few 
of the individuals who benefit from the warning are likely to be off­
spring of the caller. In this case, therefore, some explanation beyond
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parental affiliation is needed - such as a theory of interdemic sel­
ection, Quite how the trait arises, however, a subject which is under 
continuing dispute, is not important if we are to establish merely that 
such traits ^  exist in animal societies.
Perhaps even less controvertible examples of animal altruism ex­
ist in mammalian species. When members of a herd of Thomson's Gazelle 
(a species of small gazelle living in So them Africa) sight a pred­
ator such as a lion, according to naturalists Estes and Goddard, they7break into a conspicuous, stiff-legged, leaping gait. This strange 
way of running is called 'stotting®. Other African antelopes seem to 
have the same reaction when they detect danger. This activity spreads 
quickly through a herd, and may be maintained for a distance of eight 
hundred yards or so, until the herd settles into its normal, and much 
more rapid, running gait, Estes and Goddard describe actual con­
frontations between gazelle herds and packs of hunting dogs in these 
words ;
Undoubtedly a warning signal, it spread wavelike in advance of the (dog) pack. Apparently in response to the stotting, practi­cally every gazelle in sight fled the immediate vicinity,,,every gazelle began the-run for its life by stotting, and appeared to lose precious ground in the process... time and again we have watched the lead dog closing the gap until the quarry settled to its full running gait, when it was capable of making slightly better speed than its pursuer for the first half mile or so.It is therefore hard to see any advantage to the individual in stotting when chased, since individuals that made no display at all might ge thought to have a better chance of surviving and re­producing.
This does indeed seem to be a case of animal 'altruism'; the in­
dividual which performs the action places itself at much greater than 
the normal risk, according to Estes and Goddard, If it began its full 
running gait immediately, it could escape much more readily. The dis­
play is nevertheless of benefit to others; it is highly conspicuous, 
and serves, apparently, as a warning signal to other members of the 
gazelle herd. Upon seeing this, the others join in and spread the 
signal in like manner. Accordingly, the behaviour may be described as 
an altruistic alarm display.
When we are considering mechanisms of kinship or group selection,
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it is often difficult to distinguish the benefit or the loss to the in- /
dividual which practises an apparently altruistic act. It is possible 
that the stotting Thomson's Gazelle, although apparently at higher risk, 
in fact enjoys some advantage. For example, predators may be confused 
by the movement of a whole herd, and so the advantage would be with an 
individual who raises the alarm. Also, if the animal detects the pres- 
sence of a predator at some distance, it would be advantageous to start 
flight immediately, before the predator approaches nearer, and the con­
spicuous stotting might elicit a chase which the predator will soon 
give up because of the distance between him and his quarry, A third 
hypothesis comes from Richard Dawkins's book. The Selfish Gene, It is 
suggested there that the stotting behaviour is actually selfish, be­
cause the high leaps of the individual gazelle demonstrate to the pred­
ator that he is agile and speedy; the gazelle is saying "don't bother 
to chase me, I can jump this hi^î" Such a hypothesis is clearly mis­
taken, however. The high stotting, and the flashing of the white rump 
which is a feature of it, does seem to invite pursuit from the predator. 
Furthermore, stotting would seem to be of little advantage to an in­
dividual if he continues it for so long; the gazelle's natural ability 
to outpace most predators would seem to be a much better signal to the 
predator about the escape potential of the individual than would any 
high stotting, during which the gap between prey and predator is closed.
Lastly, the Dawkins theory does not explain similar altruistic traits 
in other species. Does the female nighthawk, falling as if crippled be­
fore the fox, really, demonstrate to the fox that she is so sprightly 
that she is not worth pursuing? Does the man who rescues a child from 
a burning building really wish to show the flames that he is not the 
sort to be cowed? To hold that these acts, and the action of the Thom­
son's Gazelle, are merely instances of a selfish display, is to cling 
too desperately to a dogma. The original sources on the.gazelle con­
trovert the 'selfishness' hypothesis, and the familiar cases of other 
animal altruistic actions demolish it entirely as a unitary explan­
ation of Individual behaviour.
Once again, we see the importance of distinguishing group sel­
ection processes from the traditional notions of 'survival of the fit-
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test*, which are usually equivalent to * survival of the fittest individ­
ual* . Selection, however, can operate at a level higher than the in­
dividual, although transmission of any characteristic must be an indi­
vidual -to -individual affaire The evolution of sterile worker castes 
in beehives causes no great concern to the population genetecist; the 
selective fitness of the hive as a whole is maintained under the present 
arrangement. Similarly, there should be no puzzle about the existence 
of altruistic behaviour, arising uniformly or randomly inside a colony 
or herd. Explanations of altruistic behaviour that rely on principles 
of a universal selfishness are unnecessarily complicated.
Many further Instances of animal co-operation or altruism can be 
given. Mowrer demonstrated that a laboratory rat would exert itself so 
that both it and other rats may feed: Daniel also discovered that a
rat would take turns with others in sit on a platform which acted as a 
switch that disconnected an electric shock given to the animals who 
were feeding elsewhere in the cageo^ Church has complemented this 
finding with evidence that rats are sensitive to the discomfort of con- 
specifics and will forgo food in order to save another from electric 
shock, administered when the first animal began feeding. Rice and 
Grainer*s work revealed that one animal would do work in order to rel­
ease another from a precarious position; Hanson and Mason
discovered that chimpanzees would change their established preferences11and habits in order to save others from electric shock, Wechkin, Mas-
erman and Terris showed -that hungry monkeys were subject to the
same kind of resistance to discomforting others as Church's laboratory
rats, in that they would forgo feeding if it entailed the simultaneous12shocking of another monkey. Some avian species co-operate lin caring for 
the clutch, with one parent sitting in the nest while the other finds 
food for them both, Knight and Knight have quoted the case of one 
such arrangement where a female pigeon was killed by a cat soon after 
the young had been hatched. The male continued to take his own reg­
ular turn on the nest, even though the fledgelings had died of cold13during the absence of the female.
Co-operation is also shown in the form of playful activities. It
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is generally recognized that during play, the individual learns skills
which will be of subsequent use for his own survival^ and therefore
play is important to many specieso But play-fighting predators have
stringent inhibitions against biting each other , as Eibl«Eibesfeldt
has . illustrated in polecats and other animalso The inhibition on
biting during play is characteristically linked with an absence of the
threatening behaviour which accompanies a real conflict; this is true14in any play-fighting predator. Squirrel monkeys, according to Winter, 
Ploog and Latta, will squeak continually while at play; should the 
squeaking stop, it indicates that a serious fight has started. The 
squeaking seems to be a kind of signal that co-operative, playful be­
haviour is being followed, and that no serious intentions are present. 
Squirrels themselves play chase or escape games; young deer play ter­
ritorial games rather like our own 'king of the castle®, . ' 
and similar games occur in other territorial species. Each instance of 
playful behaviour requires a co-operation and understanding between the 
partners in the play; it is a co-operation which is necessary for the 
play to occur, and therefore, since play seems to have a didactic fun­
ction with respect to later activities, is necessary for the future 
development of the animal. In many cases, it is clearly the product of 
an instinctive mechanism, requiring signals like that of the squirrel 
monkey to be effectiveo Animal species are fully able to play games 
and to follow certain 'rules® of behaviour in those games without any 
conscious agreement; co-operation is an outcome of the interaction bet­
ween instinct and early learning and is common in animals.
Care of wounded and infirme
Natural co-operation in animals extends to the care and attent­
ion of wounded or infirm species members» There are many recorded 
cases of apes carrying away wounded companions, as in the reports-of - Al- 
verdes,^^Elephants have.a particularly strong compulsion to assist- 
wounded conspecifics, deploying tusks to prompt another to its feet, 
it a p p e a r s . T e r n s  fly around a wounded conspecific; if it strugg­
les, they will circle wildly, and according to Konrad Loren^ if it is 
severely injured, they will attack and hasten its death» Dolphins will
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come to the aid of wounded ones and will raise them to the surface of 
the water on their backs, so protecting them against shark attacks and
1 Piallowing them to breathe, report Siebenaler and. Caldwell, David Lack
records the case of a blind pelican who was kept alive by the endeav-
19ours of the others in feeding him continually. It is easy to see the 
evolutionary advantage of such altruistic helping. Even if the general 
rule is inappropriate in some instances, such as Lack's, it would be, 
on balance, of selective advantage for group-living species to take 
care of their wounded or infirm members under most conditions.
Symbiotic relationships
Mutual assistance crosses species boundaries. Birds of one spec­
ies have been known to 'adopt'the nestlings of a neighbour which has 
abandoned them or which has been killed, even though the nestlings need 
not be conspecifics. Pilot fish are almost never seen alone, but al­
ways with mantas or whale sharks, and clean the. body and mouths of 
these hosts, an arrangement which keeps the host fish free from disease 
and provides the small pilot fishes with food» Cleaner fish (Lab- 
roides dimidatus) have developed a 'language' to communicate with the 
host, rapidly tapping the larger fish with their ventral fins in order 
to keep him aware of the region being cleaned and thus preventing any 
unintended mishap. The fish living on coral reefs will even travel to 
take the services of the small cleaners. Eibl-Eibesfeldt records that 
"we once observed that at times the fish actually crowded around cleaner 
stations. Various species awaited their turn, and as antagonistic as 
these fish are at other places in the reef, they were peaceful hei:e.
The cleaner station was, so to speak, a barber shop on the reef, owned20by all and therefore neutral ground." On dry land, the same hygenic 
cleaning is practised by oxpecker birds on zebras, rhinosceros,,cattle. 
and other large animals, which will stand silently and passively 
throughout the operation, in response to the calls of the birds » Other 
avian species can be seen near to herd animals at all times, picking up 
insects in the air» Insects themselves work in similar harmony; ants 
will tap greenfly with their antennae to stimulate them to secrete their 
sugary milk; some aphids can no longer remove the milk from their bod­
ies without stimulation from the ants. These aphids are protected ag­
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ainst predators and cared for in other ways by the ants, who will make 
roofs for them out of earth and bring winter eggs into the lower part 
of the anthill for safe keeping.
Defensive alliances between species are commonplace. Perhaps 
the most unusual is the relationship between the hermit crab and the 
sea anemone, the latter often attaching itself to the shell of the 
crab. The crab is given an increased measure of protection from the 
stinging filaments of the anemone, and the anemone is able to scav­
enge food particles from the prey of the crab.
The precise nature of the selective pressures which generate 
these altruistic symbioses is, again, open to question. Trivers has 
attempted to show that reciprocation between individuals of different 
species may account for most of the phenomena of cleaning in coral- 
dwelling fish, for example. Gleaners tend to be site-specific, hosts 
tend to use the same cleaners repeatedly, and the length of life of 
the cleaners is sufficient to allow discrimination of * cheaters* - 
that is, hosts who do not reciprocate, but who make a meal of the clean­
ers once they have finished their task. Whether this explanation is 
correct, or whether there is a process of selection acting upon clus­
ters of species (in this case, the functioning unit formed by the hosts 
and the cleaners) it is evident that the biological selection of al­
truism seems to operate in such cases.
Intraspecific aggression and morality
It has been mentioned already that aggression in animals and prob­
ably in human societies has a number of positive functions, in terms of 
species dispersal and the maintenance of a strong dominance order 
which in fact reduces the total amount of aggression likely to be mani­
fested in any society. The fact that these positive, group-uniting 
functions of aggression have been long ignored by moralists and phil­
osophers. explains the formulation of many inadequate theories of social 
life. For example, Rousseau presumes that aggression is common between 
animals (or between presocial men) and that one of the functions of a 
rational social contract is to inhibit aggressive tendencies on a multi­
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lateral basis, such that social life without mutual harm becomes possi­
ble. Philosophers and anthropologists alike (the latter being typified 
by Ashley Montagu in his chapter of Man and Aggression) have often as­
sumed that the ability to control aggressive characteristics is what 
distinguishes human morality from the 'immorality* of animal species.
Yet this view is entirely mistaken. Animals very often show 
marked inhibitions upon aggressive traits. The aggressive tendencies 
within species are an important part of social life - so important that 
it would be difficult for animal social groups to survive if they were 
extinguished completely - and in situations where aggression would be 
maladaptive, it is often suppressed by a specific inhibitory mechan­
ism. It will be-useful to review some examples of this sort of in­
hibition, which is so analogous to human morality and which confounds 
many traditional divisions between animal and human behaviour.
Aggressive conflicts in territorial species serve to disperse the 
members of a population. It would, however, be maladaptive if the mem­
bers of any species fou^t to the death over some territory; and so, 
while the aggressive tendency is never wholly absent, special mechan­
isms to prevent harm to each of the combatants are commonly seen in 
animal territorial conflicts. It is actually quite rare for animals 
to fight to the death with conspecifics, although this is well known in 
zoos and enclosures where a defeated individual cannot withdraw. In 
more natural environments, however, there is nearly always an inhibiting 
mechanism» Wolves certainly do fight, for example, with bared fangs 
and upright ears; but the weaker opponent will eventually show his 
defeat by turning away the fangs and laying down the ears, and by turn­
ing the nape of his neck to the superior combatant. Although this is 
his most vulnerable part, the superior animal will not continue the 
attack after such a! signal has been given. Accordingly, the loser's 
action is often called an 'appeasement display® because it inhibits 
the aggression of the winner. Darwin also noted the same phenomenon; 
an aggressive individual attempts to make himself look larger, raising 
the fur (or fins) and ears. The submissive posture is exactly antithet­
ical; the individual makes himself as small as possible, often crouching
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to appear even smaller.
Territorial conflict in cichlid fishes has been well documented,21and affords us another illustration of the phenomenon. This species 
uses highly stereotyped - or 'ritualized* - mechanisms to indicate 
threat. A species member will threaten possible rivals by spreading . 
the fins, which are large and brilliantly coloured, apparently for 
the purpose, by showing itself broadside on, and making itself look 
very large. At the same time, the individual beats its tail, gener­
ating a pressure wave in the water that serves to inform the other of . 
its strength. Only rarely do the two actually come into contact'. . If 
fitting does occur, it is rarely damaging, usually taking the form of 
a harmless pushing match with the two individuals locked mouth-to-mouth. 
Since the mouth parts of cichlids are thick-skinned, this conflict 
is unlikely to injure either partner. When the match is settled, the 
defeated individual will collapse his fins and change colouration; the 
cichlid Tilapia marie, for instance, changes from its conspicuous normal 
colouration to the dull juvenile colours, which provide excellent camou­
flage and which seem to defuse the aggressive tendencies of the other 
individual. Few species will attack the young of their own kind, and 
this particular species apparently takes advantage of the fact.
These ritualized conflicts pose a moral problem. Why should the 
winner be inhibited against finishing off his rival? For the rival 
may return on a subsequent occasion to fight again, possibly even de­
feating him» The winner exposes himself to some risk (if not physical, 
at least in terms of his ability to hold a territory and breed, suc­
cessfully within it) by his inhibition. Assuming that we do not credit 
fish and other creatures with the power to evaluate the impact of 
their inhibition upon the whole species and upon their own long-term 
survival, evolutionary considerations are" required to explain the 
behaviour, Interdemic selection would certainly yield such traits; 
kinship selection would also, provided that by not killing a defeated 
opponent, an individual would be likely to preserve the bearer of some 
genetic characteristics which were shared by each party to the dispute.
If such traits are adaptive in animals, then what of human mor-
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ality? If, as it seems fair to say, inhibitions upon damaging aggres­
sive conflicts can be explained in animals by evolutionary selection, 
it may be possible that they can be explained in human beings by the 
same principles. To be sure, human morality is accompanied by a large 
measure of rational reflection about the consequences of any action, 
the possible effect if everyone did the same, and so on. But it would 
appear to be possible that these rational activities are an elabor­
ation of traits, laid down by human evolution, and not something in com­
plete opposition to evolutionary characteristics (as Huxley's opposition 
of the "moral process' and the 'cosmic process' would suggest).
In summary, then, not only aggression but also certain inhibitions 
against the use of aggression are both products of evolution, neces­
sary to a functioning social life. The situation is described by Lor­
enzs "The problem thus presented... is always solved in the same man­
ner; the generally useful, indispensable drive remains unaltered, but
for the particular case in which it might prove harmful, a very special22inhibitive mechanism is constructed ad hoc."
Inhibitions on fighting between the sexes
The females of many species could be at the mercy of male ag­
gression (since it is more frequently the male of the species which 
acquires and defends territory)» Again, Lorenz's ad hoc inhibitive 
mechanisms are to be seen» Dogs, for example, will never respond to 
an attack by a female, except to turn away» So too has the wolf, 
Dante's 'bestia senza pace®, developed the same inhibitory mechan­
ism»
Other mammals share this reluctance of biting females » The ham­
ster male is much heavier than the female and has sharp incisors»
During the short mating period, the female can be very aggressive to­
wards the male, but he never defends himself against her assaults»
In confinement the female could (and often does) kill the male after23mating, so strong is his aversion to responding»
Non-mammalian species share this inhibition, like the bullfinch,
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which never responds to the attacks of his mate » Reptile species are24similar» When Kitzler and Lorenz painted a female emerald lizard in 
male colours, and introduced her into a male's territory, she elicited 
immediate attack, and he rushed at her with the obvious intention of 
biting» "Then," recalls Lorenz, "he perceived the female smell of 
the painted lady and checked his attack so that he turned a somer­
sault over her» The he examined her carefully with his tongue and 
took no more notice of the fight-eliciting colours - a considerable 
achievement for a reptile," The same author goes on to note that the 
female emerald lizard does not take advantage of the male's inability 
to attack but will, on the contrary, fall in submission before the 
youngest and lightest male.
Inhibitions against aggression toward juveniles
I have pointed out in the case of the chicken's aggression ag­
ainst small creatures moving in the vicinity of the brood that the 
maternal behaviour of some species depends upon ad hoc mechanisms to 
suppress aggression. This seems to be true in many species; Europ­
ean dogs almost, never attack puppies, and infantile behaviour is used 
in many dog varieties as an appeasement gesture which prevents com­
bat or ends it immediately» The same sort of inhibitions occur in 
non-mammals, such as the night heron, for example, where an adult 
male makes aggressive moves towards any juvenile which has invaded 
his territory, an attack checked immediately by the characteristic 
'begging calls' of the young bird»
25It is also hypothesized that certain characteristics of young 
mammals make them attractive to adults, eliciting maternal behaviour; 
such characteristics include the proportions of head to body, puffed- 
up cheeks and body -characteristics which are used by human illustrat­
ors to create 'lovable' characters» Of course it may be that our af­
fection for these general characteristics is transferred from our 
specif i c  love 6'f human infants, rather than the other way around ; but 
the widespread nature:of the characteristics in mammalian species sug­
gests that this is a simple and general response in all mammalian par-
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entSo Furthermore, whatever the source, it seems that the relevance 
of this set of examples for human morality is that animal species simply 
do treat infants differently from others, and just do treat members of 
the sexes differently; and that there is a biological reason why this 
should be soo So we must question the assertion, which some moral­
ists have thought that they could take for granted, of equality of 
treatment as a moral ideal. Given the function of dissimilar treat­
ment, which we can see in animals species, this question must be 
raised; and it will be discussed more closely during later chapters
Other examples of inhibitions
It would be verging on vacuity to say that aggression is effect­
ive in animals except when it is ineffective. Nevertheless, there are 
many instances in the animal world where intraspecific aggression is 
checked by inhibiting mechanisms or where it does not occur » Such in­
stances are of interest to philosophers because they are strikingly 
analogous to situations in human societies where traditional, received 
morality says that actions similar in form to the animal behaviour pat­
terns that are exhibited in those cases are appropriate in the human 
situation. One such case is the deep inhibition against a predatory 
animal taking a member of its own species as prey. Such a restraint 
is of clear importance in those pack animals, like wolves , where ad­
ult members of the species have advanced natural weaponry. Most ani­
mals will not eat the flesh of a conspecific, and this is true in the 
human situation also (except for some very limited cases of cannibal­
ism, most of which is practised for ritual reasons and is not engaged 
in without strong ceremony )» Some birds of prey will consume con­
specifics in captivity but probably not in the wild; herring-gulls 28will consume chicks which wander on to their territory, it is true, 
but they will ^Iso attack any small predator...... Gulls never attack
their own chicks»
Inhibitory mechanisms are many and varied; baboons of eithe^r-...'' 
sex will often ward off an attack by presenting the hind-quarters, a 
sign of sexual submission, and it has been noted by at least one
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29popular author that similar, if less extreme, practices reduce ag­
ression in human societies» Another, completely different, inhibit­
ory mechanism seems to be that of individual distances, a phenomenon 
common in mammalian and avian species (but not reptiles) in which the 
members of the group, like gulls or starlings sitting on a wire, keep - 
just outside pecking range from each other. Human society considers • 
it 'impolite' to intrude too near to another person; and the lines 
drawn across the floor of the House of Commons, over which no member 
is allowed to tread while apeaking, are exactly two sword-lengths 
apart»
Parental conduct in animals
Parental conduct is ah example of a pattern of behaviour in which 
one individual cares for the welfare of another, often for a period of 
many years » Its position as an-explicitly 'moralrelation cannot be 
doubted in human beings, even though we usually think it impossible 
that any normal parent would act in any other way than to care for her 
offspring just as long as was necessary» The same type of behaviour 
can be seen in a great many animal species, except those such as fish 
and reptiles » Of course, the examples most strikingly similar to the |
human all occur in mammals.
The function of parental behaviour is, of course, the protection 
of the infant until it is able to fend for itself; although the ob­
servation that some animal species are quite able to take care of 
themselves at birth suggests that a long period of parental care may 
have some further, group-uniting function, and a function to allow 
the education of species members in those species where instinct has 
a smaller role in social life»
When nursing young, as shown by studies of post-natal activity in 
mice, cats, monkeys and many other species, the mammalian parent 
changes her behaviour towards others, not only the infants them­
selves, becoming much more defensive about the nest» Then, as 
the young develop and begin to explore their world, the parent typ-
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ically becomes more vigilant and certainly more actively engaged in 
restraining them. Retrieval has been studied in many different mam­
malian species by a number of investigators, and work on this and 
other similar phenomena associeted with parent-infant relationships 
reveal the similarity between much animal behaviour and parental con­
duct in human beings. In our own and other mammalian species, the30parent-child bond seems to last indefinitely long.
Once again it might be objected that parental conduct does not 
deserve the description 'morality®. However,- this behaviour seems to 
be highly selfless, and it is difficult to know what else to call it. 
In large mammals, including man, the period of dependence may last for 
many years, during which social skills necessary to the later life of 
the infant are learned and developed. The investment by the parent in 
her offspring is major, and places her own survival at risk. The kin­
ship selection aspects of parental behaviour are obvious; the parent's 
genetic constitution will be much more likely to be represented in sub­
sequent generations if her own offspring are protected, encouraged and 
trained: nevertheless, there are many other occasions where an indi­
vidual raises the inclusive fitness of his relatives by some actions, 
where we would still call the action 'moral', or 'altruistic'. Par­
ental behaviour is of such duration and intensity that it perhaps de­
serves this label better than most.
Imprinting and the acceptance of ways of behaving
According to Wadding ton in his book The Ethical Animal, men are 
'ethicizing beings' and they accept norms of behaviour, like language, 
through the emulation of their parents and social group» Although at­
tempts to teach language to animals have not been overwhelmingly suc-31cessfiil, there is strong evidence that many species do learn soci­
ally reinforced ways of acting while very young. Experiments by the 
Harlows on infant monkeys have revealed that deprivation from contact 
by parents or peers can lead to lasting disruption in animal social 
behaviour ; and in human infants, according to John Bowlby, long mat­
ernal deprivation can cause lasting behavioural abnormality and sev-32.ere disturbance of the ethical values of an individual,
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The phenomenon of imprinting, discovered by Konrad Lorenz 
demonstrates that much behaviour can depend on incidents during a cer­
tain 'critical periodusually at the beginning of life» Hence, 
hatching chicks will 'imprint® onto the first large object they see, 
usually the parent» Experiments by Lorenz and others have imprinted 
chicks onto many different objects, even patterns and configurations.
The infant remains attached to the same object for the first few 
months or years of its life, will follow the object and show signs of 
distress when it is not to be found» But the real importance of the 
phenomenon in ethical terms is that future social behaviour may dep­
end upon imprinting» Young jackdaws raised by hand perform abnormal 
mating' behaviour ; Klinghammer®s ring doves which were so raised
attempted to mate with human hands » By exposing ducklings to drakes 
upon hatching, Hess has induced homosexual behaviour, |
Once again, we find that these observations - and they are a j
very brief pick of many examples which could be chosen - raise |
questions about human ethics » Were our own sexual behaviour (or any |
other behaviour or set of values that come within the scope of the |
moral philosophy) to be so determined by early upbringing, as Bowlby's 
evidence in particular suggests is the case, then how do we judge |
this behaviour? Is the disapprobation which most societies place on j"Îabnormal activities appropriate in the case of behaviour over which i
the individual has no control and of desires which the individual can­
not suppress? Are we not to reserve our blame (or, in other circum­
stances, praise) for the parents of the individual for being negligent 
in allowing such abnormal imprinting to occur? These seem to be im­
portant ethical questions, which deserve closer consideration.
Summary
After considering the widespread nature of social life in ani­
mals, and the existence of altruistic tendencies in many social spec­
ies (of which only a very few examples are possible here) it becomes 
clear that the traditional dichotomy between human 'morality* and ani-
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mal 'instinct', regrettably still accepted by many who are not well 
informed about biological and ethological concepts, is in need of re­
pair. There are many traits, from food-sharing through defensive co­
operation to the inhibition of aggressive tendencies, which are ob­
servable in animals and in human societies. Although it may be that 
in human groups, the consequences of any action are considered much 
more thorou^ly than by animals, it remains true that there are many 
similarities in the content, if not the expression, of human and ani­
mal social life. Since selection can operate upon groups larger than 
the single individual, this similarity, and the tendency of certain 
behaviour to promote the interests of a kinship group or population, is 
less than surprising.
Animal altruism raises the fitness of a group on most occasions, 
despite personal risk or loss of life by the altruist. Bees of cer­
tain species will defend the hive fiercely, stinging large mammals 
which approach, even though this causes them to forfeit their own 
lives in the process, since the barbed sting remains in the victim and 
tears out part of the bee's viscera. Yet the fitness of the hive as a 
whole is undoubtedly improved by this self-sacrifice by its members. 
Similarly, human morality is often defined in terms of the welfare of 
the society or population.
Even behaviour that is classified as 'immoral' by traditional mor­
al codes can be seen, in animal societies, to have a functional purpose. 
Aggression, for example, has many purposes, including the dispersion of 
territorial species, which prevents exhaustion of the available food 
and water supplies. When we observe this functional aspect, as we are 
able to do in the simple societies of many animals, we may begin to 
question whether the same 'immoral* behaviour in human beings, which is 
subject to vilification in civilized societies and rationalistic phil­
osophy, but which is so difficult to remove, does not in fact have an 
important functional component, of which we must be aware before we 
are able to make any useful evaluation of it.
Similarly, the aggressiveness of animals is sometimes limited by 
ad hoc inhibitory mechanisms that come into play when the important,
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general drive is inappropriate. This again is very similar to the human 
conception of morality as a restraint upon other drives and desires.
Yet such restraints in animals have emerged spontaneously, according to 
the pressures of natural selection, and without any rational reflection 
being necessary on the part of the individual animal, and sometimes, where 
no rational reflection would be admitted as possible by members of the • 
species. ¥e may begin to reflect upon how our own morality, so often 
regarded as a conscious and rational choice between alternatives, and 
a conscious and rational inhibition of rather broad and general personal 
drives, is limited by natural constraints that have emerged in the long 
course of human evolution. Animals are guided, through tendencies im­
planted by similar selection processes, to act in ways which we often 
feel forced to admire - in helping other species members, caring for 
offspring, and defending the group, for example - and so much is the 
survival of the group as a whole advanced by these traits that it is 
difficult to avoid comparisons with human morality.
Certain other philosophical problems arise from this ethological 
approach. One is that animal social life seems to rest upon the func­
tional nature of individual action, and not the similarity of action of 
all the individuals in a population; it is, for example, the very inequal­
ity of the dominance order which allows some animal societies to flour­
ish. What, then, is the functional importance of inequality in human 
societies, if there is any at all? What are the limits to which a 
degree of political inequality will be functional? Are the differences 
of age and sex as important to moral relationships in human societies 
as they are in the higher mammals? Are we justified in treating such 
qualities differently for functional considerations? And what is the 
vehicle of selection to which we must refer our functional considera­
tions - the family, a social group, a population, or some other ag­
gregation, or even the whole species? These are the sorts of question 
which are undoubtedly of interest to moral philosophers, but which rest 
on an empirical, ethological foundation. But before we can begin an 
answer, we must establish that evolutionary considerations are truly as 
important to human nature as they are to animal nature.
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Chapter 6
ORIGINS OF HUMAN SOCIETIES
"Throughout the five million years or so of man’s evo­lution, the highest premium has been placed on cooper­ation... or there would be no human beings alive today."
Ashley Montagu^
This is not an essay on paleoanthropology, but some observations 
on the origins of human social groups are necessary at this stage, 
for several reasons.
Firstly, we must be confident that the conditions in the early 
evolution of our own species were right for the evolutionary selection 
of altruistic and cooperative tendencies. If the conditions for 
group and individual selection of such traits were lacking in early 
human evolution, then a general theory-of human moral evolution is 
clearly inadeo[uate. Although, as Hayek has pointed out in his bril­
liant essay on 'The Theory of Complex Phenomena*, it is impossible for 
us to know fully the events that have shaped our own selection, we 
can make some general guesses with the help of anthropologists, and 
perhaps we will be more fully aware of the reasons for the remarkable 
success of the human species.
Secondly, we wish to know what the contribution of cooperative 
traits has been to this success. Was group living really of such im­
portance, and how did our psychology eguip us for it?
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Thirdly, we want to he confident that not only were the condi­
tions right for the continuation of cooperative and altruistic traits 
under natural selection, and that present human societies share simi­
lar traits with our distant animal ancestors (as best as we can judge 
from their present descendants), but also that these traits have re­
mained continuously in our repertoire, and did not disappear and then . 
emerge once more. The latter possibility would be fatal to the theory 
of the natural selection of morality, unless it could be demonstrated 
that unusual environmental conditions made morality maladaptive during 
the disappearance phase.
Fourthly, it is important to recognize what refinements or adjust­
ments, if any, have been made in our morality by cultural practices.
Since cultural variations in behaviour and the possibility of individ­
ual calculation upon the social impact of individual actions seems to 
have emerged in early human evolution, the period is well worth our 
scrutiny.
Fifthly, consider this analogy. Anticipating a man's actions is 
much easier when we know something about his background, his habits, 
his attitudes and personal circumstances. If human beings are the ob­
jects of a long biological and cultural evolution, then it is puite 
possible that our evolutionary background has left our physiology and 
behaviour with visible marks of its origin. The understanding of our 
early evolutionary condition would be as important a guide to our 
actions as our knowledge of a man's background would be an explanation 
of his.
The time dimension in human evolution
The striking feature of the 'fourth dimension' of human person-2ality - that is, its evolution - is the vast scale, Carl Sagan sug­
gests that we imagine life on Earth condensed into the period of the 
last thirteen weeks of a year (a year which begins with the formation 
of the universe itself),^ Months pass before the emergence of the first 
vertebrates on December 19th, Mammals emerge a week later. Only on 
the last day of the year do humans emerge. Stone tools are made at llp'.m, 
on that day. Agriculture is developed nearly halfway through the last 
minute of the year. Civilization can be placed between this moment on
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December 31st and the stroke of New Year. In the history of
human evolution, complicated industrial societies are comparatively 
very recent. Tiger and Fox employ an analogy similar to Sagan's to 
demonstrate this point. They say that "If we made an hour-long film 
to represent the history of tool-making man, industrial man wouldhflash by in a few seconds at the end - he would barely be seen," Ac­
cording to them, industrial man is an "evolutionary afterthought"that 
has yet to prove its durability as an evolutionary structure.
The duration of evolutionary time occupied by prehominid forms 
makes us puestion the role of reason and culture in behaviour, inclu­
ding social and ethical behaviour. Evolution depends on a balance be­
tween the retention of some characteristics that are successful, and 
the emergence of new characteristics which may or may not be more suc­
cessful. Efficiency would suggest the appropriateness of a diversity 
of different structures between which nature could select, but a large 
measure of constancy within those structures, so that the character­
istics ■ selected would be retained over the generations. Since the 
vast bulk of our own evolution involves creatures that we would not 
want to describe as rational, then if their behaviour were completely 
without limit, their survival would be unlikely in the long term. Ani­
mal societies appear to function because of the regularity of the 
behaviour of their members, for example the regularity of workers in 
a bee-hive (even though, as Rotherbuhler's articles oblipuely show, 
practical differences between hives may still occur),
Used in this sense, rationality can be taken to describe the ab­
ility to calculate the social consepuences of individual actions.
Some animals that we suppose are fairly similar in morphology and be­
haviour to our direct prehuman ancestors do have a small ability to 
calculate some results of their actions, of course; monkeys can solve 
puzzles and will use tools in novel ways to reach their objectives 
(distinguishing them from species like the galapagos finch which uses 
a tool, but in a stereotyped way), and other mammals may share the 
power to a limited extent. But this is not comparable with the 
ability to calculate the results of actions on a social order, and
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the formulation of social policy, which requires far greater depths 
of calculation. Indeed, in human societies we cannot he certain of 
the actual outcomes that may he expected from any particular piece 
of behaviour, as Ferguson, Smith and the others clearly demonstrated.
In selective termsj the haphazard and confused situation which would 
emerge from such uncalculating, perfectly variable behaviour would have 
been much less successful than the results of more regular, stereo­
typed behaviour. During most of our evolution, this was probably so.
Another feature of the theory of evolution, in addition to its 
balance of retention and variation of characteristics, is that the 
more complicated a structure, the less likely are innovations to be 
adaptive. Take for example the human nervous system. It contains 
million upon million of cells, each of them with specific functions 
relative to the performance of the whole. If some change in the system 
were present in a mutant organism, the chances would be minute - lit­
erally million upon million to one - that the change would be a sel­
ective improvement, or even equal. Similarly in behavioural struc­
tures; the more complicated a structure is, the less likely is it that 
a change will be of advantage. When we are talking about the compar­
atively complicated social structures of primates including early 
man, it is likely that a large measure of retention of characterist­
ics would have been adaptive. Where a complete change of habitat 
occurs, as can be shown in the evolution of early man, then a new 
set of behaviour patterns may have been needed for survival; but due 
to the complexity of the change required and the unlikelihood of the 
adaptiveness of any particular change, we can assume that any such 
adjustment would have been rather slow to emerge and become estab­
lished, The logic of the theory of evolution offers us a theory of 
change, but it is a theory of slow change, the change being the slower 
the more complicated the structure is. Rarely do we find any major 
mutational variations in animal evolution. Variation arises slowly 
after a series of small changes, each one building on the last, each 
one slightly more successful than the one proceeding it.
According to this implication of the theory, it would be strange 
indeed if we found any revolutionary mutations in our own natural
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history. Rather, we would expect the "beneficial factors of the past
to he retained, while successful variations would be added to this
heritage. This is why Wadding ton, Campbell and others speak of the
'wisdom* of evolution; because its survival power in a relatively7constant environment is cumulative. In our case, the regularities 
in behaviour, and the constraints upon a perfectly malleable psychol­
ogy would have been preserved to the limit of their usefulness. Sub­
sequent chapters will demonstrate the importance of predictability in 
human action and will emphasise therefore the functionality of this 
rather constant evolutionary 'wisdom'. Its retention is to be ex­
pected, even where cultural innovations have built upon it. The 
building may be high and mighty, but the foundations prescribe the 
limits of its area. By examining the origins of the human species, 
we are examining the shape of those foundations set down over the 
vast length of the time dimension,^
Our evolutionary heritage
Men are not descended from the apes, at least, not from the 
living apes. They are descended from ancestors which they and other 
living primates hold in common, as do cousins several times removed. 
All modern men, it appears, have emerged from a common ancestry, al- 
thou^ many hominid forms were unsuccessful over the long course of 
evolutionary time. From the same initial source sprang the other 
primates whose descendents live today, and then emerged at different 
times the monkeys and the apes. The tree of evolution is complicated 
with many branches, and we have to jump across so many to reach our 
nearest living relatives that it may be surprising to find any re­
semblance at all. Yet, as Dobzhansky recognizes, "A considerable 
amount of ingenuity was expended in trying to find some component 
part or structure in the human body that was wholly absent in other 
primates. This would have made man somehow 'unique*. These attempts 
did not succeed; the differences between man and apes are quantit­
ative and not qualitative, as are the differences between one ape 
species and another,"^ The form of a structure may change, although 
in human evolution that change has been rather small. Its function, 
however, is much more difficult to change without loss of evolution-
99
ary fitness. Perhaps that is why so much of animal and human be­
haviour and morphology shares a similar function.
The picture of the evolutionary tree cautions us against the 
use of overconfident examples of traits shared between us and other 
species, however, and it warns us also against apparent refutations 
of behavioural selection processes based on dissimilarities in human 
and animal traits. For example, some anthropologists note the placid 
and apparently non-territorial nature of the gorilla, our nearest 
living relative, saying that its behaviour refutes any notion that 
men are aggressive and territorial by nature,In'reply to this 
view, however, it may be objected that man is not descended from the 
gorilla, even though he may be our nearest kin. On the contrary, we 
have a common, but very distant ancestry. Furthermore, the gorilla 
has remained an arboreal creature, while men developed on the savan­
nahs of Africa, as hunters. This crucial difference can explain the 
entire divergence; a lush forest and plentiful food supply reduces the 
need for groups to defend a feeding territory or be remotely aggres­
sive, Savannah existance, on the other hand, requires large ter­
ritories and mechanisms to space out groups if the food supply is 
not to be overrun.
The stages in primate development
Crook and Gartlan recognize five stages in the development of 
primate life, although these should serve as a rough guide only be­
cause the behavioural correlations associated with the stages are 11rather hazy, . In the first adaptive grade, they place forest pro­
simians, nocturnal and insectivorous, for the most part solitary but 
pairing on occasions, A nocturnal, agile insectivore in a plentiful 
environment needs no complicated social life. In the second adaptive 
phase are placed larger simians, the Lemur and others, all of them 
forest fructivores, living in small groups and showing minor territ­
orial defence. Being diurnal, these species can be seen by predators, 
so some cooperation in defence and some social life is of selective 
advantage. In the third grade are placed other lemurs and hi^er pri-
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mates including the gorilla. These are forest or forest-fringe creat­
ures, fructivorous or vegetarian and occasionally territorial, mostly 
cooperative. In the fourth grade, forest-fringe and tree savannah 
animals are represented, including most of the macaques and a number 
of baboon species. They are omnivorous, occasionally carnivorous, 
and the size of their groups tends to be larger than the other grades. . 
Territorial defence and xenophobia are marked in some of these species, 
as may be expected in a situation where predators are many and where 
food is scarcer than in the forests. In the last level are classified 
the grassland and hamandryas baboon and other savannah primates. The 
difficult conditions make the size of groups difficult to predict; the 
gelada in the Ethiopian mountains form herds in good feeding times - _ 
which split into smaller harem groups when conditions deteriorate. In 
such species, single-male groups are the norm, and sexual dimorphism 
and division of labour is pronounced.
The savannah conditions seem to have determined the course of12evolution of our own species to a major extent. Our own evolution 
appears to have followed this radial pattern of adaptation, dietary 
change, and socialization. The pro simians are the only primates to 
have left fossils from the early days of primate evolution, about 60 
to 75 million years ago. After that, they disappear somewhat from 
the fossil record, being supplanted by the other classes of primate 
(and nowadays their descendants are to be found only in island and 
tropical refuges where they are safe from predatior^ Fragmentary re­
mains of creatures that seem to bridge the gap between the pro simi­
ans and the living old-world monkeys have been found dating from 40 
million years ago. The development of new primates continued, it 
seems, since about 30 million years ago (according to most usual in­
terpretations of rather fragmentary evidence) ground-dwelling apes 
inhabited the shores of Lake Victoria. Their bodies were not adapted 
for forest life, and their human descendants emerged, it would appear, 
from this ground-dwelling stock,
Australopithecus Africanus
The emergence of human forms is most importantly associated with
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this change in habitat from forest-fringe to savannah. Between 10 
and 20 million years ago lived strange European primates, which have 
been proclaimed by Hurzeler to be so humanoid in their dentition and 
limb structure that they may be classed as a subfamily of the human 
s p e c i e s , Australopithecus is to be found about five million years 
ago and is the first example of an indisputable man-ape - one might 
say the 'missing link' of nineteenth-century speculation (although 
this phrase is misleading in that it suggests, contrary to all evi­
dence, a series of major 'links' when a gradual procession is more 
appropriate a description of human evolution). With the change of 
habitat came a very rapid expansion in brain size; one can imagine 
that in the difficult savannah conditions, a high premium would be 
placed on such qualities. Within two million years they appear to 
have speciated into many forms, including Homo, perhaps. Their re­
mains are to be found mostly in the savannahs of southern Africa, but 
the fact that there is evidence they travelled half the globe is sug­
gestive of their evolutionary success.
Statements about the social condition of Australopithecus are
somewhat speculative. They were hunters, and there can be little
doubt that this would have entailed a social life very different from
the forest-dwellers. For one thing, the ecological rule of thumb that
a carnivorous diet takes ten times the area of a fructivorous diet to
maintain would have made them require a dispersive mechanism to avoid
over-exploitation of savannah resources. This has led Birdsell and14others to suppose that they were definitely territorial. They
lived in small groups, and some commentators believe that it can be
inferred with some accuracy (partly because of the widespread nature
of the trait in other hunter societies) that males were dominant over
females, and that males were usually the hunters while the femalesISforaged for vegetable food, Some element of cooperation must have 
been present; it would be impossible for single individuals to hunt , 
and trap the sort of prey that Australopithecus seems to have hunted 
(as evidenced by the extinction of many large species at this same 
time and by the signs of violence on the fossils of many such species)
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This cooperation seems to have been present long before the spread of 
cultural changes in human life, and before the rapid development of 
the human forebrain. The Piltdown hypothesis that human social life 
became possible after the expansion of the brain is not compatible ifith 
the facts of Australopithecene life, and the evidence for it lies ex­
posed as a fraud.
The expansion of the brain does, however, stem from this hunting 
and weapon-using life, A species, originally arboreal, with no re­
straints on using new-found weapons would find itself undergoing rapid 
evolutionary changes. Strong inhibitions on aggression, even co­
operative altruism, would be selected. Territoriality and the preval­
ence of small hunting bands would have preserved breeding isolation 
and would have allowed the emergence of such traits. Indeed, there 
seems no doubt that the conditions necessary for the development of 
altruism were present at this stage of our evolution. Groups were 
small and independent, probably aggressive toward outgroup individuals, 
which would contribute to make dispersal rates small. Animal food 
may have increased the potential lifetime, making the scope for recip­
rocal altruism greater. Members of hunting groups were interdepend­
ent, The term of parental care seems to have been increasing. In 
short, the conditions were right for the evolution of (or the contin­
ued development of) morality, and the necessity of morality in creat­
ures using artificial weapons suggests that this development did in­
deed take place.
Neanderthal man and the importance of culture
Perhaps the second major development in human evolution is the 
emergence of cultural differences; with the emergence of Homo sapiens 
neanderthalis, a tool-using species, this development probably took a 
great leap. They were descended from Homo erectus,• which lived be­
tween 240 and 600 thousand years ago, and whose brain size was larger 
than Australopithecus but less than neanderthalis. The neanderthal 
man was, says Dobshansky, "a hunter, a meat-eater, a dresser of animal 
skins.^  which he probably used for clothing, and a possessor of a rudi-
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mentary spirituality,"^^ He was also (like Homo erectus and Australo­
pithecus) a maker of . weapons, which we have seen to he a probable 
factor in the rapid evolution of early man.
Factors other than group predation must be considered, however, 
when we attempt to account for the spectacular rise of human forms from 
neanderthalis. .That species was cultural' by nature, and therefore it is 
evident that they enjoyed more behavioural flexibility than earlier 
forms; so it would be unwise to suggest that modern social life is 
based on foundations completely unaltered since the dawn of Australo­
pithecus . Yet the factors in addition to group life which went to 
shape their selection (as far as we can establish) are of interest be­
cause of their possible implications for morality.
In the first place, sexual selection would have had an effect.
This refers to the ability of some individuals, because of their be­
haviour or appearance, to attract more mates than others. For reas­
ons developed by Fox and others which need not be considered here,
this selective pressure is likely to have been important in horn-.
17inid selection. We can hypothesize that sexual selection would have 
been associated with qualities that are favoured in hunting societies 
even today. Not only group selection, but also individual selection 
would have drawn the strongest females to those males who were the 
best hunters, skilled in tool-making and innovation, and who were of 
the hipest rank in the dominance order. Qualities such as rank and 
high ability in socially useful activities are still admired in every 
society today, and it is tempting to speculate that our attraction to 
them is a function of the evolutionary success of our species.
The division of labour between the sexes is the second factor 
which seems to have emerged at this time and which would have been im­
portant in selection. Sexual dimorphism is much more prominent in 
the human species than in any other primate, and it certainly emerged 
somewhere on the course of human evolution. As Tiger notes, the male 
of our species is an efficient hunting machine, while the female is 
not,^^ In early cave paintings, the division is distinct; hunting 
scenes are common, but those represented are invariably men. Some
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representations show women gathering honey and fruits, hut never 
hunting. Similarly, men are shown in distinctive armour and carry­
ing weapons, while women are depicted in peaceful ornamental cloth­
ing, Although the paintings are generally much later than the 
emergence of neanderthalis, commencing during the ice age of about 
14 thousand years ago, it is most likely that sexual dimorphism, and 
the differences in the 'proper* role attributed to each sex are far 
older, and that their functionality in terms of promoting the fitness 
of individuals and their social groups reinforced their spread.
A third feature which may help to explain the rapid rise in 
numbers of the early humans is warfare, which some authors claim was 
instrumental in promoting moral qualities of cooperation, bravery, al­
truism and so f o r t h . I n  outline, the theory maintains that an in­
telligent hominid band may have overrun a nei^bouring band and ap­
propriated its territory. The memory of the event would be added to 
the cultural tradition of the band, and possibly repeated much later 
and in different areas under the influence of this tradition. The in­
crease of the breeding population unit through this conquest would 
have allowed the spread of the genetic and cultural constitution of 
the band. On the other hand, the communities best able to stand up 
to such conquest would be those with the most efficient defensive 
forces, and depending on the rate of killing in such battles, modern 
genetics suggests that warfare alone would be sufficient to ensure a 
high level of altruistic and cooperative tendencies within populations,
Other evolutionary traits
We can infer other traits in neanderthalis, and yet more in 
Cro-Magnon and later humans which have left us such excellent records 
in their cave paintings. The neanderthals, for example, were indeed 
the possessors of a spirituality, to which Dobzhansky has referred. 
Their burials, for example, were highly elaborate and stereotyped, 
the first such phenomenon to emerge in any species. Paleolithic 
burials make heavy use of red colourants, a practice surviving in 
Greek and Roman archaeology; Homer refers to the dead being shrouded 
in red, somethrng- which continued widely in the West up to the fif­
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teenth century and which is still found in the traditional burial of 
a Pope, All this strongly suggests an element of religion and magic, 
possibly a belief in life after death. Certainly such beliefs were 
very well established by Egyptian and Etruscan times.
What is at issue here is not the trappings of such ceremonies; it 
is their meaning with respect to the behaviour of the individual as a 
part of the group. Accepting the existence of a deity and committing 
oneself to his wishes is an act of self-denial. It is a commitment to 
live and work for the society rather than one's personal benefit. Re­
ligions are concerned with the purposes of a deity or of deities over 
long periods of time, far longer than individual lifetimes and in 
theory at least longer than the life of the society enshrining them. 
Sacrifice of personal ends to that long-term purpose is indeed an act 
of moral consequence. It is also an act which would have a selective 
advantage to most human societies. Perhaps a belief in the afterlife 
emerged as a functional part of the religious system, compensating the 
individual for self-sacrifice now - we do not know. But judging by 
the widespread nature of stereotyped burial customs and the diversity 
of their forms, which we may take as emerging independently, it
appears to be a strong factor in the evolutionary history of our 20species.
Organized justice and punishment, though not necessarily con­
nected with religion, can be seen in the cave-paintings, according to 
leading authorities. Peri cot says that "In the cave at Temigia,,,. 
we see groups of archers (with five individuals in one case, ten in 
another) raising their bows, while at a certain distance in front of 
them appears a man who has fallen, pierced with arrows. There is ev­
ery indication that we are witnessing scenes of execution, which we21may call the first pages of a penal code."
Dominance relationships were probably established very early in 
hominid evolution or before, and our earliest firm record comes again 
from the cave paintings, which show clear representations of rank in 
military scenes.
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Conclusion
The study of the emergence of early human societies forms a 
bridge between the behaviour of animal groups and the behaviour of 
living primitive human cultures. The available evidence suggests a 
remarkable continuity in the broad functional aspects of social life, 
although customs and rituals - the expression of these aspects - 
vary considerably over time and between groups.
Nevertheless, it is clear that our earliest ancestors developed 
powers of cooperation and probably altruism long before the emergence 
of the enlarged forebrain and the development of faculties of calcu­
lation much in excess of present-day animals. As the use of arti­
ficial weapons and warfare spread in the newly territorial savannah 
species, hominid evolution becomes more rapid: a small difference in 
social organization, strength, intelligence or some other factor would 
have endowed an armed individual or society with a substantial and 
immediate selective advantage. From the same process of selection 
would emerge inhibitory tendencies on intragroup aggression, altruism 
and cooperation in defence and other 'moral* traits.
Other parts of moral life would be of functional importance on 
the savannahs, as they are in hunting peoples today, such as division 
of labour and notions of the 'right* role of the sexes) sexual sel­
ection by the differential evaluation of traits useful to the society 
and the teaching of social skills in the parent-offspring situation^ 
Evidence of primitive spirituality reinforces the belief that altruism 
was extensive in neanderthal and post-neanderthal cultures because it 
suggests a notion of the continuing life of the individual and the 
social group. Prolonged maternal care (which we can safely assume to 
have been a feature of early human life because of its generality in 
higher ceropithecoids) would have consolidated social and moral life 
through the necessity of lengthy bonds between parents and children, 
and throu^ the early socialization and education of children on a more 
pronounced scale. Rules of exogamy and endogamy may well have been of 
powerful selective advantage, as Darlington maintains, but it is im­
possible to be confident about this because of the variability of the
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22traits in living nonhuman primates. Nevertheless, it is safe to 
say that variations in cultural traditions would, have promoted the 
selection of those sexual and other practices which generated a 
stable breeding system and optimum population density. These prac­
tices will be considered more fully in the next chapter, since their 
observation in living primitive peoples is easier than their infer­
ence from archaeological evidence.
Finally, it is of note that all these parts of human sociality 
were laid down in the long evolution of man as a ground-dwelling, 
hunting animal. Cultural changes may be possible; but to be sel­
ective, they would have to conform to certain limits determined by 
the functionality of human behaviour under those conditions. The 
evolution of man as an industrial creature has hardly begun, and so 
it should not be of great surprise if those evolutionary foundations 
and behavioural limits are occasionally at odds with the requirements 
of modern urban life. The limits of our evolutionary morality were 
not set down to encompass city-dwellers, and as subsequent chapters 
T-Till show, the morality that was functional in our evolutionary life 
and which, to an extent, still guides our actions, may be quite dys­
functional in modern societies. But that is a question to be dealt 
with later.
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Chapter 7
MORALITY IN PRIMITIVE SOCIETIES
”,oo if ever there was any thing, which could be called nat­ural in this sense, the sentiments of morality certainly may; since there never was any nation of the world, nor any sin­gle person in any nation, who was utterly depriv'd of them, and who never, in any instance, shew'd the least approbation or dislike of mannerso These sentiments are so rooted in our constitution and temper, that without entirely confounding the human mind by disease or madness, 'tis impossible to ex­tirpate and destroy themo”
David Hume^
There are two ways of checking the hypothesis that our morality 
has evolved along with us. The first is to consider the social and
moral life of animal species. These, we assume, are the living repres­
entatives of our ancient ancestors, distant cousins in evolutionary 
terms. We should expect them to be, in some measure (and to the 
extent that the physical conditions shaping their evolution were sim­
ilar to the conditions shaping our own) behaviourally similar to our­
selves. Although the precise form of expression of many patterns of 
behaviour have changed in evolution, we find that certain moral deter­
minants with functions ■ similar to, our own can be found in animal soc­
ial groupings. When checking the hypothesis by this method, it is the
content, and not the form, of the behaviour which interests us. To
take an analogy, we believe that we have descended from fossil species 
largely because both we and they have skulls, backbones, teeth, hair,
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2and so on. Our skulls are slightly different in shape; we might have 
more teeth or less; our backbones might be adapted for upright stand­
ing; and yet, in general, these structures do resemble each other, and 
the function which they have is as similar as the different condit­
ions affecting the evolution of the various species are likely to.allow.
The second way to test the hypothesis is to examine living human 
groups, and see whether the moral conduct exists, which has been alleged 
to be an indispensible part of the survival of animal or human social 
groups. In so doing, there is no need to rely solely upon the evid­
ence from modern, complex, 'civilized* societies, where the content of 
certain patterns of behaviour is difficult to distinguish because of the 
complexities of its form. Primitive societies are often much easier to 
understand. Hence, the purpose of this chapter is to investigate, in 
rather broad and general terms, the morality of primitive societies which 
are alive today, or (like the Tasmanians) recently extinct but of whom 
we have full accounts, and to relate the morality of these peoples to 
the natural selection of behavioural characteristics and to the morality 
of animal societies from whence it is alleged primitive morality ultim­
ately derives.
This consideration of primitive morality need not be lengthy be­
cause of the familiarity of the terrain to most people interested in 
ethics. Nevertheless, it may help to demonstrate the evolutionary ■ 
functionality of many primitive institutions and practices.
Social organization in primitive societies
The parameters of social organization are rather rigid in the 
lower primates, but may vary from group to group in the higher pri­
mates. In human societies, however, this variation in territorial de­
fence, group size, the barriers between groups and so on is found to 
be very much more pronounced. Perhaps this is largely due to the fact 
that human societies face very little competition from other species. 
With the development of artificial weapons and the enlargement of the 
human forebrain which was contemporaneous with that development,
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men have been able to shape their own environments and to dominate all 
other species. Consequently, many different social systems can sur­
vive for a time, since there is no threat of extermination from environ­
mental conditions or the competition for resources with other species. 
Some authors, such as Colin Turnbull in his book The Mountain People, 
have described communities on the borderline of existence, in which 
selfish behaviour is the norm and where family life has disintegrated. 
Nevertheless, their society - if such a collection of individuals can 
be called a society - lurches on from year to year, and could last well 
into the future. Having been freed ' ' from the discipline of inter­
specific competition, are men not free to shed that morality which en­
abled them to survive that formerly competitive state?
Against such a point of view, it must be observed that in any gen­
eration there might arise individuals or societies which are unlikely 
to survive for many generations. The fact that a society of any kind 
is in existence now is no guarantee that it will be so one hundred 
years from now. Societies on the borderline of existence are clearly 
the most vulnerable, assuming that conditions remain fairly constant; 
our concern, if we wish to see what traits (moral and otherwise) equip 
a society for long-term survival, must be with those societies some way 
above the borderline.
Another question which complicates our enquiry into the evolu­
tionary limits of human behaviour is that of the variability of cul­
ture. It is evident that cultural difference between human societies 
are largely a function of learning rather than genetic inheritance; 
and this again has led some anthropologists to believe that an almost 
infinite range of social life and practices is possible in human 
groups. But once more it must be objected that the evolutionary model 
does not prescribe precisely what forms of social organization will 
occur at any time and place; rather, it sets limits upon what is the 
range of possible practices. Furthermore, many character traits 
which themselves shape cultural differences are moderately highly her­
itable, and the diversity of the forms of cultural structure that it3is possible to build may belie the rigidity of their foundation,
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The most accurate technique for resolving these questions is to 
consider behavioural traits within our near relatives in the primate 
order. If a characteristic is subject to very little variation within 
those species, then it is a characteristic most likely to have been re­
tained during the early stages of our own evolution. If it is a vari­
able characteristic, then we cannot make bold assertions about its 
relevance to human beings, Wilson, having reviewed the evidence, 
claims that the most conservative primate traits are aggressive domin­
ance systems, male dominance, prolonged maternal care, socializationAof infants, and matrilineal organization. More variable characterist­
ics are group size and cohesiveness, the involvement of the male in 
parental care, and the intensity and form of territorial defence.
With these qualifications in mind, then, let us examine the range 
of social and moral behaviour within human primitive societies, and 
attempt to establish whether there are further consistencies of prac­
tice; for the order of primates covers many very different types of 
animal, living in many different habitats, with many different diets 
and social requirements,
(a) Hunting life and group size
For all of our species history, we have been hunting creatures, 
and according to Pilbeam, we and our ancestors have hunted animals 
for over fourteen million years,^ The size of hunting-gathering com­
munities still extant today does seem to be rather confined (although 
of course the cities of industrial man may number many millions of in­
dividuals). Hobhouse, for example, remarking on the constancy.of 
group size of a large number of primitive peoples, says that "it is 
pretty clear that the group varies from about 25 to 50 or 60 individ­
uals. I will not give the detailed evidence which would constantly 
repeat the same figures,,,"^
It is significant that this size of local community (and many 
other observers have agreed that primitive hunting communities tend to 
be less than a hundred individuals strong, but larger than two dozen) 
is precisely the size which would support one or two hunting parties 
of about a dozen adult males each. This latter number is optimal for
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nearly any joint cooperative venture of some difficulty, including hunt­
ing: it is large enough for the work of the hand to he divided between 
the members, and to distract, trap and overcome most large game. On 
the other hand, it is small enough for its members to be fully famil­
iar with the personalities and behavioural characteristics of the 
other members. In a dangerous situation, this knowledge of how others' 
are likely to react has a clear functional importance. Although only 
distantly analogous to the hunting band, it is perhaps significant that 
modern sports teams and management committees show a marked tendency 
towards an average of about twelve members, a fact remarked on by Tiger 
in his book Men in Groups.
The hunting way of life has shaped other features of human social norganization,' Cooperation within the hunting band would be a neces­
sity, Division of labour between hunters and those left at the dwell­
ing-place would emerge. Sharing between members of the group would be 
hi^ly likely, since no hunter or small group of hunters could consume 
the whole of a large prey animal by themselves. Teaching of social 
techniques to future generations would be required to ensure the con­
tinuity of the food supply. Each of these characteristics is bound up 
with human morality, and so some of them are worth a closer examin­
ation,
(b) Divergence in sexual roles
Men can run faster than women. They have more appropriate muscul­
ature for hunting; they can throw more accurately and exert themselves 
for longer. Yet there are other reasons, probably more powerful than 
these, why it would be hazardous to rely on women as members of hunt­
ing bands. In the opinion of Lionel Tiger,, the men might be ”(1) dis­
tracted from hunting by sexual blandishment, (2) certainly slowed down 
on a chase.oo (3) they might also be affected by the varying behaviour 
and mood of females in the various phases of their menstrual cycle as 
well as by (4) what may be a greater female propensity to express par­
ticular perhaps ill-adapted emotions in states of crisis; (5) females - 
would be less able and willing to engage in physical struggle with prey
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animals, and less able to defend the group from predators and possibly 
human opponents. In other words, there would be a definite genetic ad­
vantage to those males who insisted on hunting in all-male groups,"
In human societies today, primitive and otherwise, such a div­
ision of labour between the sexes is almost universal. During the day, 
women and infants remain at the dwelling-place while the men embark on 
long, ritualized expeditions to hunt for game (or in the modern world, 
to pursue the civilized equivalent, business). In the Cree Indians of 
North America, for example, the .division of labour between the sexes
nwas clearly shown and has been described in detail by Tiger and Fox.
The males did all the major hunting, although the women would herd the 
main prey animals, buffalo, into corrals. Similarly, the men cared for 
the horses, which were used in hunting, while the women cared for the 
dogs, which were not. Although women collected vegetables and on oc­
casion, small game birds and animals, they never travelled far from 
the village. In the Eskimo communities recounted by Lionel Tiger, 
fishing, not land hunting, was the main source of food; and women were 
not allowed near the boats of the fishermen, Women on board ship were 
regarded as ' jonahs* and it was often the case that a fisherman would 
not take his boat out that day if a woman had set foot on it.^^ More 
advanced seafaring communities still preserve the same kinds of super­
stitions, It is interesting that these superstitions, and other sub­
tle differences in the rights and obligations of the sexes are not 
without an evolutionary foundation which is probably of as much func­
tional value today as it ever was.
Wherever one looks in the primitive world, the activities of men 
and women are stereotypically divergent, and the duties and obliga­
tions which accrue to individuals are affected in the same way. The 
rules for the inheritance of property, for example, are often strongly 
differentiated between the" sexes, with inheritance normally passing 
through the male line, althou^ the exceptions are many. In ancient 
Greece, for example (although not exactly a 'primitive* society) titles 
sometimes passed throu^ the female line, although were exercised by 
males. Other characteristics are likewise varied between'the .sexes,
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In ancient Greece and in the Eskimo communities already mentioned, for 
instance, it would be common or even usual for the head of the house­
hold to eat apart from the women, a practice which might help to cement
the unity of the male community and which would therefore be of some11functional advantage. The Spartan state used a similar psychology of 
communal eating to promote public spirit between members of the state. 
Single-sex clubs and societies, often secret societies, are found very 
widely in primitive peoples, and even in advanced industrial societies. 
They are usually male, and female secret societies are almost never to 
be found. Such an indulgence of a sex-specific characteristic to seek 
the company of one's own sex would itself tend to promote the selective 
advantage of a hunting community, and so it seems fair to say that the 
existence of single-sex societies is probably only one particular ex­
ample of a rather general characteristic, found especially in males. 
Given this, there arises a moral question of whether such aggregations 
should be allowed to continue, or whether notions of sexual equality 
should force them out of existences the issue has been much debated in 
civilized societies, but the ethological approach suggests that it can­
not be fully discussed without reference to the selective function of 
single-sex organizations.
In summary, the words of Hobhouse are appropriate. He noted that
the sexual division "cuts every people into two portions, and the legal
and ethical position of these two portions is never wholly the same.
In greater or less degree, the rights and the duties of men and women
differ, and the divergence is not confined to matters arising directly12from the sex relation itself,"
(b) Dominance relationships
The differences between the sexes is never more apparent than in 
the dominance relationships within a community, Male dominance is a 
characteristic of primate societies, and human society is no exception. 
The higher positions in political hierarchies, whether of primitive 
or advanced societies, are normally filled by men, a phenomenon which 
is concordant with Lowie's speculation that territoriality and male
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groupings are the foundation of political activity in primitive soc- 13ieties. The same author claims that "the number of instances can be 
counted on the fingers of one hand.,. in which women either exercise 
unusual property rights or play a remarkable part in public life.,, 
even among the Iroquois (where women play a part in the election of 
chiefs) no woman had a place on the supreme council,., A genuine mat- 
riarchate is nowhere to be found," The broad characteristics of the 
dominance system, apart from this general feature, can now be described.
As in animal societies, dominance in the political sphere is ass­
ociated with certain rights and obligations. In a number of societies, 
for example, the leader or chief may indulge in relations with many of 
the w o m e n Lévi-Strauss recounts the role of polygamy in the
chieftainship of the Nambikuara of Mato Grosso, There, polygamy is 
held to be the prerogative of the chief alone (although the sorcerer may 
be a rare exception) and this is normally accepted without much concern, 
because it is recognized that a chief has certain duties and obligat­
ions to the rest of the group, and it is felt that he deserves some kind 
of reward in return. A chief may not overstep the privilege, however, 
and there are fairly uniform notions of the number of wives which a 
chief should have. If Lévi-Strauss is right in his interpretation, then 
we have uncovered a primitive man's rationalization of a phenomenon which
is very common in animal societies, namely the power of the dominant in­
dividual to have the pick of the females. This power has a selective ad­
vantage which primitive men could not be expected to understand, and 
which is apparently explained in other ways - in this case, that it is 
the just reward for obligations to the group. Such rationalization of 
innate tendencies that are selected in evolution is how complicated
moral systems are able to come into being.
In larger social groups, and those with an increased industrial 
capability, the role of chieftainship becomes more and more powerful; by 
the side of the chief are placed sorcerers and shamans, and often a land­
owning nobility. This allows for the organization of a system of just­
ice, which is always an important part of the chief's duties in primit­
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ive societies where chieftainship is stable. The more advanced the-org­
anization, the more impartial can be the justice. In the relatively 
primitive Kubu tribesmen, the headman settles quarrels, but in the more 
advanced Ojibways and Wyandots of North American, a council is held be­
fore which the plaintiff is awarded a judgement, whereupon he can demand 
compensation or revenge against the transgressor, and takes It with 
the full sanction of the community. Such institutionalized justice makes
possible the settlement of disputes without a destabilizing feud bet­
ween members of the community. Quite clearly, it is also an extension 
of the method of settling the disputes that occut in animal societies, 
where the dominant individual is rarely concerned in the dominance con­
flicts of those lower on the dominance ladder, except occasionally to 
intervene in a fight to part the combatants. In primitive human soc­
ieties, the headman's role is often just this; but as the society be­
comes more advanced, so too does the manner of judgement and execution 
of justice become more impartial and complex. The settlement of dom­
estic squabbles in primitive societies is often a task carried out by 
the women, but organized public justice is always a male affair.
Punishment is usually administered on a scale of severity prop­
ortionate to the severity of the crime. The simplest punishments would 
be direct retribution; and even where there is no formal system of jus­
tice, there is nevertheless an obligation for the injured party, or 
the clan of the injured party as in the Hopi indian practice to take 
appropriate . revenge against the transgressor. Normally homicide re­
quires the retributive death of the murderer, and adultery is thought 
to be as serious in some primitive societies; and an individual or clan 
would be thought of as failing in a matter of honour, were revenge not 
to be taken.
From the functionalist point of view, the development of justice 
and law is a powerful agent in the elimination of disruptive influences 
in the overall order of primitive societies. The fact that notions of 
revenge and retribution, are to be found in the most primitive of human 
societies is evidence that the selective advantage of a rudimentary
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system of justice can cause that system to emerge even in peoples who 
are unaware of its overall effect.in eliminating the disruptive elem­
ents from a social order. It is to support this nonrational system of 
justice that the sense of obligation to administer punishment arises; as 
will be discussed in a later chapter, this belief in the obligation of 
a party to punish a transgressor forms the basis of the advanced judic- ' 
iai systems of all contemporary'civilisations, in which punishment has- 
the same biological function as.'that. in. primitive societies.
Maintenance of social structure in primitive societies
(a) Sexual relations within the tribe
In primitive h-uman societies the nuclear family is the basic unit 
of social organization, although the family itself is more extended than 
in many modern societies, particularly those with an advanced institu­
tion for the care of the elderly. The relatively low mobility of prim- 4
itive societies makes the care of relatives a common feature of group î
and family life.
There are usually powerful sanctions to prevent the disintegration
of the family. Divorce is not readily available in many cultures, such
as the Andamanese, some Papuans, the Veddas of Ceylon and other very17simple primitive communities, according to Washburn. In some societ­
ies, divorce is impossible.
Kinship and descent systems are considered to be very important in 
most primitive societies, but there is considerable variation from one 
society to the next.. The precise formulation of many moral rules, par­
ticularly those regarding marriage, incest and sexual practices,• depends 
to a very large extent upon such systems, and the nature of the systems 
themselves may depend on environmental conditions. For example, it is 
easy to speculate, along with Darlington in his treatise on The Evolu­
tion of Man and Society, that in the middle paleolithic age, the small 
group was also the breeding unit, but that as population began to grow, 
different groups or tribal organizations of groups would begin to con­
front one another. Under such conditions, the arrangements for out- 
breeding within the tribe (ensuring exogamy, in other words) would be 
connected with those for avoiding outbreeding between tribes (ensuring
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endogamy), Many existing customs with respect to sexual behaviour 
seem to preserve the unity and cohesiveness of the tribal units and 
the practice of endogamy. One need only consider the strange customs 
of mutilation, tattooing, hairdressing, and ornamentation which dis­
tinguish one tribe from another. Other customs, more directly moral 
in nature, serve to separate tribes. These are the tribe’s specific 
marriage regulations, based upon kinship or clan membership. The 
regularity of these customs places limits upon individual action; but 
at the same time, that regularity promotes the integrity of the breed­
ing unit and prevents the mating of dysfunctionally divergent pairs.
It may also promote the evolutionary fitness of the breeding unit for 
other reasons. For example, some groups are polygamous, which is of 
advantage where territorial conflicts are common and where males are 
consequently in short supply, while some (very rarely) are polyand- 
rous, notably a few Himalayan tribes where overpopulation of the sin­
gle valleys which constitute the limits of the territoriality of the 
tribe or group is always a threat, and where polyandry operates to 
limit population growth,
(b) Functional aspects of the law
The moral relations in primitive human societies can normally be 
explained with respect to the functional importance of their behav­
iour; those following certain moral systems and rules will survive 
better than those not. The earliest written lawcodes offer a remark­
able insight into this functional aspect of morality. As an example,
one might taJce the best-documented of the early codes, the Mosaic law18of the Israelites, described in Leviticus and Deuteronomy, The most
surprising element in the Jewish law, as we can read in Leviticus, is 
its body of doctrine concerning health, clothing, the care and killing 
of animals and the storage of food, doctrine which originates with the 
beliefs of the ancestral peoples, Hebrew, Canaanite and other. Even to­
day, these rules are kept by the Jewish people, although the pious Jew 
(or Moslem) is probably quite unaware that his abhorrence of pork derives 
from the proscriptions of the earliest lawgivers against eating an ani­
mal which was a carrier of trichinosis, and that those proscriptions 
have been instilled in Jewish families ever sinceo
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Eating a particular diet, the Jews have, traditionally, had to 
raise food apart from other races and had to live apart from them, and 
therefore the scope for interbreeding with other communities would be 
limited, a phenomenon which is Icnown as genetic isolation and which is 
the basis of the emergence of a race. This isolation would prevent dil­
ution of those characteristics which made for an orderly and successful 
functioning society, and even today Jews are often regarded as being a 
'race apart' from others wherever they can be foundo At the same time,
the law prohibits incest and circumstances which might precipitate in­
cest, a moral rule which became more precise over time, although there 
does not seem to be any real understanding that incest would contrib- 
ute to a loss in fertility rateso The Mosaic law also forbids other 
practices which tended to limit fertility rates. It requires segreg­
ation as a defence against venereal diseases (Leviticus 15) even though 
this segregation is couched in terms of 'uncleanness of issue' rather 
than in terms of the transmission of such diseases by heredity,
Jewish law favours the survival of the groups and races which obey 
itp which is one reason for its survival even today. Yet the functional 
importance of the law is rarely understood by those who follow it, and
the reasons given for adherence to the law in the scriptures is gener­
ally expressed in terms of 'cleanness* or 'pollution' or even in terms 
of the will of God, rather than in terms of selective advantage and sur­
vivals As this is so, Jewish law affords us with an enlightening ex­
ample of how rules and obligations which we assume are the work of reason 
are actually derived through selective pressures upon those who first 
adopt the behavioural standards but who do not necessarily recognize 
their effect in promoting the survival of those who do adopt them.
It is also noteworthy that althou^ the breeding isolation of 
the Jewish people has caused them to be the object of much scorn by 
other cultures, the isolation of breeding units is a prerequisite for 
the emergence of moral and other traits, through a mechanism of inter- 
demic selection.
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(c) Relationships with other groups
The primitive human group of perhaps a few dozen individuals 
may or may not he affiliated to a tribal unit, according to its stage 
of development and other environmental factors. In those which are 
tied together by tribal links, kinship systems will extend throughout 
the tribe because of intermarriage between groups. This mechanism 
will promote the unity of the tribe as a territorial unit. The tri­
bal organization, with these kinship links between its members, is a 
useful device not only with respect to territory, but with respect to 
the survival of individual families and groups when times are harsh. 
It is quite common for individuals of different societies to be ab­
sorbed by other bands within the tribe during a famine or drou^t, or 
where warfare with other tribes has rendered their residential area 
impossible.
Between tribes, or between non-tribal societies, relations may
be less amiable, particularly where territorial defence is necessary
for the preservation of the society. Typically, the code of morality
20which applies to members of the group is not applied to others; of­
ten, injuring or even killing outsiders is not frowned upon and may21even be commended. Spacing between groups is maintained by con­
tinual raiding and occasional murder during skirmishes between raid­
ing bands. So common is this form of territorial aggression that 
Tiger and Fox claim that most of the history of human warfare is the
history of small raiding-trips between neighbouring villages or town- 22ships. On a more subtle level, the !Kung Bushmen of the Nyae Nyae
area call .themselves 'pure* or 'clean* but refer to other ÎKung bands
as 'murderers* or 'poisoners*. No doubt this suspicious attitude
helps to preserve the distance between groups, irrespective of its
truth or falsehood, and it is tempting to say that this is a very
primitive form of the propaganda that industrial societies use so ef-23fectively in warfare.
Continuing skirmishes between groups are very widespread, from 
the stone-age culture of the Kurelu of New Guinea (who endure a per­
sistent state of warfare with one another) to the blood feuds of pre-
123
Hellenic Greece, Such activity is usually a male task : "Throughout 
most of human history," writes Washburn, "society has depended on
2Llyoung adult males to hunt, to fight, and maintain the social order,"
Yet it is comparatively rare to find that the activity is serious in 
terms of the loss of life. Certainly there may be a few fatalities, 
and weapons are used; but the wounding of one of the enemy is often 
sufficient to end hostilities for the moment,
(d) Territory and property
In animal communities, territorial defence is an integral part of 
the social psyshology of some species. Psychologists have often quer­
ied the role of territorial defence and aggression in human groups ; 
but if we recognize the broadness of the concept of territory and the 
diversity of the forms of threat, self-advertisement and hostility 
which are used to maintain territory, its existence as an important 
part of human life can hardly be doubted. This is certainly true 
within most primitive communities. For the moralist, then, it is im= 
portant to be aware of the boundaries of this territorial behaviour; 
if a natural territoriality has evolved with us, then by understanding 
it we may approach closer to an understanding of typical human values 
with respect to the possession and control of property. We might not 
necessarily approve of the natural system (and when this leads to the 
fatal consequences of modern warfare, something with which our prim­
itive aggressive tendencies and ancient inhibitory mechanisms find it 
impossible to deal, we will undoubtedly not approve of it) but in rec­
ognizing its purposes and evolutionary functions, we may also recog­
nize its resistance to change, and be prepared to anticipate and ac­
commodate it.
The natural emergence of systems of conduct concerning property is 
a subject of interest to philosophers for another reason, because it 
demonstrates that justice does not derive from our reflecting on the 
promotion of public welfare, but upon a more direct'instinctive*senti­
ment, Hume was more wise than he knew when in the Enquiry he wrote: 
"The dilemma seems obvious: As justice evidently tends to promote pub­
lic utility and to support civil society, the sentiment of justice is
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either derived from our reflecting on that tendency, or..« arises from 
a simple original instinct in the human breast... if the latter be the 
case, it follows that property, which is the object of justice, is also 
distinguished by a simple original instinct, and is not ascertained by 
any argument or reflection. But who is there that ever heard of such an 
instinct? Or is this a subject in which new discoveries can be made?"
Since Hume's time, many ethological discoveries on the subject of ter­
ritorial possession and defence have in fact been made. Had Hume been 
equipped with this knowledge, he would have been able to devise a the­
ory of morality and justice much simpler than the one he did, because 
he would have been able to insist that our notions of justice were der- 4
ived from a 'moral sense' just as our other notions of morality, and {
were not the product of rational reflection upon the utility of the rules 
of justice with respect to these other moral notions. Furthermore,
the understanding that.,property is 'distinguished by a simple original 
instinct' is something which cautions the moralist against devising mor­
al systems in which the rules of justice, although sanctioned by ration­
al reflection upon their utility to the community, are out of accord with 
the natural justice which is a part of human psychology and against which 
posited rules are ultimately judged. Let us now examine the specific 
practices associated with property in primitive communities.
Most often, property is shared between the members of a prim­
itive human community, and certainly, land is so sharedo Group or tri­
bal land is given the status of common ground, although in the Vedda 
peoples (for example) there may be land held privately within it,» In 
other cases, trees or other objects of utility may be owned by an indiv­
idual who would enjoy most, but rarely all, of its products, Dwelling- 
huts of Andamanese groups belong to each one of the family in occup­
ation, and communal huts which are to be found in some primitive comm­
unities are divided internally among the several families occupying. 
it, each family having its own part or corner, and each recognizing an
obligation to maintai^ its portion,
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As with animal territoriality, human territories may he a function 
of several conditions, a variability which may be of selective advantage 
for the group, the tribe, or even the species as a whole. Between the 
world wars, the Bushmen of the Dobe region in southern Africa came to 
recognize a dual structure for territorial possession. Families would 
have exclusive rights to vegetables within their own territory during 
the wet season, but other bands would be allowed to hunt animals 
through the family areas. Other hunting and gathering peoples have de­
veloped similar dual systems.
The size of group territories may vary. Nearly all primitive com­
munities are stationary, and the territory they defend has to be large 
enough'to support them. Where tribes are nomadic, it is usually because 
a particular area will not support them for long; this is true, for ex­
ample, in the nomadic groups of the north African deserts. The size of 
the territories also varies according to local conditions and to the' 
dispersion of food resources and population. The Andamanese group cont­
rols a territory averaging about sixteen square miles. The average area 
occupied by a whole tribe would be about ten times that, and different 
groups could hunt on the same piece of tribal land while they remained 
at peace. Normally, however, hunting territories are mutually exclus­
ive. Each Tasmanian tribe, for instance, occupied its own hunting ter­
ritory, the boundaries of which were well respected, and to overstep 
the mark was considered reason for conflict. The same is true in some 
of the South American aboriginalso In general, primitive human societies 
are fiercely territorial*
Morality in primitive societies
(a) Sharing and cooperation
Sharing and mutual assistance are perhaps more common in primitive 
peoples than in animals* Food, for example, has a special significance 
in the norms and rules of primitive groups and is frequently shared be­
tween the members of the group9 although not necessarily equally* The 
pygmies of central Africa will call in neighbouring groups to share a 
large kill, such as an elephant, ..A strict sharing of food was observed
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by members of Bo to cu do groups, but the best parts were commonly reserved 
for the hunters and their relatives; in the Gree and Hopi Indians, food 
collectively acquired was collectively shared. Families who were 
short would be invited to share food with friends or distant relatives, 
In primitive groups throughout the world, there is a widespread be- 27lief that to trade for food, especially to sell it, is reprehensible, •
Other cooperative traits in primitive cultures are so obvious 
that they hardly merit repetition. Parental care is usually intense, 
and youngsters are educated and socialized into the roles appropriate 
to their sex at an early stage. Cooperation through division of labour 
with the advantages which an economy brings, is widely established in 
all but the very simplest peoples. Exchange and barter for mutual ad­
vantage is much more common in human groups than in the nonhuman pri­
mates, probably because intelligence, foresight and language make trade 
much easier. Speech also makes possible the transmission of infor­
mation through a group concerning the trustworthiness and reliability 
of other group members; if reciprocal altruism is to become an estab­
lished way of life, this is the cultural stage at which it will take 
root. Except in those rare cases of borderline existence cited by 
Colin Turnbull and some others, cooperation within a tribal unit is 
an altogether unremarkable feature of primitive human society.
(b) Religious practice
Culture may be learned by the individual, and it may vary from 
one group or tribe to the next; this does not mean to say that it does 
not enjoy some measure of permanence. Indeed, cultural repertoires 
seem to change rather slowly in any human group. Fashions of dress 
or language certainly come and go rather quickly; but these can be 
altered without great social upheaval. Political views, especially 
attitudes towards other nations, seem to be rather, more permanent; 28while the slowest of all cultural changes are, according to Wilson, 
changes in sexual regulations and of the belief in particular deities.
The slow-changing forms of culture, which are probably a func­
tional part of the human social system in a Darwinian sense, are most 
usually encapsulated in strict ritual, Jacob Bronowski quotes the 
elaborate ritual surrounding the manufacture of Japanese swords, a
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technique that has been passed through single families since the29thirteenth century. The ritual calls for precise - and effective - 
metalwork, with a series of important stages being executed in just 
the right way at just the right time, when the flame is just the right 
temperature, say ’the colour of the morning sun’ or ’the colour of 
straw*. In a society without books and without thermometers, this way' 
of recording the technique in fixed ritual practices would be of con­
siderable advantage, once the technique itself had been perfected. It 
is a tribute to the permanence of these semi-divine rituals that they 
have survived so intact for many centuries.
It has been seen that the rudiments of religion or magic are re­
corded in the cave paintings of early man. Magic and totemism, and 
the power to manipulate the environment (particularly the movements 
of prey animals) seem to be associated with these paintings, a fact in­
ferred from their singular content. Unchangeable myths and traditions 
occur within nearly all primitive societies, although a belief in a 
deity or deities is perhaps not the norm in hunting and gathering soc­
ieties, with the evidence suggesting that about one third of hunting30bands share such religious beliefs,^ In agrarian societies, however, 
particularly in herding cultures, the rate of group belief in an act­
ive and moral deity rises greatly, something which might be associated 
with the greater foresight and rational capacity needed for agricultural 
life.
Religious belief seems to be a way of codifying a belief in some 
transcendent moral norms and values, H i ^  intelligence might lead 
individuals or families to adopt their own moral norms, perhaps more 
functional for their particular situation; but if every intelligent in­
dividual were able to set his own standards, the society as a whole 
would quickly collapse. Consequently, it would be of selective advan- J
tage to the society if some particular moral code were accepted with 
little deviation by all the members of the group, no matter how arbit­
rary it happens to be, as long as that code, when practised, promotes 
the selection of the group. Religious belief and ritual serves to make 
the code appear more necessary and permanent than would otherwise be
128
the case, and threatens punishment against those who ignore it, group 
rejection of those attempting to reform it. Human beings are very will­
ing to accept religious and other authority, and this *indoctrinability* 
referred to by Haddington, Campbell, Wilson and other authors is
clearly useful to the group if it ensures the unity and cohesiveness of32a set of moral rules,
(c) Ethics and morality
It should not be assumed, however, that all primitive societies are 
attached to one particular code of morality. Between societies there 
may be quite different codes, depending on kinship structure, environ­
ment, feeding habits, and other factors. The morality which was ap­
propriate in the arboreal life, for example, would not be appropriate 
to the hunters of the African savannah. The groups which have made the 
transition might have adopted some parts of the new morality, but re­
tained some parts of the old, a situation which will engender some con­
fusion about moral value, and which could well explain disagreements 
about morality even in advanced societies. The same kind of con­
fusion will spring from the fact that a moral system which discriminates 
on the basis of age and sex will be more successful in evolutionary 
terms than one which does not, and a system which is adjusted to meet 
changes in environment or population density will likewise be more ef­
ficient, Different groups facing different conditions could therefore 
adopt divergent moral systems, each of them appropriate to the condit- 
tions they face. Within any single group (at least within those ad­
vanced enough to be able to distinguish the world as it is from the 
world as it ought to be) there may, likewise, be disagreement on ihe 
appropriate code of ethics,
(d) Art and culture
The religious life of early man, as has been said, is recorded in 
his art. Like so many aspects of human social life, we find that art 
is also found in other animal species* The most obvious forms are the 
paintings of chimpanzees in zoos throughout the world; their daubings 
are not random, but follow definite patterns. Other 'artistic* achieve­
ments can be seen in other species, however, particularly the spectac-33ular nest-building of the bowerbird,
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The study of aesthetics may be able to make use of the ethological 
approach to explain why it is that certain forms of art appeal to us, 
and why we bother to notice them at all. The question is not a novel 
one: in one of Conan Doyle’s stories, Sherlock Holmes mentions the hy­
pothesis that we are still moved by music because nonverbal, tone com­
munication was important in human societies before the adoption of Ian-' 
guage. Similarly, it might be that the features of representational 
art which we find pleasing today are those which would have signified 
something of importance to our early ancestors, say a source of food 
or water. The scope for hypothesis is probably limitless, but some 
general theories on this subject are so broad that they are immune
from test. It would seem to be a subject in which field-work on the34aesthetics of primitive human communities could pay dividends.''^  
Conclusion
The study of morality in primitive societies is necessary to the 
ethological approach. It helps us to discern which traits are mal­
leable in human evolution, and to discern which traits are rather more 
conservative. Also, it enables us to see the functional nature of moral 
codes, working within comparatively simple commun!ti es * Lastly, it 
helps us to discern the limits which natural selection places upon 
human morality.
Although considerable variation is possible between groups, the 
striking feature of primitive human communities is that within a local 
community, the acceptance of the moral system is almost complete and 
highly rigid. If an individual transgresses a moral code, he will 
often await his punishment quite calmly, as if it were impossible to 
escape. Religious practices, myths and traditions help to preserve 
the cohesion of the moral system, and slight differences in practice 
serve to isolate one breeding population from the next, a feature of 
social life which preserves the integrity of the social pattern of 
actions itself.
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Chapter 8
INHERITED TRAITS IN THE MODERN WORLD
"If man were indeed a blank slate for his culture to write on at will whatever perverse message it chose, we would be in even greater peril than we appear to be,"
Lionel Tiger & Robin Fox^
In our examination of the evolution of a number of social traits 
including those which we normally call 'moral* traits, we have seen 
that there have been strong selective pressures at work to produce 
those moral traits. In human society, the pressure has been at its 
greatest, and the mental facility for altruistic behaviour, because 
of the use of language and the ability to calculate the consequences 
of an action (to some degree). Through religious beliefs and through 
the cultural traditions of human societies, men have found themselves 
committed to the welfare of the society as a whole, rather than to 
their individual and narrow self-interest. The values which called 
for that advanced cooperative state were laid down long before human 
beings evolved however, although in human evolution they were at a 
high premium; but values can never be established by rational rnfr 
lection and calculation, for that calculation may only clarify what 
are the most appropriate means of satisfying our values.
Modern man uses his faculties of calculation far more than ani­
mal or even primitive human agents. The selective advantage of this
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power may be maintained by the fact that modern men live in compact 
industrial societies, with which our evolutionary morality did not 
emerge to deal. It does not follow, however, that we have the power 
to select our values at will. In addition to the values which they 
do not need to be taught, human children are continually bombarded 
with the elements of social and moral practice common to the society 
in which they live. As will be outlined later on, human beings seem 
to be culture-acceptors; children crave to learn these established 
practices, and their acceptance reinforces those practices in future 
years. This is a human addition to the 'retention and variation' 
equation of the evolutionary process. In large breeding populations, 
the genetic constitution that produces sociability can be diluted with 
other elements, and so education is probably of the largest functional 
value in maintaining social life in such populations, characteristic 
of industrial man.
In this chapter we will review the moral and social traits that 
we appear to have in common with animal societies and with our early 
human ancestors. This is not to imply a genetic basis for such char­
acteristics, but it will help to show the remarkable continuity in 
practices that is of functional importance to all societies. We will 
follow the usual pattern of social organization, maintenance of social 
organization, and altruistic traits.
The elements of social structure
(l) Widespread nature of social life
Human nature has not changed to one important extent, that we 
continue to live in social groups. Our mastery over transport, medi­
cine and the means of production has led to the expansion of geograph­
ically based communities and the expansion of breeding populations; 
but nevertheless geographical location remains a flexible limit upon 
a population. Even where our cities are very large, they are com­
monly broken down into small neighbourhoods, which might seem to be of 
little consequence to outsiders, but which are very important to the 
social life of the residents. Sometimes, city neighbourhoods are even 
divided by ethnic background, impressing one of their individual
134
2and discrete nature. This being so, the conditions necessary for the 
continuance of a genetically-based morality are broadly satisfied; 
proximity of members of a society, their mutual dependence and partial 
isolation are all features of modern industrial life, albeit to a much 
lesser extent than in the hunting and gathering peoples.
The pervasive nature of social bonding can be seen from the large 
amount of debt in modern societies. Not only does debt in the monetary 
sense maintain the mutual dependence of individuals, but the instit­
ution of gift-giving also establishes a labyrinthine network of rights 
and obligations between individuals, a network which is difficult to 
sever.^ The institution has its origin in animal societies; many ani­
mai species share food or use gifts of food to reduce aggression in a 4mating partner. In a larger sense, economic activity-is dependent 
upon social cohesion and cooperation, and helps to reinforce the bonds 
between individuals. Modern economic life is a distant analogy of 
ancient agricultural or hunting life, and the relations necessary to 
sustain it have not disappeared,-^
(2) Dominance orders in the modern world
Even in the most egalitarian countries, rank has not been extin­
guished; the hallmarks of status are always to be found, even in the 
Soviet Union and in the Peoples* Republic of China, The grand homes, 
the well-appointed offices and the expensive limousines are always 
with us,^ Between countries, the symbols might be different, just as 
in primitive societies, rank is settled by different abilities (tree- 
climbing in one band, hunting prowess in another) and represented by 
different marks of rank.
Control over social activities, which we have seen to be assoc­
iated with dominance in animal and primitive societies, is retained 
in the modern world. Executive power is rarely wielded by a large 
group; the cabinets of most governments are less than thirty people 
strong, and legislative assemblies are rarely more than a few hund­
red, The concentration of power in the hands of rather few people is 
an almost universal characteristic; even the Chinese Revolutionary 
Committee had its prime ministers and presidents. Position on this
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elite ladder is sought jealously, as political conflicts throughout 
the world testify. There are other marks of this dominance order 
which liken it to animal orders. For example, there is frequently'only 
one head of state, commonly recognized as the dominant member of a 
country (although in some countries, the duties of the head of state 
are severed from the executive power, although the executive branch of 
most governments has its own dominant individual). Some constitutions 
ensure that the head of state is of a minimum age; and few presidents 
and prime ministers are very young.
Extended industrial societies, however, cut down the scope for 
an individual to become a part of the dominant establishment. There 
is still only one prime minister in the United Kingdom, still only 
one president in the United States, even though the populations of 
those countries have multiplied enormously in the last two hundred 
years or so. On the other hand, the number of smaller groupings in 
which an individual can rise to the top has increased. Modern soc­
iety is, as Eibl-Eibesf eldt claims, full of subdivisions of govern­
ment, bureaucratic departments with their own hierarchies, clubs and 
associations of many kinds, even sub-cultures with their own spirit-7ual leaders. Each organization is closely analogous to a human hun­
ting group in size, in the exclusiveness of its membership, shared 
goals or affections, recognized norms of behaviour and competition or 
rivalry with other similar organizations. Each too has its dominant 
members, its committees, its chairmen, its gurus or its captains. The 
urge to rise to the top, even on a limited scale, seems to be a very 
common feature within human societies. Because of the usefulness of 
stable dominance orders in all forms of social group, as outlined in 
chapter four above, this trait is hardly surprising,
(3) Sexual roles and the division of labour
We have noted that in early human evolution, a division of labour 
would have been advantageous. We have also noted the generality of 
male dominance over females in primate and primitive human societies. 
There are many rather obvious illustrations that these relations 
still affect our actions and relations, however much we may wish the 
opposite.
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As regards dominance orders for example, Maurice Duverger paints 
an astonishing picture of the one-sidedness of politics.^ There is, 
he says, a "tendency to regard politics as a man's affair. The cluh, 
the forum, debates, Parliament and political life in general are still 
considered to be typically masculine activities," Later he notes "The 
percentage of women Members of Parliament, for instance, is hardly in­
creasing, On the contrary, it tends to fall after the first elections 
in which women have had the suffrage, and to become stabilized at a 
very low level" in any world government assembly, Lionel Tiger cites 
general maxima of women members of these bodies, including France (3.6 
percent), Norway (4 percent), Britain (3 percent), and the United States 
( 2 percent) Duverger notes that even in the Netherlands, noted for 
its liberal ideals, five percent was 'seldom attained*,
Furthermore, many senior female politicians have achieved that 
status partly through the political positions of their relatives ; Mrs, 
Bandaranaike of Ceylon, Mrs, Ghandi, Mrs, Roosevelt, Lady Astor and 
Jenny Lee (both of Britain) are examples. Another point on this issue 
is that female suffrage (and voting is a rather minor step in the pol­
itical process) has been won only very recently in industrial coun­
tries and is still not universal. In the public debates on the sub­
ject, men played perhaps the leading role.
Professional organizations have the same barriers. Even in the 
Soviet Union, where women are supposed to undertake the work of men, 
it is the more menial occupations which employ the highest propor­
tions of women, while the professions are dominated by men,^^ In 
other countries, the professional exclusion of women is often much 
more advanced. The London stock market admitted its first female mem­
ber only in the mid-1970s, and after much deliberation and fanfare, 
Mugdock wrote in 1937 that "while a number of occupations are univer­
sally masculine, none is everywhere feminine," and the same is still12true, ' Mead and Kaplan noted that only a tiny percentage of top ju-13dicial posts are occupied by women, In seafaring communities, per­
haps closer analogies of primitive hunting bands, women are thought 
to be unlucky on boats (and even oilrigs), a tradition which may well
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have descended directly from the exclusion of women from ancient hunt­
ing parties for purely functional reasons. While the functional im­
portance of the exclusion might be less today than in ancient times, 
the attitudes that produced it still exist. Many times is it heard 
that women * ought to be at home' or that some occupation is not 'wom­
en’s work', even where women have demonstrated that they have the 
skill and the determination to perform well at these tasks. Our 
notions of appropriate sexual roles seem to be most persistent.
(4) Age differences
In all societies, modern or ancient, the young hold a special 
place. On the one hand, they are the future representatives of the 
social system or culture and must be inducted into that system through 
education and a long period of conditioning, moderated by praise and 
punishment. On the other hand, they must be protected and appraised 
at a hi^er value than those who are already functioning members of 
society but who have little more genetic contribution to make to the 
society.
Consequently we find that children are highly valued, as group 
fitness considerations would dictate, Adam Smith expressed things 
well, saying that "In the eye of nature, it would seem, a child is 
a more important object than an old man, and excites a much more lively, 
as well as a much more universal sympathy... In ordinary cases an old 
man dies without being much regretted by. anybody. Scarce a child can 
die without rending asunder the heart of somebody, Althou^ not 
equipped with Darwinian theory to guide him. Smith did recognize the 
importance of the young for survival: "Nature, for the wisest.pur­
poses, has rendered in most men, perhaps in all men, parental tender­
ness a much stronger affection than filial piety. The continuance an 
propagation of the species depends altogether upon the former,,,"
Hume also subjugates other virtues to the need to raise children, say­
ing for example, "The long and helpless infancy of man, requires the 
combination of the parents for the subsistence of their young; and 
that requires the virtue of chastity or fidelity to the marriage bed.
Without such a utility, it will readily be owned, that such a virtue16would never have been thougjht of,"
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Children are not a part of the social dominance pattern; they 
have no political rights or executive privileges in any modern soc­
iety. The transition from this state to the state of a participating 
member of the adult community is often marked with some formal cere­
mony, In Jewish cultures it is the ceremony of Bar Mitzvah; in others 
it might be examinations or arbitrary ages of majority. The tendency • 
of societies to adopt these ceremonies is very ancient, and can be 
detected in the rituals of many primitive peoples - for example the 
initiation task of American Indians to bring back the talon of an 
eagle, or the dangerous leaping (restrained only by a vine rope) of 
some South American tribes. The form may differ, but the importance 
of the ceremony remains the same; it marks induction to manhood,
The position of the child as the future representative of the 
social lifestyle of the population is of great concern to all. In 
the industrial world, this concern is manifested by the pioportions 
of national budgets that go on education and child health and welfare, 
(in pre-industrial societies, the budget is no indication, for much 
teaching will be done within the family or local village community).
Education is, of course, of the utmost functional value, because
it is through education that the young can be encouraged to accept
the prevailing social morality. The lengthy period of maternal care
in human beings makes this educational process more effective; the
child grows to accept the values of his parents, relatives and friends
and can even draw on the experience of generations long since dead,
or at least that part of their experience they are able to put in 
17their books. The claims of educational institutions that they re­
lease an individual's powers are rather weak when compared to the 
years of subtle inculcation of traditional attitudes, social skills 
and moral qualities of self-discipline. It is hardly any wonder that 
some Athenians found Socrates to be a threat, for he questioned the 
traditional customs and virtues,; and he stressed that the intellect 
could free the soul.
Education is not a collection of discrete lessons, each learned 
in isolation. On the contrary, social learning is going on with many
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overlapping generations, in an environnent where people of different 
ages coexist side by side. In this environment, it is easy to perceive 
how the continuity of cultures and practices is maintained. Were a 
child to learn about laws, morals and facts from his grandfather, and 
he in turn learned them from his, and so on, then only some eighty 
lessons need be learned since the beginning of recorded history. This 
number leaves small enou^ room for change; but when one considers 
that these lessons would be going on just out of phase with the same 
practices between other children and adults, and that the children were 
learning from each other as well as from the adults, then the scope for 
change is perhaps even less. Variation mi^t occur, and successful 
evolution demands its occurence; but retention of social characterist­
ics has a very strong force at its disposal. Furthermore, there is 
a tendency in all human beings to accept the decision of the majority, 
or at least the decision of a local group or group of respected peers, 
as the psychologist Asch has shown in a series of fascinating experi­
ments.^^ Children especially have a tendency to accept authority and
to absorb orthodox opinion, and this trait is obviously connected with
19selective advantage. In fact, children do not merely accept such 
opinion, they crave for it. Lastly, it may be noted that the use of 
a basic language constrains the thinking of individuals. Most langu­
age has a built-in conservatism and fits most compatibly with trad­
itional virtues. In English, for- example, the word 'foreign* carries 
a distinct overtone of hostility. Or again, to describe a.person, as* 
being *of quality*, .we naturally mean of good quality; and in addi­
tion to' these terms which are not necessarily normative but which do 
carry normative connexions, there-is a host of strictly normative terms 
such as 'good*, 'best* and so .on, each of which encapsulates the trad­
itional view.of the normative. The contribution of such pressures to­
ward conformity may be essential to an adaptive accumulation of social 
customs and to the 'retention* arm of the evolutionary balance.
Nature has established mechanisms to ensure that the educational 
process does not go wildly wrong. Education is carried out in a soc­
ial environment, and if that environment is lacking, it may be impos­
sible for a young individual to mature normally or even survive phys-
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ically. There is dramatic evidence cited hy Spitz in which nearly a
third of the children committed to a foundling hospital died before the
age of two and a half years. The problem was not a lack of physical20care, but their starvation of normal family affection. Further ob­
servations by John Bowlby suggest that in orphaned children, even 
those which do survive suffer severe disruptions to their ethical and . 
social repertoire. Viewing cases where children were separated for a 
very long time from their natural parents, Bowlby says that the child 
will behave as if no human contact is of meaning to him; he will be 
unable to establish emotional bonds with other people; he becomes self-
centred: "He will appear cheerful,.. and unafraid of anyone. But this21sociability is superficial: he appears no longer to care for anyone."
This state of affairs will, of course, reduce the possibility of 
survival and procreation in those individuals who are not properly 
socialized, and will therefore prevent the possibility of anti­
social tendencies spreading in the population. It is also interesting 
to note the consequences of this for the developmentalist school of 
psychology. As has been mentioned already, the fact that human and 
animal behaviour can be altered after birth has led some thinkers to 
suppose that the range of possible behaviour is infinite, and that much 
variation in fact occurs. This ignores the heavy importance of social 
circumstances in child education; the child cannot be isolated from 
the traditional social forces which impress him constantly. Even 
though parts of his behaviour are malleable and can be changed by edu­
cation, in practice there is remarkable continuity in what is learned.
Maintenance of the social system
(l) Cooperation in defence
In modern industrial societies it is comparatively rare for all 
of the members of the society to cooperate in defence, although mil­
itary service is expected of everyone in some states such as Switzer­
land, Our ingenuity and the large scale of our societies allows us to 
employ others to form our armies. Nevertheless, it is a rare country 
indeed which does not possess a standing military force.
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Armies are always organized upon lines of strict rank, the form
of organization which seems to work so well in the defence of other
primate societies. At the same time, war is a man's sport, involving
the young males in the main. It is very rare for women in any country
to he active in the armed forces on a large scale, and even then they?2are never used in front-line battle,'' The First World War is often.
cited for the participation of women in the forces, but as Hirschfeldt
notes, this participation was confined predominantly to technical ser- 
23vices. In the Women's Royal Air Force of today, women are still al­
lotted the clerical and educational duties rather than combat posts ; 
there are few women pilots. These differences are not the result of 
a female lack of ability in any of the physical skills ; they occur be­
cause we think that there are 'proper' roles for men and women even 
today. This attitude is of undoubted advantage to the society whose 
members possess it, as it would be in a nonhuman primate band and a 
band of primitive hunter-gatherers. Women and children, the future 
prospects of a society, are usually the object of defence, while the 
relatively dispensible males are its practitioners.
Organized warfare has always been a male preserve, as even our 
recorded history makes plain. At the same time, it has changed in 
other ways. For example, it must be observed that violence resulting 
in the death of a nonspecific is very rare in the animal kingdom; it 
may happen under conditions of severe overcrowding, but for the most 
part it is absent, even in territorial disputes. The early history 
of human warfare seems to be much the same. In primitive peoples to­
day, conflict between societies is mostly limited to skirmishes and 
raids. The institution of the king's champion by which disputes were 
settled in Biblical times and before, existed well into the Middle 
Ages, In Greek literature we find that skirmishes with adjacent town­
ships were deemed successful when one or two casualties had been suf­
fered by the opponents, which was sufficient to satisfy honour. The 
rise of the conquering armies did not begin until agriculture, and the 
other material possessions which go along with it, was well estab­
lished.
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Modem warfare is different from ancient warfare and from the raids 
and skirmishes of hunting societies in that territory is not the sole 
object of the conflict. There is a limit to the amount of space which 
any society can control and exploit. But modern societies are rich 
in other ways; rich in potential slave labour and rich in material 
possessions or singular technological skills. The attractiveness of 
complete conquest is therefore increased. It is also made possible by 
the invention of weapons which ld-11 at long range. One of the reas­
ons that the killing of a nonspecific is rare in animals is that ani­
mals either lack the natural weaponry to do it, or specific Inhibitory24behaviour has evolved to prevent it. Men also share a certain inhib­
itory mechanism; it is difficult for most people to consider killing 
another with their bare hands, or even with a weapon at close quar­
ters, Advanced weapons which kill at great distances have solved this25problem for us, and have changed the face of war. It is indeed
tragic that when we need our natural morality the most, our technolog­
ical ability has outstripped it.^^
(2) Dispersion
In primitive societies, each group of about fifty or so indi­
viduals defends its own territory, the size of which depends on many 
factors including the available food supply. The functional nature 
of this arrangement for the continuation of the society is obvious.
Industrial societies, of course, are much more complicated; as 
the number of people living in a small geographical area has increased 
by virtue of increasing agricultural and technological ability, our 
relations with other members of our own community or country have be­
come more difficult. It is quite plausible to argue that human nat­
ure has not evolved with a sound mechanism for dealing with large
community life; that our intergroup responses are still more approp­
riate for pre-industrial, possibly pre-agricultural lifestyles which 
they evolved to facilitate. Being clever creatures, however,, we find 
ourselves members of extraterritorial groups and make a certain alleg­
iance toward them. These may be professional groups, small local com­
munities or neighbourhoods, religious sects or political clubs, spec­
ial interest societies, or any other,
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This phenomenon is what Garrett Harding calls 'tribalism' in the 27modern sense. The term should not be reserved for small groups, 
clubs and socities, however, for the same phenomenon appears to apply 
to racial and even geographical divisions between the residents of 
any single country. The 'tribal' attitude is typified by sentiments 
similar to those in ancient tribalism. The 'tribe* is perceived as a 
special group, distinct from others, to which each member has a per­
sonal obligation. Other groups are viewed as competitors, with fear 
and hostility manifested toward them to some degree. One morality is 
recognized for insiders, another for outsiders. When the 'tribes' are 
religious or racial units, it is not uncommon to find a country torn 
apart by civil violence between them. The xenophobia which typifies 
the tribal attitude becomes increasingly important, and hatred toward 
other tribes is taken as a mark of membership in one's own. Noncon­
formists are driven out or punished when this modern tribalism reaches 
its most advanced stages.
For the most part, competition between modern 'tribes' is easily 
controlled, but civil war between two or more factions has afflicted 
nearly every geographical country at one time or another. Xenophobic 
tendencies in these circumstances can hardly be praised, but their 
extensiveness can be judged from the underlying evolutionary functions 
which they do serve, or did serve in small human groups. The group- 
uniting function is still present; hatred of outgroup individuals re­
inforces ingroup ties. For primitive bands, this might be a useful 
function, even thou^ in modern industrial communities, it may lead to 
great strife. The isolation of a group throu^ xenophobia is another 
function in the same category, this time the evolutionary advantage 
being that it preserves the concentration of genetically-determined or 
culturally-determined practices in the group, avoiding an influx of 
possibly disruptive individuals. The difficulty for moralists is that 
to some limited extent, these two advantages of xenophobia are still 
present. We like to feel as though we belong to some special group 
of similar individuals, be it professional, racial or other; and the 
indiscriminate marriage of completely different cultures really could 
cause problems in moral and social behaviour where the two sets of
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social attitudes come into conflict. Even if we were able to abolish 
our fear and hostility to other ’tribes”, then, there could still be 
difficulties because of the possible disruption in social systems 
which (in isolation) function well at the moment.
So far we have been talking about the opposition of groups that 
do not necessarily have a territorial base. In modern man, large ' 
areas of land are defended by countries or kingdoms as a complete 
unit. Defence of smaller areas by a group of fifty individuals or 
so is much rarer; but this does not mean that the primitive territor­
ial imperatives of our hunting past have been extinguished. Modern 
social life has destroyed such territorial units, but we find that in­
dividuals are still highly territorial, and family units share the 
tendency. Our homes are separate; our gardens are often marked by 
enclosures, walls and hedges. Very precise surveying and mapmalcLng 
leave no doubt as to the limits of ownership units. Trespass is 
grounds for court action, even though the act of trespass may cause no 
physical damage to property.
Our complicated societies allow there to be many forms of ter­
ritory; not only homes, but offices, even cars, can be included. All 
of them tend to be marked with the owner's name or some distinctive 
decoration which establishes ownership. Rooms are not entered before 
the door is knocked, a ritual which acknowledges the jurisdiction of 
the occupant.
The concentration of human life in industrial cities has forced
a dramatic curtailment in the amount of space which an individual can
enjoy, althou#i it is true that individuals can learn to live under
such conditions. Nevertheless, strict laws of property ownership and
transfer are applied, which shows the psychological importance of
property and personal territories in the mind of modern men. Were our
nature different, like the galapagos lizard, we might well be able to
live on top of one another, with several families crowded in the same
room and sharing the same ground. The fact that few human beings are
able to accept such conditions testifies to the strength of natural28mechanisms of human dispersion,
1^5
(3) The regulation of sexual conduct
Laws about sexual behaviour can be found in every human society,
and they are supplemented by as large a body of moral doctrine on the
subject, at least in the more advanced primitive societies and in the29industrial societies. The widespread nature of these regulations and 
concerns suggests the key importance which is placed upon sexual be­
haviour, Clearly, the breeding practices of any group is of instru­
mental consequence to the survival of that group; but it is rare for 
sexual rules or morality to be couched in terms of social welfare; an 
appeal to inherited or accepted values is all that can be raised in 
justification. As we see from Hebrew law for example, the proscrip­
tions on indiscriminate sexual behaviour are sometimes written in lang­
uage of ’cleanliness’ or ’fitness* or other quality which is valued in 
itself,
A successful breeding population will display several rather uni­
form, predictable traits. In the first place, there is partial iso­
lation from other populations, and more or less complete isolation from 
widely different groups, the latter trait tending to diminish the fre­
quency of wide crossbreeds and maintain the distinctiveness of races. 
Secondly, population bonds are strengthened by endogamous mating with­
in the population. Of course, a breeding population may include sev­
eral local communities or distinct groups, sometimes groups which are 
generally hostile or on poor relations. Mating will also be exogamous 
to the extent that it occurs outside a family unit. Through the bal­
ance of these forces, population character and uniqueness is retained, 
while the possibility of genetic variation is allowed.
The rules which embody this breeding system are still to be found 
in modern industrial countries. As breeding populations have expanded, 
and as cultural factors have increased the number of individuals with 
whom intracultural marriage would be possible, the traditional norm 
that mating should be inside a certain population has become less nec­
essary, Even so, there are enduring prejudices against marriage with 
different national or cultural groups in many cases, a relic of the 
previously, functional sexual morality of the primitive band and tribe,
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The regulation of incest, however, is still with us in an obvious and 
undiluted form, Darlington, on this subject says: "The rule of exogamy 
in one form or another applies to all known human societies. Kinship 
by descent is always recognized and mating with one’s own kin is al­
ways held to be wrong, one*s own kin being those who are classified as
kindred under one's own social system. This rule we can ascribe with •30certainty to our common ancestors as the beginning of modern mano"
The case is, however, perhaps not so clear cut. In the first place,
there seems to be a universal rule against marriage within the family,
but not necessarily a universal rejection of sexual relations within
the family. Some anthropologists, such as Murdock, claim that the ban
on sexual relations is universal, while some, such as Fox, claim that31there are clear exceptions within primitive cultures of today, ¥e
can, however, take it that the proscription of incest is very general,
especially within the nuclear family, although cultures may vary in the
rules regarding incest with related kin; in some cases the proscription
can cover very distant relatives who happen to be recognized as ]d.n or32called such because of the particulars of the language,
A discussion of this (or any similar) aspect of social life must 
address three questions: firstly, what is the selective advantage of 
the regulation; secondly, what is the source of our motivation to com­
mit some act that is contrary to our advantage; and lastly, why do soc­
ieties come to forbid such behaviour at all? These questions have been 
raised in a critical manner by Robin Fox in his book Kinship and Marri­
age, and they do indeed show the problems that may arise when we 
tackle such speculative subjectso
In the first place, why should incest be a disadvantage to soc­
ieties practising it? We can dismiss the popular folklore that mutat­
ion rates would be unduly hi^, which is quite unfoundedo We must also 
doubt the arguments that individuals who marry or have offspring by 
their own relations will, like Oedipus, be their own fathers or suffer 
some other confusion. Unless this led to a complete subversion of fam­
ilial authority, there should be little problem of evolutionary fitness. 
Nor can we really take seriously the view that incestual relations
14?
prompt the formation of unbreakable bonds between the partners and a 
reduced desire to form kinship links with other families; again, it 
has not been proved that this argument is sound. Casual incestual 
relations within a family would be quite compatible with marriage 
outside the family. But it is certainly true that persistent incest­
ual relations, or marriage within the family, would have some of these' 
problematic effectso In particular, it would reduce the dependence of 
the family unit on other families for the purposes of finding mates; 
and this would reduce the network of bonds between the members of a 
society in which several nuclear families coexisted. In the selection 
stakes, it is altogether likely that the close-bonded societies would 
perform better than those made up of discrete families •with little re­
liance upon each other. Consequently, the successful societies would 
tend to be the exogamous ones; and from there is it a simple step that 
our ancestors might have "taken to assume that sexual relations, and not 
ma.rriage, was the deciding factoro
The question of o’ur motivation for incest is also revealing.
There are, of course, two schools of thought: one is that we have a
high moti-vation to commit incest and that this must be regulated for
biological advantage; the other is that we have little such moti'vation
and that lack is the basis of the 'rationalized* proscriptions. The
latter school backs up its claims with 'demographic' evidence that
early man would really have had little opportunity due to a short
life-span, relatively few offspring survi-ving to maturity, the
wide spacing of childbirths and a random sex ratio; each factor would
have increased the likelihood of extrafamilial matingo When these33factors changed, it is argued, our ways were already set,^^ No doubt 
our rationalizing minds would have developed some arbitrary rule or 
rationale to explain that behaviour. Proponents of the former pos­
ition may argue that close inbreeding does in fact have some ad-vant- 
ages, and so could have been useful at some stage in our evolutionary 
past. One advantage is that it concentrates deleterious genetic char­
acteristics, rather than spreading them through a population; if a high 
rate of sacrifice could be borne, then the genetically recessive char­
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acteristics would be eliminated over the generations. In arboreal life, 
this may have been of advantage; but when our hominid ancestors moved 
to the savannahs, such sacrifice would probably have been maladaptive. 
Consequently, a proscription on inbreeding would be of advantage.
Yet another possibility is that marriages within a family would 
be less fertile than others because of a reduced sexual desire in the • 
partners. There is some evidence to show that children who have been 
living in the same family circle for some time, while not related by34kinship, have lower reproductive rates upon marriage to each other. 
Similarly, members of Israeli kibbutzim tend to avoid marriage and 
sexual relations with other members of the same collective. This would 
seem to favour the Westermarck view, that familiarity in childhood 
breeds mutual indifference, although it is possible that deliberate
training by the parents might have the same effect (the view of Freud,
\ 33 for example)
This brings us to the third question: if individuals want to com­
mit incest (according to Freud) or do not want to commit incest (as in 
Westermarck) then T^y are there any conscious rules at all? The quest­
ion can probably be resolved by considering the costs and the benefits 
of outbreeding and exogamyo On the benefit side, marriage with other 
families forms social bonds tending to consolidate the society. Sex­
ual competition within families may be avoided, and outside marriage 
would give a family a greater opportunity of sending its represent­
atives to other parts of the environment, thus increasing the chances 
of their genetic characteristics surviving throu^ the generations (in­
stead of being completely obliterated by some local environmental 
change). On the cost side of the equation, distance between adjacent 
families might pose a problem, although much less so if there are 
plenty of distant and non-relatives near at hand. In early hominids, 
as in the hunting communities of today, it would be unlikely that many 
individuals in the social group would be non-relatives (although some 
peoples, such as certain Australian Aborigènes, have solved this by 
constructing two or more moieties within the whole tribe, inside which 
no marriages may take place but between which marriage is allowed),
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One could well imagine that it would he only with the development of 
successful cooperative hunting techniques, or more likely, with the 
development of agriculture, that human social groups became large 
enough for non-relatives to be immediately available. At that time, 
the rule, or norm, which encouraged individuals to make a search for 
mates outside their immediate family (even in the light of the costs 
of that search) and which was a feature of the more successful soc­
ieties because of their avoidance of the costs of inbreeding, would 
have been firmly established. As societies grew, all that was re­
quired was its quantification; human beings seem to have a tendency to 
crave the quantification of rather vague biological imperatives into 
definite rules of behaviour, a tendency which probably helps avoid 
disputes and conflicts. In most societies, the accepted degree of 
relatedness seems to be about where the number of gènes•shared by the 
partners is about one ei^th - that is, first cousins. When the costs 
of search for more distant relatives is lower, in nomadic tribes for 
example, one would expect the degree of relatedness allowed to be less; 
whereas, in more permanent families (royal families or remote village 
communities) one would expect the incest rules to be more lenient.
The precise rule in each society may be rather arbitrary, for a soc­
iety will have no means of checking the contribution to its evolu­
tionary fitness made by the rule, and may in fact be unaware of the 
correlation.
So we see how it is possible for behaviour such as incest, the 
evolutionary disadvantage of which is probably quite slender, to be­
come entrenched in social rules and regulations on a wide scale. The 
disadvantage, over the many generations of human evolution, can make 
a large difference in the fitness of otherwise identical groups. Also, 
we see how some regulation of behaviour founded in biological advant­
age can be very different between two societies, particularly when the 
evolution of those societies has been different in some crucial respect.
Other sexual behaviour carries similar or stronger restrictions, 
although once again the precise rules and the types of behaviour re­
stricted varies much between societies. In general it can be said
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that behaviour tending to reduce the fertility of the society is dis­
couraged, It is difficult to see how such rules would emerge under 
kinship selection unless the social group was prominently endowed with 
related kin, but they would be the natural outcome of interdemic sel­
ection processes. Depending on circumstances, some societies have 
favoured polygamous behaviour (which would be adaptive under difficult- 
conditions where male mortality rates are h i ^ ) , but few practice poly­
andry. The norms may vary, but deviation from them is usually a 
reason for indignation in other members of the society. Again, this 
suggests that group selection processes have been important and that 
'self-interested® behaviour has been subjected to discouragement by 
others.
Modem moralists question the right of a society to legislate on 
matters of personal morality. This is the debate between Hart, Devlin 
and others on 'legal moralism® which is mentioned in a later chapter 
at more length. The simple point which can be made here is that the 
justification for such questions - that individual sexual behaviour does 
no harm to others - is itself doubtful; if societies allowed their 
members completely free rein, and if they were disposed to take it, 
then there would be a great deal more strife than there is, and far 
fewer coherent and functioning societieso
Of course, this biological morality mi^t be quite inapplicable 
for the modem world. In contemporary societies, overpopulation is of­
ten regarded as a major problem, and in vezy few countries (France is 
an exception) is there a conscious effort to increase population, un­
less there is a threat of occupation from neighbouring countries or 
unless there has been a major catastrophe. Hence many of the western 
powers attempted to increase their populations shortly after the sec­
ond world war. Unfortunately the incentives which were awarded to 
the larger families-have been confused-with child welfare aid, and have 
proven remarkably difficult to remove, despite their outlived useful­
ness, The threat of overpopulation is so vivid because we have evolved 
as very efficient breeding machines; our social groupings and our tech­
nology have increased the lifespan of ourselves and our offspring, and
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our morality has not yet adjusted to the fact. Nobody suggests that 
the threat of overpopulation should be met by complete abstinence - 
our sexual urges are simply too strong for such appeals to work. But 
there is still opposition from some people to contraception, from more 
to abortion, and from almost all to infanticide, each of which are pot­
ential solutions. Our evolutionary morality still pulls us in direc­
tions which would have been useful in the past, but which cause new 
difficulties in the industrial world. This is a subject which will be 
taken up again in chapter eleven.
Altruism and other moral behaviour
It can be taken as datum that human beings in modern societies are 
altruistic and cooperative - at least at times. The prevalence of 
human altruism makes possible and necessary the study of moral phil­
osophy; were there no tendency at all to act or desire to act in moral 
ways, the subject would not exist. In psychology also these phenomena 
have evoked much research, for example in Macaulay and Berkowitz's 
Altruism and Helping Behaviour, or Wright's Psychology of Moral Behav­
iour, More popularly, human morality has been discussed in the works 
of Ardrey, Lorenz and Morris, but the need to explain human morality 
has also struck more academic biologists and geneticists, such as Triv- 
eia, Maynard Smith, Hamilton, Wynne-Edwards and Wilson in his recent 
book Sociobiology, Clearly there are similarities between men and the 
social animals in the cooperation and altruism exists in both.
Psychologists and philosophers might differ in their explanations 
of how these traits are maintained. Some, like Smith, would say that 
morality is motivated directly through sympathy; others would insist 
(like Hobbes) that self-interest was the chief motive. For our pur­
poses here, such questions are less important than the problem of how 
similar human moral behaviour is to animal moral behaviour. To assess 
this, we have to look at some exemplars of human morality and determine 
whether it is represented in animal societies and whether it is likely 
to be maintained through the workings of evolution by natural selection.
We may consider human moral traits conveniently by listing them 
under the following broad categories:
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(l) Sharing and cooperation
The sharing of food is common in pack animals, where it is sel­
ected for reasons of biological efficiency; if prey animals are too 
large for the hunters to consume alone, then the whole group benefits 
from being able to share. The same phenomenon of group sharing of 
prey is universal in primitive human societies under all but the most 
harsh conditions. Similarly in modern societies, food is an object of 
sharing. Although it happens rarely in civilized societies, the lack 
of food by an individual or family causes distress to others, a con­
cern manifested by the institutions of soup kitchens, wartime food 
parcels and government programmes designed to assist the nutrition of 
poor families and children, often at great cost to the taxpayer.
Other resources are also shared. Despite the tendency of indust­
rial countries to meet a shortage by increased production, rationing IÎ
of commodities is taken to be a very reasonable solution to a forced |
shortage. Wartime rationing of food, clothes, petroleum and many 
other products is an example; the rationing of oil and cooperation in 
energy conservation were the immediate reaction of many countries to 
the OPEC oil cutbacks and price-rises of the 19?0s,
The modern world has invented the ultimate device for social co­
operation — the economy. The economy is a system which encourages 
each individual to contribute the services or commodities he posses­
ses in exchange for other benefits in terms of commodities available 
from the rest of the individuals in the economy. The advantages of 
the division of labour, common to insects and other social creatures, 
are shared by modern man (although in man it is learning which deter­
mines the skills contributed to the economy, and not hereditary char­
acteristics) .
Examples of noneconomic cooperation are so numerous and such an 
everyday occurrence that we could easily forget them. Consider, how­
ever, the multitude of such small acts of sharing. The housewife bor­
rowing a cup of sugar; the couple asking a friend to babysit; the of­
fice worker sharing a ride to work with a colleague; people who organ­
ize Sunday-school outings, dances, fêtes and parties; members of inter­
est groups who share books and magazines on their subject; the list
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is apparently endless. The moral psychology associated, with these 
and similar acts is largely what we would expect it to he under the 
model of the evolutionary emergence of morality suggested by Trivers.
We simply do feel guilty if there is some small sacrifice we could 
have made for others but did not. If someone is in urgent need, we 
do feel more disposed to make sacrifices for him. As far as the soc- ' 
ial group is concerned, evolutionary fitness will be improved by such 
a psychology, and (to the extent that gratitude is rewarding to the 
person making the sacrifice) gratitude also will be selected in evo­
lution, its intensity proportionate to the size of the sacrifice. i
These are psychological traits which are functional in evolutionary 
terms and which prompt the performance of acts that are put under the 
heading of morality.
Acts of generosity or altruism toward other members of one's pop­
ulation, even though they may be strangers, is quite compatible with 
the evolutionary selection of the population, and can be of selective 
advantage. Contacts so established may further the performance of 
future altruistic acts between the various partners, and so be of 
double importance. There is every indication from the available evi­
dence in psychology that human beings do set up cooperative systems 
with strangers. . The 'prisoner's dilemma* game, for instance, yields 
the'highest reward to both players over the long run only if one al­
lows his opponent to win half the fames and if his opponent allows him 
to win the other half. Attempts by both to win as many as possible 
yield far lower profits. When playing this game over many trials,
human beings have a tendency to cooperate, chiefly by alternating37their winning and losing. Many other studies on the performance of38altruistic acts for strangers have been made. Generosity does seem
to have the effect of establishing new friendships (and new cooper-39ative opportunities) or repairing broken ones,
(2) Parental behaviour and education
Most cooperative or altruistic behaviour is to be seen in the 
context of family groups, of course, and it is easy to see how such 
behaviour will very easily spread through a population if it confers a
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selective advantage on those families who practise it. Whether the 
transmission process is through learning or throu^ genetic endowment 
is unimportant, as long as the transmission is effective. More detailed 
considerations about the link between family relationship and morality 
will be made in chapter eleven.
One of the clearest forms of self-sacrifice is in parenthood. The 
period of parental attachment in human beings is longer than in any 
animal (although some large creatures like elephants are challengers) 
and a bond between parent and offspring often lasts until death. Some 
of the consequences of this early and deep socialization have already 
been mentioned in this chapter. Within the context of home or school 
there are important lessons to be learned about other things, however, 
including morality. Natural selection should favour the dissemination 
of information about the altruistic and moral tendencies of other mem­
bers of society: for example, *X is a good man® or *Y cannot be I
trusted* or *Z always keeps his word* will all be useful information to 
an individual and an individual's acting in accordance with that in­
formation will contribute to the prosperity of himself and of the soc­
ial group. Similarly, an individual's own morality may be changed or 
settled in the formative years. This was a function which Hume attrib­
uted to praise and blame, that an individual learns about his moral 
excellences and shortcomings, and feels disposed to do something about 
them in the light of the criticism of his fellows.
Along with this form of criticism, formal punishment must be 
placed. In animal societies there are ways of dealing with behavioural 
deviations from the norm - a parent will bite her straying offspring, 
or an individual will be driven from the group if he acts in an unusual 
manner. In human societies, the institution of punishment is so ob­
vious that further comment is almost redundanto Suffice it to say that 
one of the oldest forms of punishment is probably exile, which we share 
with some animal societies. Inflicting pain (akin to biting in other 
mammals, perhaps) is probably another ancient form. Imprisonment is 
rather recent, depending upon the wealth of communities to establish 
prisons, but even this punishment is very like animal punishment, being
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a kind of temporary exile,
(3) Aggression and inhibition
It is almost trite to mention that in human societies, aggressive 
conflicts between men are common, while violence between men and women 
“ at least, in a physical sense - is much less so. We read newspaper 
accounts of street brawls and gang fights with dismay, perhaps, but 
with little surprise. Accounts of men beating women, however, we take 
to be very serious and somewhat surprising. Certainly there are many 
occasions in which men feel aggressive towards women; but there seems 
to be a strong inhibition against doing physical harm to a member of 
that sex. There may be modern rationalizations for the different view 
we take of violence towards men and towards women; for example, we 
point to the comparative weakness of women and conclude that they are 
more likely to come to harm from a degree of violence which would not 
hurt a man. We talk of it being wrong to hit a 'defenceless* woman. 
Whatever the rationale, it remains true that we normally have, and 
expect, greater self-restraint towards one sex than towards the 
other,, The selective advantage of such an arrangement, which we share 
with other social animals, is apparent. Popular authors such as Des­
mond Morris have made so much of the inhibition (and the ways by which 
modern women behave to evoke it) that further discussion would be 
superfluous here.^
A similar inhibition seems to modify our aggression towards 
infants and juveniles. Once again, it is commonly thought to be a very 
improper act to injure or beat a child. This view is so established 
that in some modern societies even normal physical punishment is 
shunned. It is certainly true that the child is more vulnerable to 
attacks than the adult, and that from a genetic point of view, the 
loss of a child would be a loss to the whole society; but the inhib­
ition on aggression towards children seems to prevent (or reprove) 
any form of severe violence, whether potentially fatal or not. There
is also plenty of psychological evidence that a child's appearance4l'softens' the emotions of possible adult aggressors.
Social animals often have 'ritualized® movements whereby aggres-
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sive encounters can be stopped when one individual has accepted de­
feat. This is a very necessary mechanism when the natural weaponry of 
the species is sufficient to do severe physical harm to either of the 
contestants. In modern human societies, the same behaviour remains in 
its vestigial form. The institution of the ’submission* is honoured 
even in the lowest of brawlsp and is universally recognized in sport­
ing fi^ts. If human behaviour were truly ’selfish* in the way out­
lined by Richard Dawkins or Robert Tri vers, and the survival of one’s 
self and one’s relatives was the driving power of any so-called 'altru­
istic* behaviour, then such an institution would be pointless, for it 
would give one's enemy a chance to live and fight agaiUo There can be 
little doubt that the recognition of submissive gestures (or in the 
modern world, words and writings) as the end of aggressive conflicts 
is mediated through group selection processes. The enemy, although 
he may be a threat, is nevertheless a part of the population and a 
potential contributor to its succession,
(4) Care of the wounded and infirm
We have seen that in a number of social species there is a dis­
position to come to the assistance of wounded or infirm individuals.
As well as this, the extensive grooming practices of primate groups 
help to keep each individual healthy. In human societies also, there 
exist methods to care for infirm individuals and maintain the health 
of the others.
Modern societies have extended this care to a very great extent.
Hospitals and doctors specialize in it, increasing the possibility of
its effectiveness through their singular knowledge. The shamans of
primitive cultures may have enjoyed less success, but there actions
arose from group concern about the sick; before them, medicine was an
unspecialized subject in which all members of the group would play a
part. Tiger and Fox quote some interesting cases, including Negrito
and Cochiti Indian communities, where the illness of one individual is42the signal for rituals which involve the whole society.
Many industrial' societies share their health resources with ex­
tensive welfare plans. This is true not only in the formally social­
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ized health services of the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia and Swe­
den, for example, hut also in countries such as the United States, 
where health services are heavily subsidized for those of more modest 
means. Like food and possibly education, health is one of the things 
which civilized societies seem to believe is a ’right' of each of 
their citizers. Hence the widespread programmes to educate doctors 
and to make medical care ’free* or * equally available* to those in need 
of it.
Summary
It can be seen, then, that there are many similarities between 
some animal social behaviour and human behaviour in even the most ad­
vanced industrial nations. The basic structure of human communities, 
although much complicated by the vastness of modern communities and by 
the erosion of territorial considerations in the formation of social 
bonds and alliances, shares features of similarity with other primate 
groups. The mechanisms to maintain group cohesion and to protect the 
group as a functioning whole are retained in modern man. Altruistic 
tendencies, also supporting the evolutionary fitness of their practi­
tioners, are retained on an expanded scale in our complex societies; 
indeed, they might be even more necessary in such conditions than they 
would be in the very simple world of a small, mutually dependent local 
community.
There is no problem in the assertion that these traits are built 
upon older foundations that were laid down, principally, during the 
early evolution of the human species. At every stage in our develop­
ment, the traits of social organization and of altruistic or cooperative 
action would benefit the groups, societies, populations or species that 
shared in them. If by chance these tendencies were to be extinguished, 
then selective fitness would have been reduced at the same time. Some 
adjustment of the mechanisms would of course have been necessary under 
the changing conditions that have confronted our species; but the gen­
eral advantages of social cohesion and cooperation would have ruled out 
any major change away from those characteristics,
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Chapter 9
ETHOLOGY, EVOLUTION AND ETHICS
"For ToH,Huxley, fifty years ago, there was a fundamental contradiction between the ethical process and the cosmic pro­cess.., To-day, that contradiction can, I believe, be res­
olved, .
Sir Julian Huxley^
There is a great deal of confusion and doubt about the place of 
evolutionary theory in philosophical enquiry. Above all, philosophers 
and biologists have fancied that they perceive a 'trend* in the dir­
ection of evolutionary development, and that the.promotion of this 
trend is the proper object of a moral system. This chapter argues that 
the 'trend * view of evolution is a misguided one, and that any histor­
ical tendencies in evolutionary development do not imply a moral duty
to maintain or promote the trend (as Waddington suggests) or to resign2ourselves to it (as Needham supposes).
We will also examine what are the facts of the evolutionary devel­
opment of human morality, and extract the broad implications of that dev­
elopment. In the following chapters, some of these implications will 
be discussed in much more detail; for the moment, we will be concerned 
with uncovering what the etbological view (as a type of evolutionary 
theory of ethics) does and does not imply.
The evolution of morality
The ethological view of morality reminds us that our moral capacit-
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ies and ideas (the 'moral sense') have evolved through the natural sel­
ection of these and other characteristics borne by our species. Accor-3ding to Daiches Raphael in his classic essay on this subject, the ex­
planatory power of a theory of the evolution of ethics lies in its ab­
ility to demonstrate the source of those moral ideas and capacities, 
specifically, our capacity to make moral judgements, the authority of 
the sense of duty, and the feelings of remorse which follow a trans­
gression, Without a theory of the logic of group selection, as already 
outlined,^ it is impossible to explain the origin of morality in evol­
utionary terms. Some attempts to perform this impossible task are re­
viewed later in this chapter, as are other out-of-hand rejections of ~ 
any connexion between evolutionary theory and the development of moral­
ity which collapse once the explanatory power of the group selection 
concept is unveiled.
Right away it can be seen how group selection would account for the 
emergence of the three characteristics to which Raphael r e f e r s I n  the 
first place, our notions of right and wrong, good and bad, our attract­
ion to some modes of conduct and aversion to others, lare not with- -■ 
out their implications for survival. In that sense, as Muller (1958) 
clearly grasped, moral judgements are no different from desires and 
likes, being selected for and transmitted when they promote the life of 
the group. Similarly, Raphael's sense of duty or obligation can be ex­
plained from the point of view of the group. It is important that act­
ions promoting the welfare of the group should be performed by individ­
uals, even though their desires for self-preservation (also a product of 
the evolutionary process) might pull them in the opposite direction.
The 'sense* of duty is no more than the triumph of t one tendency 
over the other, and as such it may be selected by evolution; the strong­
er the individual feels the obligation to act against his own 'self- 
interests' (as commonly defined), then the more is the survival of the 
whole group promoted. For the same reason, Raphael's third character­
istic, the remorse felt by an individual when her  does not act to pro­
mote the interests of the group, can be considered as the fruit of nat­
ural selection, because it will lead him to associate the discomfort of 
remorse with actions contrary to the welfare of the group. The effici­
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ency of this evolutionary mechanism is not reduced by the fact that the 
individual might not have been able to act in any other way on this par­
ticular occasion; hence we often do feel remorse even though we were 
powerless to prevent a certain outcome. It is the same with another 
moral characteristic, our condemnation of actions which reduce-the conrnun- 
ity's-welfare; even today we often imprison or otherwise punish people 
for manslaughter although they were unable to prevent what they did, 
or did not realize the consequences of their actions. Similarly in 
primitive societies, it is common for an individual to be punished for 
breaking an established principle, even though he may have had no notion 
that he was doing so, or though he may not have been able to do other­
wise. The functional nature of the general rule causes it to be select­
ed by evolution, despite occasions where the general rule might 
seem inappropriate to us upon rational reflection. The theory that 
morality derives from the natural selection of groups of individuals 
seems to explain not only Raphael's elements of morality, but other 
parts of our moral psychology as well - such as remorse when we could 
not help our actions - that other evolutionary views (and rationalist- 
constructivist theories) are powerless to deal with.
The theory of social instincts
The idea of a morality based on social instincts originated with
David Hume and Adam Smith in the eighteenth century. To Smith, it was
a universal 'sympathy* which formed the basis for morality. Quite how
these social instincts came to be implanted in human beings remained a5mystery until Darwin's observations on the subject. Those. observât--^ 
ions made two main contributions to the debate. The first is Darwin's 
suggestion that the initial social impulses forming the basis of moral­
ity are to be found in animals. He was perhaps mistaken in supposing
that these impulses were motivated by sympathy (the concept being bor­
rowed directly from Smith), but at least he gave us an understanding
that animal communities do work co-operatively. The second observat­
ion is that natural selection would favour co-operating groups, although 
again, Darwin supposed that it would be force of example (as Hume said, 
certain actions would be praised by one's fellows, and the praise would 
cause others to emulate one's actions) which generated the sociable
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actions in the first place. The concept of group selection in this 
rudimentary form is one of Darwin's most useful insights into the wor­
kings of evolution, although the concept lay fallow for many decades 
after its introduction.
Nevertheless, both Darwin's points have their drawbacks. Smith's 
view that 'sympathy® (a policy of 'do as you would be done by') is the , 
main driving-force behind morality is a rather simplistic notion, and 
when taken to the extreme, leads to situations which advocates of the 
view would not like to accept. Smith, of course, explained this soc­
ial instinct of sympathy by saying that individuals can imagine them­
selves in the position of others, and can therefore say how they would |
hope to be treated under the same circumstances. We really do 'feel 
for® people; according to Smith, and some part of their emotions is en­
gendered sympathetically within us, and our notion of the right way to 
treat others is strongly affected by this sympathy. But against Smith 
it must be observed, as Huxley observed,^ that this sympathy could not 
be the only thing determining our feelings of right and wrong, since:
"If I put myself in the place of the man who has robbed me, I find that 
I am possessed by an exceeding desire not to be fined or imprisoned; 
if in that of the man who has smitten me on the cheek, I contemplate 
with satisfaction the absence of any worse result than the turning of 
the other cheek for like treatment. Strictly observed, the 'golden 
rule' involves the negation of law by the refusal to put it in motion 
against law-breakers.. That refusal would be dysfunctional, and 
any society not taking revenge against its law-breakers, or excluding 
its disruptive members, would be soon extinguished. The simple rule is 
insufficient to explain the actual moral feelings men possess,'.and why 4
they happen to promote the general welfare. The ethological view, in 
tracing the evolution of moral values and behaviour, and linking this 
with a theory of the logic of group selection that explains the emer­
gence of moral relations under it, enables us to outline the several 
facets of human character which make up morality. The one-dimensional 
view of Adam Smith and of Darwin does not.
Hume's theory of the emergence of moral action through the praise 
or blame of one's colleagues detracts from Darwin's second point, the
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outline of the mechanism of group selection. Hume remarks that praise 
follows actions which benefit the general welfare, and since.people like 
to receive the approbation of their fellows, these actions are the more 
likely to be repeated. Darwin adds to this that the groups in which 
this is so will stand a better chance of survival than others.
Although this scenario is substantially correct, Hume's analysis 
could be misleading. It suggests that moral action is praised because 
of its utility to the group, a utility which has to be perceived and 
measured before praise is due; but this is not how we measure out praise 
or blame. We praise some actions automatically, without any reflect­
ion upon their contribution to the general welfare (although this sub­
sequent reflection might change our opinion). We also praise a num­
ber ; of activities . although it would 'be impossible to estimate their net 
effect on the general welfare without an evolutionary social .'psychology 
to explain it. Actions are praised because we have a disposition to 
praise certain actions, not solely because of à rational calculation of 
the utility of those actions. In applying the ethological method to our 
morality, we can discover why we praise and blame things as we do, and 
what are the utilitarian roots of our morality, however disguised they 
might be.
Theories of evolutionary ethics
Darwin does not even mention the thesis that the study of evolution
can tell us what we should think of as being good, and this is certainly
not an implication of the present work. The course of evolution is 
blind; it summarises adaptations to past events, but cannot be said to
have a 'trend* which ought to be encouraged. Some examples of this kind
of thinking will illustrate the point.
(a) Needham's Historicism
The most notorious misconception about evolution, that it follows 
a 'trend* and that the right course of action is to discern and follow 
this trend, finds expression in several Marxist writers, of whom one of 
the most eminent is Joseph Needham, In his book History is on Our Side^ 
he declares that "whatever force hinders the coming of the world co­
operative commonwealth... that force is ultimately doomed. Against the
world-process no force can in the end succeed,"
At the time, Needham might have been right in discerning a short­
term trend towards the coming of the 'world co-operative commonwealth'; 
but as Anthony Flew notes, "a trend is a very different thing from a law 
of tendency. There is a trend if there has been a direction in the dev­
elopment so far, whether or not there is any reason to think that things 
will continue to develop along this line. But to assert a law of ten­
dency is to say that something always has occurred.and always will occur, 
except in so far as this tendency was or will be inhibited by some over­
riding force, . Furthermore, a law of tendency is a very different thing 
from an absolute law of development,,, an absolute law of development 
would state that some particular line of evolution is absolutely inevit­
able, that it neither will nor could be prevented by any counteracting 
7forces," This law of development is clearly what the views of Needham 
amount to, and Engels's eulogy agrees; "Just as Darwin discovered the 
law of development of organic nature, so Marx discovered the law of dev­
elopment of human history," But in objection, it must be asked; Whence 
arises the certainty about this inevitable development? Is it not poss­
ible that there are countervailing forces which have not yet been per­
ceived? How can anyone be convinced that this is a law of development 
and not a temporary trend that we see?
The only defence which Needham would have (and it was not a defence 
which he offered in any convincing way) is that natural selection prom­
otes species which are successively more able to live in their environ­
ment and expand their numbers. If the most successful conceivable org­
anisation of our species (or any other species) is that of the 'world co­
operative commonwealth*, then it might be supposed that evolution will 
inevitably take us to that point. Yet even this defence rests on two 
challengeable points; the first is the premise that the 'world co-operat­
ive commonwealth* is the most successful conceivable organization, and 
the second is that we will ever reach it. The dawn of the atomic age . 
has left some people with grave doubts about the latter,
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(b) De Chardin’s 'increasing complexity*
The philosopher, priest and paleontologist Teilhard De Chardin sees 
the march of evolution in a different way. According to one commentator,^ 
De Chardin says that "Throughout evolutionary time,,, the matter of stuff 
of the universe organizes itself into an ever-increasing complex of inter­
related component parts. He goes on to say that this observed process 
makes manifest a property of matter which is more fundamental and 
more meaningful than anything observed before in science. With increase 
in complexity, not only of individual organisms but also of the group 
to which they belong... there has'been a corresponding rise in the psy­
chic quality of life until, with man, we see not only some degree of 
conscious control of the material world, but also the possibility at . 
least of the psychic becoming increasingly spititualized, and so of the 
spiritual finally taking precedence: its failure to do so represents the 
state of ’original sin*,"
Increasing complexity is one of the most commonly-held 'laws* of 
evolution, Simpson, noting sources for various hypotheses about the 
direction of evolution, says of this one merely "See almost any text on 
evolution," Once more, there is insufficient evidence that De Chardin’s 
alleged law is enduring. Our 'psychic* faculties do not seem to have 
developed at all since history was first recorded (probably since our 
brain reached its present size). There is no reason to suppose that any 
further development will occur.
Secondly, De Chardin insists that our psychic development is reach­
ing a 'christosphere *, that the ultimate triumph of the spiritual is the 
duty of every Christian to promote. But why should this be so? The 
scriptures, of course, might recommend it; but there is nothing in the 
actual process of psychic development, if it exists at all, which for­
ces us to see the goodness in the process and to develop it fully. Some 
extra argument must be introduced before one can move from the of a law 
of tendency (and since De Chardin seems to think that the process requires 
promotion from the Christian Church, it is clear that he sees the process 
as a law of tendency and not an absolute law of development, unlike the 
Marxist writers ) to the ought of our alleged obligation to promote the
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tendency. De Chardin might have excellent reasons why we ought to fol­
low his advice; but they are not a part of the evolutionary process 
themselves.
(c) Higher and lower forms of life
We see that 'trend® theories of evolution (as represented by laws 
of development and weaker laws of tendency) do not offer a basis, in 
themselves, for recommending any one action against any other. There 
is another belief which should be dealt with here, that of the superior­
ity of more evolved forms of life, 'Superiority® implies a position on 
a scale of values: but are evolutionary values the same as ethical ones?
In evolutionary terms, when we saycthat a species is 'the fittest' 
or that it is 'superior', we mean that it is the best able to survive. 
With respect to a certain target.(surviving) this species is more succ­
essful or more efficient than any other. It is rather like our saying 
that the 'best* knife is the one which cuts most efficiently. Fitness 
in any activity of this sort is not a guarantee of superior ethical 
value, A species which can survive well (such as a new strain of rodent 
or a particularly virulent strain of 'flu) is not the one which we nec­
essarily feel should survive, or would give any approbation at all.
Even Herbert Spencer, who coined the phrase 'the survival of the.fit­
test ' and had views-to match, could not bring himself to argue that mere 
survival was 'good*; he had to introduce notions of the breadth of life 
(concerning complexity of organization) and surplus happiness before he 
could fabricate a standard of goodness. Length of life in itself cannot 
be equated with goodness except by a definition which few people would 
wish to make. The distinction between the course of evolution and the 
actual ethical values which we have is taken to its most extreme by 
Thomas Huxley^^who supposed a complete opposition between the cosmic and 
ethical processes.
The'distinction is, however, a false one: although the present or 
future trend of evolution cannot supply us with a reason for action (ex­
cepting if we have some objection to the trend and believe that it can 
be changed), the past history of our own evolution has shaped our bodies 
and personalities. What we regard as moral has been shaped by this hist­
orical process. Past events have determined what we think of as moral
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and what we think of as immoral, since our morality itself, and any 
other characteristic which has a bearing on survival and population 
numbers, has been selected through evolution* The fact that there might 
be a discernible trend in evolution does not mean to say that our val­
ues are such that we consider the encouragement of that trend to be 
ethically good* Human values are those which have helped our species 
survive in the past, not those which are in line with any present evol­
utionary trendo
(d) Waddington*s identity
C.HoWaddington has gone further than most in asserting that the
12course of evolution is good in itself. He says: "we must accept the
direction of evolution as good simply because it good according to 
any realist definition of that concept." His reason for believing 
this is that "the nature of society is such that, in general, it dev­
elops in a certain direction*oo the ethical principles which mediate the 
motion in that direction are in fact those adopted by that society."
To speak in terms of a ’direction* of development of society is 
most unhelpful, since it is difficult to define. Waddington’s.formul­
ation also suggests that the ethical principles, of a society are al-- 
ways adjusted to evolutionary necessity, whereas in fact it is possible 
that some new evolutionary trend may develop which we might think is 
very bad but which our surviving descendants, being selected :'in 
terms of this new trend, might take to be very good. Human values 
might change with natural selection, but there can still be a lag bef­
ore they catch up.
Furthermore, it is evident that we can and do question institut­
ions and actions. Waddington is right that evolutionary theory can 
tell us why it is that we regard some .things as being good - because
that is the way evolution has made us - but whether we should regard
those things as good is another question. For example, we might rec­
ognize that we value honesty because groups of honest individuals are 
selected by evolution and therefore become more numerous than groups of
liarso Yet we can ask if it is right to be honest* The answer must be
1?0
given in terms of our other valuesT that it is right to be honest 
because honesty promotes social cohesion, makes social life possible, 
reduces fear and 'suspic"ioh, enables each -of' us to further our own in­
terests more easily than a solitary life, or some other appeal to 
our values* The ethological approach, with its notion of the funct­
ional nature of ethics, can make that answer more precise.
The real problem with Waddington’s philosophy is that he not only 
defines the ’direction of evolution’ as good, but believes that the 
direction itself provides us with a tool for choosing between ethical 
systems. The ’direction of evolution’ seems to have been elevated to 
a meta-ethical concept.
There is, of course, no reason why we should take Waddington’s 
word on the appropriateness of this way of choosing between ethical 
systems. However, questions about the survival-value of one ethical 
system as opposed to another do colour our judgement when we choose 
between them. We want to loiow whether the institutions advocated by 
one philosopher could ever work, if they could endure, if they 
would promote social cohesion, or if they would interfere with natural 
inhibitory mechanisms and thus havè unforseen consequences* These are 
types' of questions about moral .systems which we need to know when making 
a choice. It is not true that the ’direction of evolution’ is an indis­
putable way of choosing between ethics: but it is true that an under­
standing of the evolutionary nature of our social and moral psychology 
makes the person doing the choosing far better informed about the prob­
able consequences of the adoption of any particular moral code* This, 
again, is why the ethological view is necessary in ethics,
(e) Flew’s ’law of self-preservation’
A confusion about evolution and its role in ethics which has been13set down by Anthony Flew in his book Evolutionary Ethics can be men­
tioned briefly in passing, because it illustrates the individualist 
conception which most philosophers have concerning natural selection, al­
though a group selection concept would be more accurate. He says that 
if there is some "law of self-preservation, under which all our actions 
could be subsumed, there could be no point in appealing to this law as
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a reason for acting in one way but not another**." If all our actions ^
are the result of evolutionary forces, how can evolution say anything 
at all about ethics?
This argument looks convincing, until we realize that evolution sel­
ects groups. The values of a group might be such that the group is pre- 
served, and under natural selection this is likely to be the case. Yet 
the individual members of the group might know nothing of the survival 
value of their morality* It is too strong a use of language to say that 
their actions are subsumed under the ’law of self-preservation*. They 
are not; they are included under human ethics* Also, a society may 
be ’preserved’ even though not all its members act in furtherance of 
the general welfare; is their action ’subsumed under the law of self- 
preservation®? Of course it is not. When we tell someone.that self- 
preservation suggests a certain course of action, we do so to make them 
aware that actions have different implications about self-preservation.
This might be a point over which they were confused or misinformed, but 
if our observations concerning self-preservation actually impinge on 
their own desires and values, then we have provided a reason for action.
Summarizing this section: the evolutionary views of Needham and 
Marx, De Chardin and Waddington are confusing and open to misinterpret­
ation because of their various degrees of reliance on concepts of a 
’trend® or ’law® of evolution. Evolution works blindly, and is of use 
to ethics only in so far as it can help us understand what the events 
have been which have shaped our values* Furthermore, the view that 
later or more evolved strains of life are somehow ’better® in an ethical 
sense is mistaken. Sadly, however, this is the view which most philos­
ophers seem to think is implied by any evolutionary ethical system*
Longevity or virulence does not encapsulate ethical value; but our own 
ethical values have been shaped by the implications of longevity and 
genetic transmission*
Conclusion
These are the main points which the ethological point of view 
does and does not imply. It is altogether too easy, torsuppose. thatithe 
’direction* of evolution Is inevitable » that we should be entirely
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unconcerned about the future of our species (as Russell thought was im- f
plied by evolutionary ethics) or that the future of our evolutionary 
development is good in itself (as Waddington maintained). None of these 
conclusions is justified because the theory of evolution, as it applies 
to humankind, is a statement about past events, not future trends. Past 
events have moulded our values, and it is from that point of view that 
we judge the goodness or badness"of actions and future developments.
The main implications of the ethological view are concerned with 
the clarification of evolutionary psychology; ruling what can and can 
not be covered by ethical systems and notions of responsibility, ex­
plaining how our values come to be as they are, and showing how certain 
courses of action or inaction will precipitate outcomes which we might 
or might not think are ’good®. The details of these broad implications 
will be covered in the succeeding chapters*
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Chapter 10
PUTTING THE THEORY TO WORK: CRITICISM OF THE SOCIAL CONTRACT
"If the reason be asked of that obedience which we are bound to pay to government, I readily answer, because society could not otherwise subsist."
David Hume
There are many problems associated with social contract theories, 
and these theories, like many other philosophical systems, can be critic­
ised in an effective and new way from the ethological point of viëw.
The comments contained in this chapter will serve as an illustration of 
the usefulness of the theory in such philosophical criticism, and will 
provide the foundation for some prescriptions for social policy .that are 
contained in the following chapter.
Certainly, the social contract view neglects the possibility of what2Hayek calls ’order without commands', since it assumes that social in­
stitutions are the product of conscious choice, and rejects the possibil­
ity that just institutions, although.a product of human action, are not3necessarily the results of human design. Yet from à historical survey 
it becomes evident that human* insitutions are not'always the resultaof 
rational'choice; I and'•îwhere ^ social contract theories suggest otherwise, 
they are clearly open to attack.
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Another problem with the social contract notion is that it implies 
the existence of some presocial state in which there was no contract.
Some contractarians (like Hobbes) say that the presocial state need nev­
er have existed, but is merely the fate which would beset us were we 
unable to agree on social institutions: and Rawls, in his modern ver­
sion of the social contract, suggests that the ’original position’ is 
merely a device through which we can determine the principles of just­
ice. Nevertheless, each concept of the presocial state is, in a very 
real sense, contrary to what we understand human nature to be. Human 
beings are not solitary animals, but are, as Aristotle noted, social or 
political creatures. None of our primate relatives, except the early 
prosimians, have been solitary. So to take the non-social ’state of nat­
ure’ as the exemplar of human nature is highly suspect.
Furthermore, some ’social’ characteristics must exist even in the 
presocial state; for without them (such as the tendency to make and keep 
promises or the restraint against ruthlessly attacking fellow humans)
no contract could ever be entered into.
One more difficulty is that the social contract implies a willing 
agreement, at least the contract as expressed by Hobbes and Rousseau.
This is, as Hume observed in his scathing essay Of the Original Contract,
less than likely; in fact people often do disagree with the ruling govern­
ment and thus their consent - even their ’tacit’ consent, given the diffi­
culty of extricating onesself from the control of any government and 
culture - is hard to substantiate.^ Governments are often maintained by 
force; is the obedience of the citizenry tacit consent? Is this a basis 
for justice? How should disagreement be dealt with in a state?
These and other problems demonstrate the need for a new line of 
criticism with respect to the social contract. The ethological view of­
fers a base for such an approach. Not only does it demonstrate that the 
social contract is very far removed from a natural foundation, but (per­
haps more damning) that it can be dismissed as an unneccessary and mis- %
leading rationalization of social institutions that can be explained in 
a more parsimonious manner.
The early history of the contract
As an historical account of the origins of social man, the contract
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“ïhas itself enjoyed a long history. Perhaps the first written accounts ?
of it appear in Plato’s Protagoras and in books 2,3 and 4 of the Rep­
ublic, where something like it is criticised. Later, Cicero suggests 
that the theory was widely accepted in his day, when he asks in Pro ÎSextijp who of you, 0 judges, is ignorant that the nature of things
has been such that at one time men, before there was any natural of civ- I
il law fully laid down, wandered in a straggling and disorderly manner 4
over the country... Those men, therefore, who showed themselves to be
the most eminent for virtue and wisdom... collected into one place those
who were previously scattered abroad, and brought them over from their
former savage way of life to justice and mildness of manners. Then came ;
those constitutions, devised for the utility of man, which we call com- 5monwealths. . . ’’
The contract endured long in theory subsequently to Cicero; the 
feudal system which prevailed in Europe could be understood as an un­
written, but nevertheless formal and accepted contract between lord and 
vassal from which both sides derived benefit, and even a contract between 
King and God in which adoration was balanced by power. The contract 
theory of government is explicity outlined by the first political scien­
tist, Machiavelli, to whom groups of families represented the ’presocial’ 
state, their proximity and desire for mutual protection requiring  ^
their association and the conscious formulation of law. The precise 
form of those laws would be determined by historical accident, but their 
content would always be to prevent friction between the parties to them.
Hobbes
Among the classical contractarians (most prominently represented by
Hobbes, Rousseau and Locke) Hobbes is the most reticent on the subject of
the ’presocial’ state. He does not say that it is an historical fact,
although he remarks that natives endure something akin to it, and that it7is the natural state between nations. It is certainly the state into 
which men would fall, were there no government to protect their rights 
and interests, and no allegiance to that government. His speculation 
about that state of nature is therefore simply an attempt to discover 
what needs and desires are most fundamental to man, so that the theory of 
justice can be adjusted to fulfill those desires and needs. For Hobbes,
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the method leads him to suppose that men are naturally egoistic and self­
ish; like Cicero’s natural men, they would acquire "just that property 
which they could either seize or keep by their own personal strength and 
vigour, by means of wounds and bloodshed."^ This is how men, given their
nature, would be were the restraints of government removed. As one9commentator says, "By pointing out the disastrous consequences of a non­
political condition, Hobbes aims to indicate the fundamental reason why 
government is needed, and the precedence which this end - the security 
of mens’ lives - must take over any other conception of the good. Bef­
ore one can conceive of any ’principles of justice’ being adopted among 
men, Hobbes believes, one must first presuppose the establishment of a 
government with the power necessary to enforce such principles." Hence, 
in Hobbes’s view, the submission of an individual to a soverign gov­
ernment is subsequent to his rational reflection upon the alternative.
This was, in Hobbes’s day, a revolutionary psychology, arid ^ it is 
still hard to accept. The essential point, however, is that Hobbes saw 
the state of nature as somehow more natural - that is, more closely re­
flecting real human nature than the political state. Since it is from 
this natural state and this allegedly real human nature that the prin­
ciples of justice are to be derived, it is vital to Hobbes’s political 
system that he should have.correctly portrayed human nature. Yet the 
most cursory view of the ethological evidence would tell us that he was 
much mistaken. The mechanisms- of selection operate such that those in­
dividuals who happened to co-operate with one another would flourish, 
while those who cut each others’ throats would not; rational reflection 
upon whether or not to co-operate is not necessary to group selection 
(although it may indeed prove functional). This irrational co-operation 
we see in animal communities, from the social insects upwards; therefore 
there is no need to suppose it is otherwise in humans. The ethologist 
will agree with Hume in Of the Original Contract that "the state of soc­
iety without government is one of the most natural..." As that state 
of compliance in the forebearances which we call justice and morality 
preceeded rational reflection, so is morality not necessarily founded in 
the rational agreement that Hobbes supposes.
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Rousseau
Rousseau’s state of nature was quite different from that of Hobbes. 
In the Second Discourse he says that primal man could have been found 
"wandering through the forests, without industry, without speech, with­
out domicile, without war and liaisons, with no need of his fellow men, 
likewise with no desire to harm them, perhaps never even recognizing ■ 
anyone individually." Therefore to Rousseau, men "in a state of nature, 
having no moral relations or determinable obligations one with another, 
could not be either good or bad, virtuous or vicious; unless we take 
these terms in a physical sense, and call in an individual, those qual­
ities vices which may be injurous to his preservation, and those qual­
ities virtues which contribute to it; in which case, he would have to be
accounted more virtuous, who put least check on the pure impulses of ,.10nature.
The possibility of man's benefitting his own self-preservation by 
being an unwitting member of a functioning group (such as a bee-hive) 
is omitted in Rousseau as it is in Hobbes. And once again, the auth­
or’s conception of what the world would be like were human nature to 
run its course is little more than a guess; but unfortunately for 
Rousseau (and the history of political philosophy) it was a disastrously 
mistaken guess.
Nowhere in the animal nature closely related to our own species can 
be found the anonymity of which Rousseau speaks and upon which he bases 
a doctrine that human beings have no natural obligations or allegiances. 
The prosimian mouse lemur is our closest relative with a solitary life­
style. Even Darwin’s cattle, and ordinary farmyard animals recognize 
other members of the group; this recognition, and the system of domin­
ation and submission (which has been described already in chapter 4) in 
domestic hens is the source of our term ’pecking order’. As has al­
ready been mentioned, even bees protect their hives against strangers, 
and animal xenophobia, either within or between species, is)commonl^^ If 
animal nature is remotely like human nature, then Rousseau’s analy­
sis is wrong. His account does not even correspond with the nature of 
the most primitive human societies that have no established government 
but an obvious social order and regulatity. The ’natural man’ is not
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free from all- moral relations, as . Rousseau supposed; on the contrary,
no sooner do two human beings come together, than one assumes a dorainat-12ion over the other, and questions of ’rights* arise.
According to Rousseau, "The first man who, having enclosed a piece 
of ground, bethought himself of saying ’This is mine’ and found people Î3simple enough to believe him, was the real founder of civil society," 
and it is from this much evil springs. Men (in Rousseau’s opinion)
were not evil before the foundation of society; now there is evil; there­
fore society is probably to blame. Consequently, society should be ad­
justed such that its evils can be reduced or eliminated. Property, for 
one thing, must be abolished. But even in this view, Rousseau was 
wildly mistaken. As we have seen, the territorial urge is older than 
mankind; it is widespread thoughout animal societies; it exists with con­
siderable force even today in ’civilized’ man. Such is its functional 
importance to animal social groups that it is unlikely that it was ever 
temporarily absent from our evolution, emerging subsequently when govern­
ments arose. Human groups could not have controlled their population and 
ensured food supplies had they not been territorial throughout their 
early history. On the second point, of the natural goodness of man, 
this too is something that Rousseau would have been less convinced about14had he been aware of the ethological evidence; if the hunting hypothesis
of human evolution is correct, men were originally predators who killed
to live; and the large numbers of protohominid species which arose and
then perished suddenly seems to suggest that our early ancestors, unable
to restrain themselves in the use of their new-found weaponry, took a15heavy toll on members of their own species.
Although Rousseau recognized that the abolition of society was im­
possible (partly because of the good bound up with the evil in it), his 
prescriptions for it are astonishing; to abolish property and to submit 
all individuals to the ’general will’, even forbidding private associations 
that might interfere with this allegiance.
The greatest tragedy of Rousseau’s thought is that he greatly over­
estimated' the simplicity with which'.social ills can be righted by employ­
ing our rational faculties. What we want to do, we can; by understanding 
our presocial ’nature’, Rousseau thought, society could be adjusted as we
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choose (and for the better). Today, that heritage is encapsulated in 
the writings of a limitless array of political Utopians, all of whom 
believe that it is ’society’ which is the curse of man, and _ all of whom 
maintain that social institutions are perfectly malleable. Sadly, this 
is a philosophy of the impossible; there are human institutions, like 
the institution of property rights, which are founded in human nature • 
and are remarkably résistent to change, principally because of their 
selective advantage to the species which has them. Or again, oblig­
ations to individuals and groups other than the sovereign authority ex­
ist everywhere, and there are clear advantages that they should. On 
this point, Eibl-Eibesfeldt says: "In the art and literature of all 
peoples there are many recurring themes, situational cliches: loyalty 
of friends, manly courage, love of homeland, love of wife or husband, 
love of children and parents - all are the basic noble motives of human 
actions that we follow from an inner disposition. They are the basic 
themes of literature and the theatre from the ancient world to this
day.. . Are these motives and associations to be obliterated in the18’just’ society? The utopian social engineers (as Popper calls them )
seem to believe that they can, or that when we ’understand’ our own
natures, then they will be recognized to be transient and unimportant: 
but the long history of these ’recurring themes’, their existence in 
other species, and their clear advantage to groups that display them, 
suggest that they are so fundamental to our social psychology that they 
cannot be lightly dismissed.
To blame ’society’ for particular ills is not to blame something
which is subsequent to human nature; it is to criticise a part of human
nature, a phenomenon which has evolved with us and which was not devised
by conscious minds. If history is indeed a chronicle of crimes, follies
and misfortunes, then human beings are to blame, not the concept of 19’society’. When we understand human nature (and not the partial sketch 
of human nature offered by Hobbes, Locke or Rousseau) then we will under­
stand that human beings are not fallen angels, and that social institut­
ions (although many are consciously engineered and therefore malleable) 
are based in that nature and are remarkably resistant to change.
John Rawls
Rawls’s Theory of Justice exemplifies a modem form of social con-
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tract. Because of its comprehensive scope, rarely attempted since the 
Leviathan, Civil Government or The Social Contract, it deserves exten­
sive treatment here.
For Rawls, the ’original’ position (or presocial state) is merely 
a theoretical device, intended to provide us with a ’value-free’ state 
of justice. Individuals in the original position are stripped of their 
personal values, and of any knowledge of their personal characteristics 
(age, sex and so on) which could bias their conception of what is just 
and what is not. Rawls finds that he can include without controversy a 
few values, however, the ’primary goods’ which "are things which it is 
supposed a rational roan wants whatever else he wants," these being 
"rights and liberties, opportunities and powers, income and wealth." Al­
so allowed are certain ’’general facts about human society" including an 
understanding of "political affairs and the principles of economic the­
ory" and the "basis of social organization and the laws of human psychol­
ogy," for Rawls realizes that we have to know whether our rules of just­
ice that were devised in the original position can in fact be followed 
by the human beings they are laid down for. Other facts must likewise 
be known to the parties in the original position, that the earth is 
finite and that resources are scarce for example, since without these 
factors, justice might not be needed at all.
Rawls’s position is contradictory: all of the classical contract 
theories suffer from the same problem, although none are as obvious in 
the contradiction. On the one hand, Rawls wants to exclude all personal 
knowledge which could bias the judgement of the parties to the original 
position, and to keep them behind the ’veil of ignorance’ about their 
age, sex, abilities, period, loyalties, and so on. In constructing this 
situation, Rawls has .sûcceeded\in dhvising"aitheory of justice which is 
’value-free’ by making it ’fact-free’; for the veil of ignorance is a 
figment of fantasy, without any possibility of a counterpart in the real 
world. Were any number of men to come together in the real world and 
choose principles of justice, they would choose according to their con­
ceptions of what is good; on some things they would have to choose the 
majority view, although on others there might be unanimous agreement; 
personal interests would be lost to majority interest; but they would al­
ways be thinking of the kind of society they would like to see, and the
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kind of society they judged to be good. When Rawls asks them to choose 
principles of justice that are indifferent between different views of the 
good, he is asking men to do something which is foreign to their natures. 
Such a choice is hardly possible at all, but is necessary if Rawls is 
to insist on his ’value-free’ formulation of the principles of justice.
The veil of ignorance is something which the classical contractarians . 
like Hobbes did not need to hypothesize; Hobbes’s state of nature was 
something which men would fall into, given their natures,under conditions 
of political anarchy. From an appeal to that nature itself, Hobbes 
could proceed to justify his system as a rational way to serve basic 
human motives. Rawls, by denying those values, cannot offer a foundation 
for his system.
On the other hand, Rawls finds it necessary to allow some informat­
ion about human nature through the veil- what rules it is possible for 
human beings to follow, traditional values that the new justice must al­
ter, and facts about human beings and the world which make justice nec­
essary. Yet, like the classical contractarians, he chooses to include
only some aspects of human nature, and leaves out other important things. 20As Warnock rightly objects: "if, as Rawls insists, I am not to know my 
age, sex, nationality, abilities, date, and so forth, why would it be 
relevant that I should know my zoological species and galactic locat­
ion?" As a result of this selectivity, Rawls is able to develop a sys­
tem that accords with what he considers important, not what others
consider important. This point is worth further scrutiny.
Rawls’s principles; and the empirical content of ethics
Rawls alleges that two principles of justice emerge from the choice 
of parties to his original position. The first is the principles of the 
priority of ’equal liberty’. The second is what he calls the ’difference 
principle ’ and concerns the allocation of resources between individuals. 
Each principle is troublesome because of the question of how much emp­
irical information Rawls is prepared to allow - in Wanock’s words, how 
thick is the veil of ignorance?
Although Rawls does not define liberty, thus avoiding objections21about its alleged ’priority’ to some extent, his insistence upon that
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priority raises the question of why individuals enjoying anything that 
is normally referred to as perfect ’liberty’ should submit themselves 
to the rule of law at all, given its primary place. Perhaps the liber­
ties (or at least the powers) individuals enjoy under the rule of law are 
greater than otherwise, although this is doubtful: but is it really im­
possible to assert that human beings simply may not value the new legal 
system and the new liberties included under it? And certainly, some in- |
formation about human desires, needs and values is required when we choose V
between competing systems of ’liberties’; or else we could not determine 4
how far different liberties should be protected or curbed for the end of 
promoting others, a determination which is the backbone of political 
philosophy. Rawls, insisting on the priority of ’liberty’ gives us no 
means to choose between liberties or systems.
The information which must be allowed is what Kant would dismiss as 
’social anthropology’ and therefore not part of ethics; to him it was our 
reason, and not our humanity, which made us capable of moral action and 
Ox making moral judgements. The view is still common in philosophy (al­
though not usually as dogmatically held as Kant’s) and therefore, some 
arguments against it are needed here, arguments which will also suffice 
as a criticism of the ’value-free’ part of Rawls’s theory.
Kant’s notion can be attacked with arguments of various strength.
A weak crticism, advanced by Warnock, is that there are certain min­
imum conditions which make obligations and justice necessary. The quest­
ion of what principles rational beings would adopt, given only that they 
are rational, is one "too totally unspecific to admit of anything by way
of an answer. Why, one might for instance ask, would such beings adopt23any principles at all?" The answer must be because they have occasion to 
do things; so immediately we have accepted the provision that our moral 
beings are not merely rational, but are rational agents. And then, why 
does it matter what a rational agent does? The answer can only be that 
the action of one agent interferes with those of another; so now we have 
conceded that our agents are in some way vulnerable. This kind of in­
formation, while it does not necessarily apply only to humans, is at 
least empirical; Kant, perhaps unwittingly, takes this kind of empirical 
information as given.
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A somewhat stronger criticism would be to note, further to the fore­
going, that in limiting the empirical content of morality to such utterly 
general levels, only the most general principles could be derived. A 
negative version of the golden rule-might follow from the information con­
ceded so far, but even this is doubtful; why should the individual be in­
terested in preventing harm to others? If he has unlimited might and
power at his disposal, then the harm of others could be of no concern to
him; it is only when we concede (as Hart does^^) approximate equality of 
strength between the agents that specific principles of morality start 
to emerge. So we are even nearer to the human situation. Contrary to 
Rawls, and contrary to the rational constructivists, the more we allow 
human nature into our thinking, the nearer we get so something which can 
be called ethics. Humanity, and the desires, values and limits to act­
ions which are a part of humanity, are indeed a part of morality: as 25Urmson puts it, "Morality... is something that should serve human needs, 
not something that incidentally sweeps man up with itself." To say that 
there are some things which it is right to do, but to maintain that no 
human being is capable of doing them is a rather pointless view; such 
a position carries nothing by way of prescription, advice or goad to our 
activity, nor any concern with those things which we as human beings hold 
to be important;
In justifying the place of a clear picture of human nature in ethics 
(that is, in justifying the allowance of a great deal of empirical infor­
mation about ourselves in ethics) it should be pointed out that ’a bill 
of rights is not a suicide pact’. For contractarians who allow a certain 
empirical content into their systems, Hobbes and Rousseau for example, 
it is in fact quite the opposite; to them, the contract is meant to red­
uce friction and hostility. Yet by allowing only part of the human psy­
chology to enter the picture, it is easily possible for us to advocate 
systems and rules which would actually threaten social life, because we 
had overlooked the existence of some piece of behaviour, or value, or 
trait. To take an example: suppose that we observe that human beings like 
and strive toward equality, and that they believe in the compensation of 
one individual with natural disadvantages by another with natural advant­
ages. Suppose then that we ruled that in the ’good’ society, infants
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would be taken from their parents very early in life (much earlier than 
the Spartan tradition, say) so that nobody received the advantages of 
special upbringing. Would the resulting situation turn out as we had 
expected? Probably not; as we have seen from Bowlby’s observations 
on institutionalized children, the social lives (and ethical beliefs) 
of those infants could be seriously changed, with the chance of pronoun­
ced (but unpredictable) changes in future social organization. When we 
speculate about a moral prescription such as this one, we cannot say 
if it is a ’good’ prescription until its consequences have been examined; 
and those consequences can only be known when we have a complete picture 
of human nature.
Lastly, it can be said that there is no definite place to draw the 
line between the empirical content which is the proper concern of phil­
osophy and the empirical content which is not. The more information 
that is allowed, the more precise can be our prescriptions, and the more 
useful can they be as a guide to our actions. There does not seem to be 
any definite point at which we can divide the empirical content necces- 
sary for the ’foundation’ of morality from that which is useful to develop 
a ’superstructure’ upon it - as Warnock supposes in Kant and Anthropology. 
When, with Warnock, we allow one piece of information into our analysis, 
we remove any justification for not including more.
The result of these considerations is that the social contract theory 
must be viewed as somewhat weak. The contract is only a good explanation 
of human conduct when we hypothesize that there is no natural inclin­
ation for form societies, and that these are a rational construction from 
which certain (rationally-derived) rights and obligations can be said to 
follow. When we include the ethological evidence about animal and human 
nature, however, we see that social organization is, or can be, prior to 
human reason; and when we check the logic of the evolution of groups of 
individuals, we can see the functional nature of such non-rational 
sociality, and why it should have occurred outwith human reason.
The Difference Principle
Returning now to the second principle which Rawls claims is bound to
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emerge through agreement in the original position*, this is that 
"social and economic inequalities are to be arranged... to the greatest 
benefit of the least advantaged/' provided that there is ‘'fair equality 
of opportunity,** This principle, although not strictly essential to 
the discussion of the relevance of human nature to social philosophy, 
does show how confused our thinking can be when we take only part of 
human nature to be the base for our discussions.
The part of human psychology which Rawls starts from in engineer­
ing this principle is that which includes the notion of ’deéext*, ap­
parently borrowed from Kant but as Rawls describes it, totally opposed 
to Kant’s thinking. His claim is that*'undeserved inequalities call for 
redress, " and that inequalities of birth must therefore be compensated 
for.
Unfortunately, from the Kantian principle that no man ’deserves’ 
his natural abilities, it does not follow that other men ’deserve’ any 
particular asset more than the holder, and therefore that any redistrib­
ution should occur. To do so would in fact be a violation of Kantian 
doctrines of individuals being ’ends in themselves’. Moreover, the 
difference principle violates many other features in human psychology; 
for example, rights of ownership. The principle does, however, fol­
low from Rawls’s assertion that abilities and talents are "a collective 
asset to which he (the individual) has no moral claim," but this as­
sertion is itself false. As Nozick has pointed out some people are 
blessed with healthy bodies; should they compensate others because of 
that? Are arms and legs to be redistributed, as the ’perfect’ enact­
ment of the difference principle would seem to suggest? The question 
is ridiculous; there are some abilities and talents which we generally 
believe it is a right for the individual to possess. Accidents have 
very little to do with justice, and accidents of birth are compatible 
with most notions of a ’just’ society, particularly where the value 
of a particular talent of ability cannot be measured (or would be dif­
ferent to different people) and therefore where compensation cannot be 
judged.
Another point demonstrates the logical absurdity of the difference 
principle. Were it to be rigidly applied, one might ask why it would
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not be right to include other species. We have talents which canaries 
and hedgehogs do not: are we then to compensate other species because 
of this? The fact that Rawls makes no mention of this application of 
the principle is revealing, because it shows that even in his ’value- 
free’ treatment of justice, he has to accept some fundamental human 
values^ and has to include in his analysis empirical information, ar­
bitrarily chosen, to substantiate his own political view. It is a 
patchwork philosophy which is remarkably weak at the seams.
Civil disobedience
Thus far we have examined certain examples of social contract 
theory, and have seen that they incorporate marked methodological def­
iciencies. The most serious is that they consider only a part of human 
nature, and by no means a representative part. Now, a short consider­
ation may be given to a subject which is widely accepted by the classic* 
cal contractarians, but to which Rawls is directly opposed, namely the 
necessary obligation of the individual in the state to the powers of 
authority. Some comments on Rawls’s notion of ’civil disobedience’ will 
make the point.
In his chapter on ’Duty and Obligation’, Rawls supposes that there 
are certain ’basic liberties’, and that the infringement of these lib­
erties would be quite contrary to the intention of the agreement in the 
original position. These basic liberties are never defined, so it is 
impossible to be clear about what Rawls has in mind, and from whence 
these liberties are thought to arise; but from his assumption, he con­
cludes that an individual is justified in civil disobedience whenever 
the law of the majority is ’sufficiently’ injurious to his basic lib­
erties. An individual will know this, he goes on, when it is obvious 
that a truly impartial assembly of men, in the original position, would 
never have allowed or thought of the law. To Rawls’s ’democrat’, demo­
cratic institutions are not sacrosanct, but there to ’yield just and 
effective legislation’, which failing to do, they may be ignored and 
rejected by any individual who disputes them.
On the theme of the importance of empirical information to any judge-
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ment of justice^ we may note that things which are likely targets of 
civil disobedience would be excluded from consideration in the original 
position by the ’veil of ignorance'. Are nuclear power plants to be 
built despite their alleged risk; is smoking to be allowed in the light 
of its disputed correlation with cancer; are women to be compensated 
through loss of earnings while pregnant? These are questions which our 
courts, with all the facts about human nature at their disposal, cannot 
be sure about, no matter how impartial they try to be. From behind 
a veil of ignorance, where some aspects of human nature are allowed, but 
others are prohibited, a just decision must be even more difficult.
And indeed it can be objected that Rawls's allowance of.civil 
disobedience whenever the individual finds 'sufficient' cause is a rec­
ipe for anarchy. So diverse are human opinions that some interest or 
group, claiming 'injustice', has deeply-held convictions about almost 
every part of public policy. To legitimise disobedience as a result of 
those claims would be to allow civil disruption on a continuing basis.
No social system could operate under such conditions. Civil disobedi­
ence is, almost by definition, disruptive, and causes inconvenience or 
hardship to some people; can it really be sanctioned when it can be so 
easily seized upon as an excuse for any anti-social actions?
One instance in which this refusal to comply with the commands of 
authority could be of crucial importance to a state is in time of war. 
Rawls says that, given the predatory nature of modern political powers, 
refusal to serve one's country is all the more necessary. In practice, 
however, countries ^  expect a great deal from their citizenry; and, ag­
ainst Rawls, people do feel, at those times, more inclined than at other
times to come to the assistance of their political leaders. As Lord27Cecil points out in an interesting speech, the vast operations of 
modern wars, the huge numbers who voluntarily chose to sign up in the 
armies of the world, and the heightened feeling of obligation to the 
country's cause could not be explained by anything other than human 
psychology or 'natural instinctas he calls it. Were we, like Rawls, 
to devise a system in which this 'natural instinct' was lacking, we 
would be devising a system only partly related to human nature, and we
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would be eliminating a source of many strong de facto' obligations.
Other writers have attempted to make out that the source of oblig­
ation rests in rationality; Hobbes supposed that obligation arose be­
cause the consequences of ignoring it would be harmful to the individual; 
Hume also says that without obligation to authority, society could not 
exist, and suggests that it is our rational desire to be members of soc­
ieties which forces us into compliance with our rulers. Rawls, however, 
seems to abandon the prospect of obedience entirely; or at least he 
leaves the stable door so wide open that any amount of disobedience could 
bolt through it.
A further illustration of the the shortcomings of Raiwls is his fail­
ure to consider the functional aspect of a stable social order in which 
obedience to authority has its place (although is not necessary the 
basis for indefeasible rights). Is that stability not something which 
the individual might value; might it not be that stability which guar­
antees him his 'basic liberties' in a less than just world? If this is 
so, the individual might still feel an obligation to authority, even 
though he believes that some laws are unjust. Provided that there is 
a political system through which his views can be expressed and heard, 
and in which reform is possible, he has no justification to move im­
mediately to civil disobedience, with all the harm to others and risk 
to his own liberties which that involves.
Summary
Social contract theories suffer from a misplaced confidence in the 
ability of human reason to solve any problem. This is not always the 
case, and 'rational' laws can bring about unforseen effects when human 
psychology is miscalculated.
Therefore, we have to develop a system in which human psychology is 
properly calculated, a system in which moral rules are subjected to the 
test of practicability and fidelity of consequence.
Another reason for the problems associated with social contract 
systems is that they suggest a presocial state which could never have 
existed, and attempt to draw lessons about human nature from a consid­
eration of that nonexistent condition. Rawls and the other contractar-
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ians are fond of saying that in the original state there must have been 
an 'equality' between individuals, because nobody had to accept the 
social contract in the first place; but as we have seen, this state of 
equality is a fiction, and obligations are as old as man (indeed, a 
good deal older).
Yet by insisting that the 'natural man' is the moral equal of the 
next, devoid of obligations to others or powers over them, social con­
tract philosophers have built a system devoid of foundation in human 
nature, although in fairness it can be said that some of them take 
parts of human nature into their systems. Nevertheless, no account of 
a social contract has included a systematic survey of what Kant would 
call 'anthropology', empirical information vital to any form­
ulation of rules of morality and justice. In fact, the contract would 
be seen to be of little value if such things were considered, because 
there is a natural 'social contract' in human nature which is far stron­
ger and older than the speculations of philosophy.
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Chapter 11
FURTHER PHILOSOPHICAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE APPROACH
"Politics ought to he adjusted, not to human reason, hut to human nature, of which the reason is hut a part, and hy 
no means the greatest part," ^Edmund Burke
As we have seen, the social contract theory is an inadequate hasis 
for the derivation of principles of justice, of duties, obligations and 
ri^ts. When these are ’derived* from an allegedly presocial state, 
they are derived from a state contrary to human nature. When the pre­
social state is hypothesized merely as a device to study human nature, 
it is necessarily misleading; and the very diversity of those political 
systems which contractarians have thought themselves ahle to derive 
shows the emptiness of the approach and the dependency of the conclu­
sions upon the information ahout human nature which the contractarian 
is disposed to admit on the ground of his own preferences.
The social contract theory is misleading also in its implication 
that there is agreement, even tacit agreeement, to social institutions. 
In primitive cultures it is quite possible for individuals to follow 
established norms of behaviour without realizing that they do* This 
might be conformity, but it is not consent, and therefore cannot furn­
ish us "with the basis of obligation which the contractarians thought
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they had derived. Hume's argument on this point is well known. In 
his essay Of the Original Contract, he notes that many individuals 
who are covered hy the law have no say in its formulation, and that 
the 'consent* of such individuals is neither here nor there. Further­
more, it cannot even he said that some individuals "tacitly consent' to 
he hound hy a regime if escape for them is impossible, as it has heen 
in certain countries where capital punishment was meted out for any at­
tempt to travel abroad, or where individuals were physically prevented 
from travelling (as they would he because of the modern Berlin Wall, 
for example).
The third major objection to the contractarians is over their as­
sumption that all social institutions, since they are apparently regu­
lar and orderly, must he constructed deliberately hy an individual or 
many individuals. Ferguson, Smith, Montesq.uieu and Mande ville have, 
however, demonstrated that this is not soo Human deliberation has in­
deed built many towering institutions j hut there are some institutions 
which are the products of human action, though without human design.
Hence, some new basis of social organization and obligation is 
req^uired to replace the contract theory. It must be one which accommo­
dates the principles of human nature that are sketchily covered, twist­
ed or ignored by the contractarian. Our best guess of what these prin­
ciples of human nature are comes through our observation of men and how 
they behave, and through our knowledge of their past or 'background', 
gained through the ethological method and through what we can infer 
about the requirements of human nature given the criterion of evolu­
tionary survival in the historical past.
Regularity and obligation
The immediate question for discussion, then, is what is the source 
of moral obligation? If we take the obligation of a promise as a spec­
imen of obligation, why should a promise be kept, and are there any cir­
cumstances under which the obligation dissolves? These questions go2back to Plato, but are still prime targets of debate.
One interesting answer is given by War nock in his book The Object
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of Morality, and provides a useful starting-pointo He says that the 
crucial thing about a promise is that it enables others to depend upon 
or count upon our actions. This can be very important to the person 
extracting the promise; he can then be confident that the promiser will 
take care of his beloved cat during the vacation, or will give him a 
ride to the important conference in the morning. Under this analysis," 
a promise is a kind of prediction: "Yes, this is going to happen. I am 
going to act in this way, and not in any other way, I will feed the 
cat," As a prediction, it can be a true or a false prediction, and to 
keep a promise is to have made a true prediction, while to break one is 
to have uttered a falsehood, "It is my submission," concludes Warnock, 
"that our words may 'bind' us for the future; they make it the case that 
only by acting in a certain way can we ensure that we did not, earlier, 
speak or act falsely," Therefore the obligation of a promise is simi­
lar to the obligation of truth-telling.
War nock'8 remarks end at this point, having left the question only 
partly answered, but having allowed us to answer it more fully. It is 
all very well to show that the obligation of a promise is identical to 
the obligation of truth-telling; but whence arises the latter obligation? 
The answer seems to be in terms of the functionality of truth-telling. 
Creatures which tell the truth enjoy a higher evolutionary fitness than 
the others. In any one situation, it mi^t be to the ad"vantage of an 
individual to tell a lie or to 'cheat' ; but in a social species will 
evolve mechanisms to deal with the liar and the cheater, since if 
lying went on very widely, nobody would know what to believe or what 
they could rely on. In a fickle social environment, the outcomes of an 
action could not be predicted, and social life would not be possible.
An analogy is language: were our use of sounds completely random 
in their use to designate objects - if a man who pointed to a typewriter 
ceiled it a 'book' on one occasion and a 'porcupine* on another - then 
we would not have a language at all, just a capricious and unpredictable 
set of sounds. We would be unable to communicate through those sounds, 
and the many benefits of communication through language would be denied 
us. Similarly, were we to tell the truth on few occasions, or not at
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all, then our social relations would he capricious and unpredictable.
If it is very unlikely that someone who has made a promise (say, to feed 
the cat) will in fact do so, then the rational action would be not to 
solicit the promise at all, but to take care of the task ourselves. If 
it is very unlikely that a person who makes some statement (e.g., 'those 
animals are not dangerous*) is telling the truth, then it is prudent 
to ignore him. When human actions become unpredictable to a certain 
degree, in other words, social life itself becomes impossible and dys­
functional, (Of course it is possible that a group_whose actions were 
unpredictable might, by chance, survive better than another whose ways 
were thoroughly predictable. The probabilities must, however, be 
weighted against it, particularly in the long run of evolutionary selec­
tion). In social animals which are capable of truth and falsehood, like 
human beings, selection would have favoured the positive valuation of 
truthfulness and its encouragement through many mechanisms including the 
notion of moral obligation.
The other mechanisms that help to establish the predictability of 
human action have been mentioned already. Education and early social­
ization are clear examples, and they are highly adaptive mechisms in 
an intelligent species, because they leave some flexibility of action 
such that particular, unforseen circumstances can be dealt with. In­
deed, were we like bees, completely predictable and moving under the 
determinate pressure of instinct, no promises would be needed; each in­
dividual would know precisely how the others were going to act without 
any question. Our notion of 'obligation* is a functional device which 
allows us some degree of predictability in human affairs without, the 
rigid instinctive determination of our actions.
Another mechanism is simple conformity. It is well known by psy­
chologists that human beings show a remarkable tendency to fall in line 
with the judgements of those around them. Experiments show that even 
our judgements of physical qualities, like the relative length,of two3nails, can be swayed by the ruling opinion of a group. Moral practices 
also appear to be influenced strongly by social norms according to the 
experiments of Homstein and others, according to which people tended
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to act more altruistically when presented with a 'model* of altruism 
some time earlier. We conform also to authority, as was shown in the 
remarkable experiments of Milgram, in which experimental subjects would 
perform actions which appeared to be highly vicious (although the situ­
ation was designed to deceive them) upon instructions from the authori- 
tative experimenter. Furthermore, when social pressure is put upon 
deviant individuals, it seems to be stronger, the more deviant the in­
dividuals concerned,^
Conformity to social pressure and to the rulings of authority is 
often regarded as a sign of personal weakness. Here, however, there is 
some problem for the first-order moralist, since the psychological evi­
dence suggests that we are nearly all conformists to some degree, and 
that most people conform to social norms to a much greater extent than 
they think. Are we all to be characterised as weak-willed? Clearly 
not. Secondly, the moralist has to face up to the fact that our con­
formity to the opinions of others, and our gullibility in accepting 
ways of behaving from others, may be essential to an adaptive cumula­
tion of cultural experiences in which successful methods persist 
through emulationo
Some moralists, amongst whom a number of psychologists feature 
prominantly, raise another question: whether it is right for adults to 
pressure their children to conform to norms .that have little or nothing 
to do with the maintenance of the social system and the survival of the 
beings living under itb Hair length and clothing style are familiar 
examples. If any answer is to be given, it must take into account the 
fact that tUe workings of evolution are blind. The mechanism of con­
formity is of selective advantage when it retains useful and functional 
characteristics, but there is no reason why conformity in matters that 
are neither functional nor dysfunctional should be purged from the sys­
tem, since there would be no selective pressure in either direction. 
Accordingly, some non-functional characteristics are retained with the 
functional ones. This may make our behaviour with respect to such9characteristics in the young more easily understandable,
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Let us return to consider further mechanisms underlying the pre­
dictability of the social environment, A feeling of guilt when we have 
defaulted on some obligation or have acted out of - accordance with est­
ablished norms is another such mechanism, Hayek likens guilt-feelings 
to the feeling of fear in a machine operator who inadvertantly throws 
the wrong lever and sets the machine out of control. Until the cause 
of the loss of control is established, the machine continues on its own 
way, quite unpredictably. The operator experiences fear because he 
does not know, from moment to moment, what the machine will do next. 
Similarly with the social establishment; when we act against the est­
ablished norms, we have no way of predicting what the outcome of our 
actions will be. Hence guilt is a factor tending to keep us within 
customary limits of behaviour, consolidating our notions of obligation,^
There is one further mechanism to consider, and that is the in­
stitution of legal and moral rules. The fruits of natural selection 
are not always the most functional arrangements, of course. For ex­
ample, the cells which are built by bees in a natural hive are much 
less than perfectly hexagonal, although they are roughly so. Likewise, 
there may be considerable variation in human tendencies to conform or 
to behave irregularly, to be altruistic or selfish. For rough pre­
diction of the outcomes of an action, this variation might make little 
difference, but it is clear that we can increase ^ predictability by 
setting, and adhering to, arbitrary moral and legal rules of behaviour. 
The conditions necessary to make these rules effective at increasing 
the predictability of outcome of actions are only that the rules should 
be followed (the greater the following, the more predictable the out­
comes), In practical terms this means that such rules must be well- 
known and accepted by the individuals covered by them.
The effectiveness of the rules is not dependent upon their treat­
ing everyone equally, Hume seems to have recognized this when he says 
that the rules of property should not change and should be well-known,9but that the precise content of the.rules is * pretty indifferent*,.
To his mind, it would be quite possible to have a sobie'ty where, -say, 
women or children could not own or transfer property, provided that the
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rule was known and generally accepted. This is a point which Plamenatz 
refuses to a c c e p t . I n  fact, however, we do formulate our rules of 
property and succession in just such a manner; the male heir inherits 
the estate and the peerage, not the female. If he is under a certain 
age, the property may he put in trust for him, but is unlikely to be 
handed over outright. In other words, our rules of property do not 
treat people equally; they discriminate on the grounds of age and sex. 
Provided that they are well-known and rather permanent, they will never­
theless contribute to the formulation of a smoothly-functioning and pre­
dictable social order, within which we can make decisions and take act­
ions with a h i ^  degree of certainty in the outcome. This will be a 
positive contribution to evolutionary fitness.
Political differences
That in order to function efficiently, our rules do not have to 
treat people equally is a point which will be of importance when we 
treat the * uni ver sali zability* doctrine of ethics in the following chap­
ter, For the moment, it might be helpful to look at one such mechan­
ism of inequality which seems to be highly adaptive-for'a society, namely 
the mechanism of political differences or differences in dominance. We 
have seen that it is an established social order in primate groups that 
makes social life possible. Were individuals to be of equal rank, 
there would be continual disputation about who is to lead, when the 
group is to do one thing, when another, and so on. These disputes could 
never be resolved because of the equality of the individuals concerned, 
none of which is able to force his opinions on others. Thus is is that 
rank orders evolved in our ancestral species long before human fore­
sight and calculation emerged.
Even the contractarians, priding themselves on the rationality of 
our social actions, are unconvincing on this point, Rawls is the prime 
example, because his 'democrat' considers his own judgement of an is­
sue to be of equal weight to the judgement of everyone else, no matter 
how many other people there are. Rule by the majority would become im­
possible under such conditions. The earlier contractarians noted that 
there was a need for individual subservience to a government or 'sover­
eign' as a way of avoiding such problems, but they too are unconvincing,
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In a contract between equals, why should any one member accept a junior 
role? Could such a contract come into existence when any one of its 
signers could hold out for the position of sovereign?
Such questions did not arise in the course of our evolution, for 
we were equipped with a dominance structure that would make them un­
necessary, As Knipe and Maclay observe in their amusing book,^^ dom­
inance relationships are an everyday part of human society, however 
subtle the difference might be, (Even the eighteenth-century Scottish 
philosophers recognized that no two men could talk for more than five 
minutes without one developing a mastery of sorts over the other).
Minor differences in the exient to which we will submit to the suggest­
ions, assertions, will and ideas of others make an important contrib­
ution to the predictability and stability of human affairs.
Political inequalities, then, must be judged only with reference 
to their overall effectso Moreover, small differences in rank are 
not something to which everyone has a strong aversion (as Rawls sup­
poses in his treatment of 'primary goods*), but on the contrary, are 
common and are unthinkingly accepted. Our conformity with the demands 
of authority has been mentioned already: for the (minor) political . 
privilege of voting, we entrust executive powers to a small body of 
men, and are bound by all the laws they impose upon us, and even fight 
in wars and emergencies upon their wordo This does not seem much of 
a 'social contract' in the accepted sense, but it is an institution 
which we call'democracy'and actually admire. Political inequality is 
not something that we naturally and strongly detest, but something 
which seems to excite our feelings of obligation.
It is noteworthy that these obligations are themselves unequal,
"In proportion to the station which a man possesses," wrote Hume, "Ac­
cording to the relations in which he is placed; we always expect from12him a greater or less degree of good,,»*' The obligations of nobil­
ity are indeed different from the obligations falling upon other men. 
The Greek notion of agathos was expected in the noble-born; rulers' have 
always given the appearance of being paragons of virtue (although as 
Machiavelli's handbook of state. The Prince, reveals, the reality might
2D1
be quite different). Today, we expect certain standards of behaviour
from policemen, government officers, judges and any others in author-13ity that is different from our standards in other men.
The elaborate mechanisms to ensure and enforce our subservience to 
a sovereign that have been devised by some contractarians seem unneces­
sary, even brutal, in the light of our natural acceptance of inequality> 
Rousseau's prescription for conformity is to outlaw all voluntary assoc­
iations that may compete for the allegiance of individuals. From the 
ethological point of view, three major objections can be raised against 
this strange recommendation. First, as Tiger hypothesized in Men in 
Groups, the small social group is the fundamental and most ancient 
building-block of human society. Even in the modern industrial cities, 
we form ourselves into clubs, societies, unions and religious sects, 
seeming not only to enjoy, but also to seek out such association» De­
stroy that association, and a vital part of human life will have been 
cut out - with unpredictable consequences» Secondly, as Pirie notes 
in his Trial and Error, the existence of a variety of small groups and 
social systems is necessary for the 'variation' arm of the evolution­
ary balance, so that one group can learn from another, and so that there 
is a greater chance of at least one system surviving the rigours of long- 
run evolutionary selection. Thirdly, as Lorenz argues in On Aggression, 
the competition between political groups, sports teams and other 
associations may relieve natural aggression, and so promote social har­
mony in general.
Moral equality
The avoidance of such systems of inequality when devising moral 
codes has been a target of moralists throughout the course of philo­
sophy, The same attitude was reinforced throu^ the insistence of 
the contractarians that men must be considered as equal partners in a 
social contract. Hence, Benthara's maxim of justice, "everyone to count 
for one, nobody for more than one," and Mill's rule that "One person's 
happiness,,, is counted for exactly as much as another's," have been 
given the status of "a fundamental, self-evident truth,,. For this 
assumption no warrant is given, or can be given, other than alleged in-
202
tuitive perception. It is an a priori cognition,
When we examine what our conceptions of justice and moral equal­
ity actually, are, however, we find that we generally and naturally 
discriminate between people, treating them differently, and counting 
some people for more than one and some for less than one. Indeed any 
other world would be altogether repugnant to us, not to mention its 
evolutionary shortcomings. In a time of crisis, for example, we norm­
ally make attempts to protect women and children; they are the first to 
be rescued from the burning hotel or the sinking ship. We have other 
rules which forbid us from striking a women or a child, but allow us 
more discretion in our actions toward men. Had we a choice of life 
or- death to make, it is the Prime Minister we would feel obliged to 
save rather than the madman, whatever our views of the political abil­
ities of either» The individuality of the patients in our moral de­
cisions is important to us in these and many other circumstances, and 
it would be difficult to make a choice between one option and another 
under a Rawlsian system of 'equal* justice. When we enter the burning 
hotel, we do not want to have to draw straws to find out who should 
be saved; fortunately, our deeply-held but unequal valuations of dif­
ferent human beings enables us to make much quicker decisions.
There have been ingenious explanations of why anything other 
than moral equality is impossible as a foundation of social life. As 
we have seen with respect to primate societies, these explanations do 
not fit the observed facts, Hazlitt, for example, notes that people 
of equal strength and ability, or approximately so, will squabble un­
less their shares in the product of their joint effort are also approx-15imately equal» This is the only possible modus vivendi, he concludes. 
Yet one glance at any society reveals that things rarely work this way. 
Products are allocated unequally. Furthermore, people are very dif­
ferent in strength, ability, and their willingness to conform to the 
prevailing norms and accept their given shares. Strict equality is 
not the only possible form of social organization, and so it pos­
sible to speculate about the merits of one organization against another. 
The maxims of Bentham or Mill cannot be so easily assumed.
2Q3
Age and sex differences
As instances of our differential treatment of individuals, consider 
our reactions to the characteristics of age and sex. Few people would 
suggest that it is right to treat children exactly equal to adults. No 
social contract, including the Constitution of the United States, grants 
children equal rights in voting, representation, property, and many 
other things. Similarly, no constitution expects children to he pun­
ished identically to adults if they commit some transgression. Every 
civilized society has special lawcourts to deal with juvenile offenders, 
and it would he thoug^it quite wrong that such offenders should he made 
to suffer adult justice. Similarly, we do not allow children to have 
many rights enjoyed hy adults: their judgement, we believe, is not suf­
ficiently mature or reliable for their actions to be fully predictable, 
and were they allowed complete responsibility in all areas of adult soc­
ial life, then the regularity and predictability of that social pat­
tern would be reduced. In addition, the child'might be 'spoiled* by his 
enjoyment of a large measure of self-determination at an early age: so 
once again, social life would become more fickle and more difficult,
Evoluüonary considerations suggest that our species would come to re­
ject, by and large, attitudes and principles of the equal treatment of 
minors, as indeed it has.
Our social life would be under strain if we treated some individ­
uals as children for part of the time and the same Individuals as adults 
on other occasions. This would make some people uncertain a'bout what 
their rights and responsibilities really were, and would make it more 
difficult for otheis to know exactly how far they could rely on the 
actions of those individuals » Accordingly, one of the functions of in­
itiation ceremonies like the Jewish Bar Mitzvah, or of arbitrary ages 
of majority, is to help us to be consistent in our treatment of young 
people, and to make them aware of their precise responsibilities at any 
particular time in life. It may seem strange to the philosopher that 
on one day we treat a person in one manner, and on the next in another, 
and that such different treatment can be justified; but in fact there 
are sound evolutionary reasons why this arrangement is followed, and
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if the philosopher or the moralist is at all concerned with social wel­
fare or human survival (which few claim not to he) then he cannot eval­
uate such differences in treatment without reference to the evolutionary 
functions they serve.
There are many occasions^ in addition, to problems of the beginning 
of adulthood and adult responsibilities where age considerations are 
relevant in deciding the morality of some action. Take the familiar 
problems of whether it is right to prolong the lives of children born 
with some serious genetic deformity, or to allow aged individuals to 
end their own lives with our assistance, Ardrey has concisely (if 
unfairly) caricatured such positions: "Life must be prolonged, what­
ever agony it presents to the dying, A child defective physically or 
mentally must somehow be saved sufficiently to join the breeding popu­
lation, To restrict the reproductive rights of the genetically affected 
would be an act of discrimination,"^^ Such principles may well be de­
rivable from the axioms of Rawlsian justice, from an original position 
of moral equality where individuals were ends in themselves such that 
no other individuals could claim jurisdiction over them in matters of 
life and death. But can such principles explain the problematic un­
easiness we feel about these problems or help us to resolve them? It 
would seem not; on the contrary, these principles are the source of 
many of our problems in the matter.
The difficulties arise because values that are biologically ex­
pedient in one situation are not so in another, and that the typically 
human desire for consistency in thought and deed often leads us to 
apply certain principles indiscriminately between such different situ­
ations, There is clear functionality about the moral principle that 
each individual is an 'end in himself and that another has no justif­
ication in robbing him of his life, impeding his freedom of movement 
and so on - at least, not without a good argument based on some other 
moral principle of wide acceptance,' Similarly, there is clear
functionality in the piinciple that we should try to help others who 
are wounded or infirm and try to bring them back to normal life. So 
is it that these values are selected in evolution, and. that we speak
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of the 'right* to life, or liberty, or the pursuit of happiness. There 
are, of course, occasions where such unrestricted rights would be 
dysfunctional, and so every society has its methods of restraining or 
punishing some individuals. Our awarding or curtailment of these 
rights is, of course, dependent on age and other factors.
What, then, of a child born with a serious, incapacitating genetic 
defect? Does morality require us to award him (or acknowledge) pre­
cisely the same rights as normal adults? In animal societies, blind 
evolution has answered the question, and abnormal individuals are re­
jected or killed by the parents at birth: there would certainly be a 
small chance that the mutation was a functional one, but the probabili­
ties are very much against it. When an individual is fully grown, how­
ever, members of the animal societies we have examined will assist him 
when necessary, and will help to prolong his life. Their behaviour is 
a function of his age. The same is largely true in human preindustrial 
societies, particularly those such as eskimo communities where the re­
sources necessary for life are scarce.
In advanced societies, however, spoken commitment to moral equal­
ity (however far from the facts it may be) is given as a reason why 
such actions would be wrong. It is certainly true that we have the re­
sources to spare in caring for incapacitated children. The law of the 
'survival of the fittest* does not exclude them because in a world of 
advanced medicine and intensive care facilities, they are as fit as 
anyone else. On the other side of the balance sheet are two deficits, 
however; firstly, the society which advocates full ri^ts for these . 
newborn (or prenatal) infants will have to divert more resources to 
their care than other societies. With each case, the survival pros­
pects of everyone else will be reduced very sli^tly. Secondly, the 
family of the infant will probably bear the greatest burden. They will 
have to nurse, tend, feed, and spend time and money on their unfortun­
ate offspring. This must reduce their ability to raise other, normal, 
infants. To the extent that kinship selection is a part of human life, 
such a family is being denied a chance to have its genetic constitution 
represented in future generations (except, perhaps, throu^ an acci­
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dentally deformed and unrepresentative individual). The moral question 
is thus rather more subtle than it is usually portrayed; the life of 
the infant must be weired against the parents*, contribution to future 
generations. Should we punish the parent who takes the life of her de­
formed infant immediately after its birth? The question cannot be ans­
wered with respect to the *a priori cognition* of moral equality alone.; 
the mechanisms of kinship and group selection (which are, after all, 
responsible for highly moral values and actions in men) must be taken 
into consideration.
Raising these points about the differential treatment of individu­
als on the basis of age shows how principles of evolutionary selection 
are a necessary part of certain moral questions. In a prerational ani­
mal society, these judgements are taken automatically without the need 
for lengthy calculation. If we are to use our powers of calculation to 
help us decide between courses of action, however, it seems necessary 
that we should take all available information about human nature into 
consideration, and not rely on limited principles of supposed human 
nature, oversimply applied.
Turning to a consideration of different treatment of individuals 
on the basis of sex, the same harvest of problems springs up, but a few 
prescriptive points can be made as well.
Men have always been treated differently from women: in all spec­
ies in which there is any sexual dimorphism, the same differences of 
treatment and difference of social role is apparent. Although the pre­
cise tasks that, each sex takes on, and the precise obligations or 
rights that it has cannot be generalized from one species or population 
to another, some complementarity between the sexes is far from inex­
plicable in an evolutionary context. In the social life of most hunt­
ing and gathering peoples, for example, it is the men who hunt while 
the women gather crops and vegetables. The men usually exercise com­
plete political control, while women control the household. The ex­
clusiveness of the roles has little to do with characteristics contin­
gently related to sex, for instance, strength: the strongest woman in a 
community may be far stronger than the weakest man, and still she would
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be excluded from a hunting expedition. Similarly, in modern industrial 
societies it is the men who go out to work while, for the most part, 
women tend to the household, despite little or no difference in the 
technical abilities of each sex.
The exclusive nature of many professions has, of course, led to 
complaint from many women and women's organizations. While the etho- ‘ 
logical analysis does not pass comment upon whether these movements are 
moral or immoral, it does point to two things. Firstly, the roles of 
the sexes depend on obligations as well as rights. Were the rights of 
either sex expanded, then in order to maintain the balance, obligations 
would have to be adjusted likewise. This is perhaps one reason why 
some men argue that if women wish to be treated just like men as re­
gards employment or admission to clubs and societies, then they cannot 
expect to receive the many, if minor, privileges awarded them under 
etiquette. This is certainly not to say that any change is impossible 
or undesirable. On the contrary, the second point which the ethological 
analysis suggests is that any change of this sort is likely to meet with 
some resistance. In hiiman and other societies, changes in social roles 
do not come lightly. The industrial world discovered that after years 
of suffragette campaigning for the vote, which was associated with severe 
political upheaval, and even suicides. If sexual roles are to be 
changed in any major way, that it seems impossible for us to rely on 
the mere * enlightenment* of our minds by logical evidence. Our ways 
are sufficiently firmly set that only force and positive legislation 
could achieve any such change »
Maintenance of social institutions
Previously we have seen that primate social groups depend for their 
continuation on certain 'homeostatic* mechanisms of population control, 
individual dispersion, and norms of sexual behaviour and marriage.
Let us consider these with respect to the morality of modern societies, 
beginning with the last.
Little needs to be said because marriage and kinship were treated 
extensively in chapter ei^t. However, the question often arises of 
whether a social group has the light to set its moral opinions into
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law, or to punish people for certain sexual and other practices. To 
decide between the alternative points of view, it is vital that the 
philosopher (or the moralist) be equipped with at least some understand­
ing of the evolutionary issues involved.
The regulation of sexual activities through law is anathema to
liberals such as H.L.A.Hart in his classic monograph Law, Liberty and •
Morality. This 'legal moralism', says Hart, is "the view that the en-17forcement of sexual morality is a proper part of the law's business,"
He sketches a somewhat unfair caricature of the judiciary, in which the 
courts are supposed to regard themselves as the eus to s morum or "the 
general censor and guardian of the public manners," feeling justified 
and obliged to punish all deviations from some standard of behaviour 
which Hart does not fully specify (for perhaps it can never be fully 
specified at all). He is right, however, that our legal institutions 
do indeed leave scope for the legal punishment of very vaguely defined 
sexual behaviours. Such punishment is difficult for the liberal to 
allow in his conception of a 'just' society.
However, our treatment of problems of endogamy and incest in chap­
ter eight shows that an individual's sexual practices do in fact affect 
other members of society, Incestusl'relationships ' could cause con­
flicts within a family and could lead to an erosion of social bonds in 
larger societies and populations. The effects might seem small, 
but over many generations, they grow to importance. Indeed, the long­
term importance of such behaviours is probably one explanation of the 
readiness of humans -to criticise or outlaw it, both of which may in­
crease the selective ad-vantage of the population. Sexual behaviour is 
something which other members of a society do have an interest in»
The larger a society, the less would any individual's own welfare de­
pend on the habits of others,: but the' fitness of an individual and his 
descendants over the generations mi^t well remain dependent upon 
others, however large 'the society should grow.
The most extreme example of the offences which Hart claims are 
"not the law's business" would be those referred to as a 'conspiracy 
to corrupt public morals', English legal institutions in the early
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1970s witnessed a number of prosecutions where there seemed to be a
genuine and exerted attempt by some individuals to change the moral18values of society, particularly among children. When morality is 
viewed as a functional part of social life, and not merely a contin­
gent property of social life, the public concern over such incidents 
is explicable; and furthermore, the right of society to restrain indi­
viduals from certain actions, whether within the sphere of sexual mor­
ality or outside, becomes much more clear.
Population numbers are another subject which have caused concern 
to modern societies. Sir Alexander Garr-Saunders struck up a lively 
debate on the matter in 1922 when he noted that primitive human groups 
control their populations by custom and ritual, rather than strive for 
larger and larger group numbers. When one group becomes large, it us­
ually splits into two, Other practices which will serve to regulate 
group numbers are also condoned, including abortion, infanticide and 
restrictions on sexual behaviour. In modem societies, the population 
'problem*, if it exists, is dissimilar, for many millions of individu­
als can and do live in rather small areas, sustained by increasingly 
productive agricultural techniques and sophisticated food delivery sys­
tems. Nevertheless, an ethological approach might explain why there 
is discontent and violence within cities.
The ethological method would also have something to say on the 
debate over whether contraception should be outlawed or admitted as a 
means of population control. The arguments on both sides are complex, 
often turning on the definition of 'human life* and on the propriety 
of introducing laws upon which there is a major division of opinion.
A few remarks of interest can be offered, however. Two methods of 
limiting family size are commonly recognized. One is periodic absfin­
ance, supported by recent Catholic doctrines against the other, arti­
ficial contraception. The Church's argument starts from the foundation 
that sexual activity has only one function, namely the conception of 
children, and that this function is God-given and therefore it would 
be morally wrong to thwart it.
The Catholic doctrine may of course be challenged by arguments
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about the economic or social hardships of families with unwanted child­
ren and so forth ; hut the ethological argument on the matter is far 
more basic. If the Vatican employed biologists it would be aware that 
sexual behaviour has many more functions than the obvious one. It is 
clearly instrumental in forming long-lasting bonds between the partners 
concerned, and thus in providing a stable environment for the raising 
of children. The strength of the bond, althou^ imperfect, is also of 
advantage in human societies because sexual jealousies are diminished. 
Lastly, the intensity of the bonding _ between two individuals pro­
motes social bonds between their families, thus increasing the inter­
dependence of the whole society. The primary grounds of the Church's 
objection seem, therefore, to be the result of a misinterpretation of 
the function of sexual behaviour. Far from restraining men from evil, 
the orthodoxy seems to be forcing them to risk social welfare by a 
weakening of interpersonal bonds.
Population dispersion
The third mechanism for the maintenance of social life which we 
have elected to discuss is dispersion and the various bondings between 
relatives and strangers, A particular problem here is that of xeno­
phobia and racial hatred.
According to Smith, the bonds between members of our species
on a continuum. At one point in The Theory of Moral Sentiments, he
says that "the force of benevolence becomes weaker the more remote and
casual the connexion. And when we come to foreigners or members of
other sects or groups with interests which are thou^t to be opposed to20ours, we find not simply the absence of benevolence, but malevolence.” 
This statement is certainly valid descriptively, but it suggests that 
malevolence can be overcome by an injection of benevolence into our 
behaviour. In fact, the distrust or fear that people have of foreign­
ers has its own evolutionary and psychological source, and must be con­
sidered by itself ; moral discussions become confusing when xenophobic 
reactions are contrasted with family or friendship ties. In our evo­
lutionary history, xenophobia was of undoubted selective advantage. It 
preserved breeding isolation, and made the emergence of social life, in­
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eluding morality, possible» It increased the bonds of unity between 
the members of such a semi-isolated group, giving them a common cause.
It helped to keep antagonistic groups at a distance, so preventing the 
over-exploitation of natural resources.
In modern societies, xenophobia and the hostility to outsiders 
that is associated with it causes severe problems, particularly within • 
multiracial cities and countries with religious or racial divisions. 
Civil strife seems to be inevitable when two divergent groups are 
mixed together in roughly equal quantities. Nevertheless, we have been 
unable to devise any reliable method of dealing with such conflict, 
short of civil war» Appeals to the 'better nature® of the combatants 
are rarely effective; the view of moralists like Russell, that conflict 
can be ended for all time if only people can learn to triumph over it21in their own minds, is surely one of the most pointless philosophies»
So too is the assumption by Hinde and others that aggression (in this_
and other forms) is largely learned, and can therefore be unlearned or22discouraged in future generations. Aggression, like language, is 
indeed learned, but it would be almost impossible to prevent children 
from picking up a language: they have, unquestionably, a genetic im­
perative to learn language, although the exact words and grammar varies 
between countries and continents.
The development of human cerebral qualities has made violence the 
more terrible, not only because of the development of artificial weap­
ons, but also because of "the ability of one group to paint others in
shades of deepest black. Propaganda reduces our opinions of our ene-23mi es to a sub-human state. Far from curing aggression, or countering 
it through education, the human brain is constructed, apparently, in 
such a way that aggression becomes much more bloody than would otherwise 
be the case.
What is the importance of this for morality? Two points seem to 
emerge. The first is that if the hostility of one group towards another 
had a function in evolution, it might have a similar function today. 
Before we pronounce on the evils of aggression, say, we would therefore 
have to consider what positive functions, if any, that it has. Below
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will be listed some of the positive functions of so-called 'unsociable* 
tendencies. The second point is that if the same hostility is impossible 
to destroy, or can be changed only very slowly, then our attitudes 
to it and to related sociad policies are in need of revision. Instead 
of trying to end civil strife in the cities by larger and larger police 
battalions, it might be found more humane to redistrict racial or re­
ligious groups so that contact and conflict between different groups 
were minimized. Although this would cause great distress to many in­
dividuals in the short term, it might be the only long-term solution 
to the persistent fighting in many parts of the world. Similarly, and 
once again despite the loss of personal freedom by many people, the 
power of a country to determine its own. standards of immigration, 
whether by racial, religious, political or any other criterion, cer­
tainly does bear scrutiny. In the long term, it might be the only way 
to avoid disruptive violence» Therefore it should not be excluded from 
consideration on the grounds of the 'a priori cognition* of moral 
equality.
Unseen functions of 'unsociable* tendencies
The problem with human aggression is that it has positive func­
tions in addition to its disruptive effects. In multiracial societies, 
the positive functions of xenophobia have become sources of great dis­
comfort, but other forms of aggression still have their ancient bio­
logical importance. As Anthony Storr reminds us, aggression "has evol­
ved with the great Darwinian principle of natural selection, and is24therefore aimed primarily at preservation rather than destruction»"
One of the obvious functions of aggression is, paradoxically, to 
ensure peace and order within a community, since social dominance and 
rank are maintained by aggressive behaviour. When this remains at the 
level of threat, then open dispute and violence can be avoided - 
injurious fighting for political position would be clearly dysfunc­
tional, Sharply-defined rank orders are the basis of military and 
other organizations where precision of individual and group performance 
is needed, Frederick II of Prussia is said to have insisted that his 
soldiers should fear their officers more than the enemy,
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Competition between members of a society is also a trait that is
apparently selfish, but which has a positive function in promoting
social welfare, Hume called ambition "the source of all actions and
25enterprise which have ever been observed among mankind»" Adam Smith 
observed that it was ambition "which rouses and keeps in continual 
motion the industry of mankind. It is this which first prompted them 
to cultivate the ground, to build houses, to found cities and common­
wealths, and to invent and improve all the sciences and arts, which en­
noble and embellish human life,*^^
/
Kant also perceived the social importance of certain character­
istics, including those to advance oneself over the heads of other men 
and to rule them» To him, such 'unsociable* desires as self-assertion 
and competition are the only things which pull us out of our animal 
state. He says:
Without those not especially lovable characteristics of unsoci­ability, unlovable in themselves, all talent would forever remain hidden in the bud as in the arcadian life of the shepherd, in complete harmony, satisfaction, and mutual loves people, as docile as the sheep they herd, would impart no greater value to their lives than their domesticated animals possess: they would not fill the position left to them by creation for their purpose as rational creatures. Therefore we owe our gratitude to nature for the quarrelsomeness, the envious, competitive vanity, and the never- satisfied desire to possess or to rule,,» They betray, it seems, the plan of a wise Creator and not the hand of an evil spirit who meddled in His majestic plan or spoiled it in envy,"
Kant, Smith and Hume lacked the evolutionary models to back up 
their claims, which is one reason why this part of their doctrines (es­
pecially Smith's theory of the 'invisible hand' that is familiar to 
economists) were greeted with silence or doubt and ridicule. Today, 
however, we can indeed see the selective advantage of these and other 
characteristics through the ethological examination of simple but an­
alogous animal societies. To the moralist of today, therefore, it is 
necessary to be aware of the unseen biological functions of certain 
human actions and institutions before passing judgement upon them.
Otherwise, we may be led into quite erroneous beliefs and quite dys- 
functional codes of moral conduct. I;
One item that might be mentioned under this heading is the owner­
214
ship of property. Some idealists, like Rousseau, see property as an
impediment to the establishment of a liberal commonwealth, an idea
which enjoys remarkable favour among academic radicals even today. Yet
we must remember the evolutionary functions of property in terms of
spacing out the species and ensuring that every family has solid lines
of supply. Its usefulness, again, explains its strength; why even the28infant proclaims 'this is mine' with irritating persistence; why 
every lawcode since Hammurabi has made property a principal objective; 
why hedges, gates and precise boundary measurements are so important 
to us. It may well be possible to remove people from their property, 
as the Soviet experience with collective farms showed; but in that case 
the reform was possible only with the greatest bloodshed. To remove a 
part of human personality requires major surgery» A similar reform in 
any other country would undoubtedly run into the same obstacles and,
13ke the highly inefficient Soviet collectives, do little to justify 
the 'idealism* of their founders.
Moral philosophy and the ethological approach
There are many lessons here for the moralist, mostly in terms of 
what is and is not possible because of human nature, and what is pos­
sible only if we are prepared to use a great measure of force or deal 
with unanticipated consequences of 'reform'» Some of these have been 
dealt with above» There are also lessons - and problems - for the sec­
ond order moral philosopher, to which we may now turn,
(a) Morality and circumstances
It is clear that the consequences of any action depend upon the 
circumstances surrounding it. This may seem obviousT but when we can 
understand something about the social environment throu^ the etho­
logical method, then we possess a sounder basis for moral judgements, 
Hume and others constructed an ethics in which utility was an explan­
ation .of and a reason for moral actions; but this is a static analysis, 
and we need to be able to recognize that different actions may be bio­
logically advantageous in different circumstances. The morality which 
would promote the interests of a society that had been newly started in 
a comparatively expansive environment (such as the American frontier in
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the nineteenth century) would be altogether different from the morality 
that would be necessary in a crowded urban environment. The former 
would be selected for high fertility rates, cooperation on joint ven­
tures and flexibility of behaviour to suit an unknown and changing en­
vironment, The latter would encourage the 'urban* values of self- 
restraint, limitations on fertility, inhibitions on interpersonal 
aggression, and so forth. If there are such things as national stereo­
types, then these contrasting social characters can indeed be found 
in each kind of environment| certainly there is a popular belief in 
the distinctness of the personalities of Britons and Americans which 
seems to support the theory» Understanding the environmental cir­
cumstances, then, is necessary before we can understand morality»
There is no one 'natural law* which guides our actions, except the 
natural evolutionary^law* that our morality and social life must be ad­
aptive if it is to survive,
(b) The quantification of duties
Human variation is a fact of life» In all measurements of human 
body or personality, there appears to be some degree of variation be­
tween individuals - some short, some tall, some withdrawn, some ag­
gressive, In general these characteristics are distributed in a dis­
tribution which has most individuals at the centre and fewer at the 
extremes, so that the distribution, when represented graphically, be­
comes a, bell-shaped or 'Gaussian* curve»
Clearly, for some behavioural characteristics, the individuals 
at the extremes of the curve would cause problems for the social pat­
tern of actions unless they were curbed. To some extent, conformity 
itself will achieve this, but there are still people who are (say) 
overly selfish, and at the other extreme, people who are very highly 
generous or altruistic.
Each of these may be sub-optimal as far as social welfare is con- 
cernedo Selfishness, obviously, makes social life difficult. Over- Igenerosity, however, may have the same effect. As Herbert Spencer |
pointed out, in a society of pure altruists, social life would be im- 4
possible, because nobody would accept for himself the fruits of the I
altruism of others. Similarly, there must be at least sufficient ego-
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ism for an individual to maintain his health and vigour. Without that, 
he could hardly make and contribution to the welfare of others. In 
other words, complete altruism is as dysfunctional as complete selfish­
ness, At this point, the wisdom of Aristotle's golden mean becomes ap­
parent.
Nevertheless, many moral codes enjoin a high level of altruism 
upon everyone, a level which, if attained, would be dysfunctional. The 
problem for the moralist, which we can see on this analysis, is that 
while a degree of altruism lower than one hundred percent would be 
functional, there is no way to incorporate this into a moral system,
A rule such as 'do unto others as you would have them do unto you, about 
fifty percent of the time* would be outside our ability to encourage by 
praise or blame and outside our ability to enforce legally. The moral­
ist has to make the choice of having no prescription at all or having
29one which claims to be applied universally.
Despite moral preaching, we do in fact judge actions on the basis 
of functionality, accepting behaviour immediately around the func­
tional mean and discouraging behaviour at either extreme. Thus, while 
we enjoin people to be altruistic, we consider them weal^  and undesirable 
if they easily give in to the wishes of others. While we praise cour­
age, we pity foolhardiness. Virtues such as generosity, benevolence,
8elf-restraint and others which philosophers sometimes call 'imperfect 
duties* come under this heading; they cannot be quantified easily, and 
their ’perfect* performance would in fact be harmful. In this way a 
distinction can be formed between these actions and' others which require 
complete conformity if social life is to continue at all. Were we not 
to expect people to drive on the proper side of the road, or warn 
others when they were about to eat a poisonous fruit, or inform the 
police when they see an armed and dangerous criminal in the area, then 
mortality rates would be much higher and the fitness of the society 
would be diminished.
However, there are some occasions in which we can and do make 
rather fine judgements of moral actions on the 'altruistic-selfish* 
continuum. To take Urmson's example from his essay on 'Saints and
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Heroes', we would, indeed praise the actions of the soldier who fell on 
a live grena.de in order to save his fellows from the blast. We would 
note that it was 'above and beyond the call of duty'. But if the 
benefits in terms of human lives saved could be easily calculatedp and 
if it were found that these were clearly less than the cost borne by 
the soldier, then we might come to the opposite conclusion, that the 
action was foolhardy rather than courageous. If his fellows were suf­
ficiently far away that they would have received only minor wounds or 
no wounds at all, then we would certainly ask why the soldier did not 
run to save himself instead of making such a pointless move. If fact, 
in situations like this we are making the trade-off between the costs 
and benefits of an altruistic act which Trivers claims we do automati­
cally,^^ The survival prospects of a whole society can be improved if we 
act in accordance with these costs and benefit balances on a reciprocal 
basis, and if the hypothesis of individual selection is accurate, the 
reciprocal altruist may increase the fitness of his own genetic rep­
resentation, We do not require to be able to calculate the costs and 
benefits precisely, but if we are able to do so, then we have a sound 
basis for calculating the moral worth (or foolhardiness) of an action. 
Because of the functionality of our acting in accordance with the costs 
and benefits of an action, it is perhaps not surprising that we do em­
ploy this kind of calculation in everyday situations,
(c) Are we moral or selfish?
A problem which emerges from the ethological approach is that of 
how 'altruistic* an act of self-sacrifice really is. Most aspects of 
animal sociality and morality are advantageous to the cooperating in­
dividual; in the human case, the individual also benefits from his co­
operation in a culturally-determined system of rules and norms, as 
Bishop Butler, Hutcheson, .Tucker and other eighteenth-century writers 
were at pains to point out. It can therefore be argued that an act 
of self-sacrifice is, in fact, a selfish act. If everyone in a Hobbes- 
ian contract restrains his impulses to injure others, for example, then 
everyone benefits»
Other cases are less clear, and it can be argued that the individ­
ual is the loser from an altruistic act, or that he also gains, Warn­
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ing calls in birds furnish us with an exemplification. Some avian 
species-^members will issue a distinctive warning call when a predator 
comes into view» This call will be the signal for other members of 
the species within range to take flight or to take cover. Yet the 
issuance of the call must, occasionally at least, result in the death 
of the caller, either from the predator or from a second predator who 
was previously unaware of the caller's position, Williams in his book 
on Adaptation and Natural Selection cites three possible explanations 
for how this behaviour is nevertheless selected» First, he says, it 
is selected by the mechanism of group selection, in which the group 
and not the individual is the target of selection; the loss of life 
of one individual is of advantage to the other group members and there­
fore the warning call disposition arises randomly within the group in 
every generation. The second possibility is that warning calls are 
functional during the breeding season because they help protect the in­
dividual's mate and offspring, and therefore serve to improve the sur­
vival chances of the individual's genetic endowment. Warning calls 
continue in other seasons for genetic simplicity. Thirdly, warning 
calls operate all the time because there is a good chance that close 
kin (who carry some genes in common with the individual caller) will 
be near by and will benefit, A fourth explanation, favoured by Trivers, 
is that warning calls actually aid the bird giving the call. It is dan­
gerous, he says, to have a predator eat a nearby conspecific because 
the predator may (i) be sustained by the meal, (ii) be more likely to 
form a specific search image of the prey species, (iii) be more likely 
to learn the habits of the species and perfect his preying methods,
(iv) be more likely to visit the area again, or (v) be more likely to 
1 earn useful information about the birds ' habitat. Even if all this 
were true, then the caller, although helping others more than himself, 
would still be helping himself. Therefore, it is argued, even this ap­
parently altruistic act is really selfish. The problem here is that 
it is impossible to collect evidence which would test between the views 
of Williams and those of Trivers » The average cost to birds issuing 
warning calls, and the average benefit to their nei^bours, is very 
difficult to establish. One could think of analogous cases in human
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morality where the individual altruist might, on closer scrutiny, gain 
in some measure from an apparently 'selfless* act.
There are other cases of animal behaviour where the individual is 
undoubtedly at risk by his altruism and where it is impossible to see 
any gain to him. Of course, it is possible that in many circumstances 
(for instance the avian parent distracting a predator) that the genetic 
constitution of the individual may be better preserved through the act. 
When philosophers talk about 'selfish' acts, however, they invariably 
mean those which benefit the individual himself, and not his relations 
or offspring, even though they share genes with him. So behaviour such 
as avian distraction displays, or the characteristic 'stotting* of the 
Thompson's Gazelle, can be said to be undeniably selfless as far as 
the philosopher is concerned. The individual is at great risk for the 
benefit of other individuals.
Accordingly, it is possible for the philosopher to say without 
doubt that animals do on occasion act selflessly. His definition will 
be slightly different from that of the biologist, who will include as 
'selfish' some actions were an individual's relations also benefit, be­
cause of common genetic endowments. Nevertheless, the philosopher may 
take comfort from the fact that even though some 'altruistic* behav­
iour may be selected in evolution (through genetic capacities or through 
cultural determinants) it can still be properly recognized as selfless. 
Acts which benefit a society may also benefit the agent, so that self­
ishness and selflessness are conjoined. On the other hand, some acts 
which benefit a society put the agent at risk without personal gain, 
despite their evolutionary origins. The eighteenth-century analysis of 
Butler, Hutcheson and others in which 'benevolence* was reconciled with 
'self-love* can, on this analysis, be brought into sharper focus. The 
reconciliation is indeed possible, but it is one-sided, for there are 
some 'benevolent* acts which are quite contrary to 'self-love* in the 
philosophical sense. In cases where we are able to calculate the costs 
to the individual of an action and the benefits gained by others by it, 
we can even put the eighteenth-century reconciliation on a quantitative 
basis and come to definite conclusions about the particular courses of
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action that would he necessary if the reconciliation is to he allowed 
as being genuine (that is, if certain apparently selfish actions are in­
deed instruments of the selective fitness of the whole society),
(d) Nepotism
If an individual's benevolent actions make it more likely that
his relatives, and the part of the agent's genetic constitution which
is shared with them, will survive and have more offspring, as the
theory of kinship selection suggests, then we can make several predic-31tions about the sort of benevolent actions that would be expected,"^
In the first place, it seems probable that natural selection would favour 
those who make their relatives the object of altruistic acts more read­
ily than they do others. Evolution would be unlikely, however, to sel­
ect those who favoured their family to the exclusion of others, since 
in that case the social bonds linking families would disintegrate.
In the second place, near relatives would tend to be favoured more than 
distant relatives as the objects of benevolence, since nearer relatives 
offer a greater chance of the agent's genetic representation in future 
generations (assuming that near and far relatives enjoy equal repro­
ductive capacities in this particular case). Thirdly, between two 
relatives of equal nearness, it is the one which is more likely to gen­
erate successful offspring who will tend to be awarded the agent's 
favours, It will probably be those who are younger and fitter who will 
be preferred.
Do human beings act in this way? There is every indication that 
they do, and that people are more willing to make a personal sacrifice
onfor a relative (even cousins and nephews) than for most others. As
Adam Smith noted, our mostpowerful feelings of obligation are towards
our immediate family. Outside that, other relatives elicit the same
feelings, but of reduced intensity, and more distant relatives still
evoke feelings of greater obligation than we would experience with33respect to a non-relative. Even when we meet distant relatives whom 
we have never met before, it may be noted, we often experience some 
emotion to treat them rather more kindly than we would treat perfect 
strangers. Also, it may be no coincidence that when religious groups
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;ior secular societies wish to stress or encourage mutual cooperation and 
obligation, they sometimes call each other 'brother* or 'sister*.
We may call the phenomenon of an agent's acting altruistically on 
behalf of his relatives in preference to acting altruistically for the 
benefit of a non-relative 'nepotism*. Indeed, 'nepotism' can be said 
to occur even where the agent suffers no personal sacrifice, such as 
the familiar case of choosing a relative to fill a vacant executive post 
in one's companyo Nepotism has a clear evolutionary advantage: traits 
possessed by the individual are more likely to survive in the long term, 
including the disposition to help others (one's relatives). These 
traits may have a genetic foundation or may be learned, provided that 
they are retained with little change over the generations. This kin­
ship selection mechanism therefore can and does promote the emergence 
of benevolent or altruistic tendencies that favour related individuals 
and .hence . (since societies comprise individuals) whole societies or 
populations.
Yet there may be some objection that this analysis is not so easy. 
Nepotism, far from being regarded as a virtue, is commonly disliked.
Does the evolutionary process then select traits that are contrary to 
most notions of morality? The answer is that in this case it does not; 
even if it is one's relatives which are being preferentially selected, 
they are members of society and therefore society benefits. Also, the 
strength of the nepotistic tendencies are important when we judge the 
situation. Mild nepotism may do negligible harm to other people. But 
when nepotism becomes flagrant (say, the boss's son is promoted over 
the heads of ten better-qualified people, each anxious to get the job) 
then people are likely to take strong objection to it, A certain de­
gree of nepotism will be excused as 'only natural' or insignificant; 
above that, it will be criticised by others. One can well imagine that 
this criticism will tend to limit the actual performance of nepotism.
In evolutionary terms this is of advantage. Over-extensive nepotism 
would promote the interests of families in opposition to others, and 
the bonds of social cooperation between families would be eroded. On 
the other hand, a certain degree of nepotism, if it causes negligible 
harm to others, is of advantage in the selection of altruistic traits.
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When the philosopher or the moralist consider the morality of nepo­
tism, therefore, the relationship between its usefulness and its 
strength must affect their final judgement,
( e) Punishment
An important subject of moral debate which deserves mention under 
this chapter is that of punishment. Does the ethological method sug­
gest any contribution to our theories of punishment, its justification 
and proper object?
As with other parts of human morality and social life, punishment 
has evolutionary origins which are essential to any discussion of it.
By 'punishment' is meant something which is unpleasant, which is in­
flicted on an individual because of some transgression, and is deliber­
ately imposed by some individual in authority. Thus in animal soc­
ieties, punishment can be seen in the form of (for instance) a dominant 
male baboon biting a female who strays from his presence. Punishment 
of offspring by animal parents is also commono The phenomenon can be 
traced throughout the course of human evolution. In the primitive 
human societies which we take to be similar to our ancestral social 
groups, simple rules of punishment are recognized: an offender can be 
punished by the individual he has harmed, or by the family of that in­
dividual. As societies grow more complex, a chieftain assumed the role 
of arbiter and punisher; in yet more complex societies, he is replaced 
by councils of elders or hereditary officialso Modern societies elect 
or employ judges, policemen, sheriffs and juries.
It may be noted that each step in the development of these insti­
tutions of justice is an advance over the previous one in a single re­
spect: that the decision as to the level of punishment becomes fur­
ther removed from the offender and his family. The individuals making 
the decision have become less partisan in the matter. When punishment 
is meted out by the family of the offended party, its severity may be 
difficult to predict, but when it is administered by an impartial body 
of legal officers, it is likely to be more predictable. Naturally a 
small and primitive society cannot support such a judiciary system, but 
it is of selective advantage to have some form of punishment, however
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unpredictable are its methods. Were it impossible to restrain those 
individuals who threaten the stability of the social pattern of actions, 
then social life would become much more difficult. Hence in animal 
and human groups, punishment of sorts occurs continually. The more 
predictable the punishment following some transgression, however, the 
more efficient does its use become.
In order to see why this is so, one has to consider the evolution­
ary functions of punishment with respect to the fitness of a population 
or a society. The first function that it may have is to remove from 
the group some disruptive behaviour pattern, A pathological murderer 
of conspecifics would be a threat to the fitness of any group, for in­
stance, Were such a creature to be found, the survival prospects of 
the others would be reduced unless they removed it - either by killing 
or by exile. The second function is to adjust the behaviour of indi­
viduals who are and who will remain members of the group so that their 
new behaviour conforms with the rules or norms accepted by the group 
as a whole. Inflicting some personal discomfort or harm has been 
found to be an effective way to achieve this end. But each member of 
an animal social group is useful to it, particularly at the outset of 
colonization, and it would be dysfunctional to administer a large pun­
ishment for a minor deviation from the norms. If an individual is in­
capacitated by a heavy punishment, he cannot be of much use to the com­
munity in some emergency, A major deviation may require a major pun­
ishment to correct; but a minor deviation, if it can be corrected with 
a minor punishment, is best so corrected.
The philosopher's task is not to decide what particular punish­
ment, if any, is appropriate to any particular transgression. Compar­
ative jurisprudence shows that different societies have different 
ideas of 'appropriate' punishments, and this is not a cause of much 
concern. His task, however, is to decide on what grounds punishment 
can be justified at all, in the light of a generally-accepted rule that 
it is wrong to cause suffering, and to suggest.what evidence is per­
missible in such a debate.
Four main arguments have been produced on this matter. The first
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is the utilitarian argument, that punishment is justified if it pro­
duces more happiness than otherwise or if it suppresses more pain. Ac­
cording to Benthan, "all punishment is a mischief.,, If it ought at all 
to he admitted, it ought only to he admitted in as far as it promises 
to exclude some greater evil," This argument has been met with crit­
icism from those who claim that if people could be persuaded that an 
innocent man was in fact guilty, the utilitarian would feel justified 
in punishing him. To meet this challenge, the crude utilitarian argu­
ment requires a further ad hoc principle that each human being has cer­
tain minimum rights (to remain unpunished if innocent) or should be 
punished only if he committed a transgression voluntarily. This is a 
somewhat serious adjustment for utilitarianism, since notions of 
justice and desert that are prior to the pleasure principle are explic­
itly recognizedo The admission of the principle that a man has an 
undeniable right to remain unpunished if innocent also suggests that in 
our judicial procedures, any doubt of guilt at all would be necessary 
grounds for acquittal.
Such an admissibn'is not only a'cbmplicated addition to the util­
itarian argument, it also contradicts another justification of punish­
ment, that of the deterrence of other would-be offenders. Naturally, 
deterrence would require efficient prosecution and trial. But of 
itself it would admit very brutal punishment for minor offences o If we 
cut the hands off anyone found shoplifting, it would very likely deter 
other people from the same crime. That punishment would also fulfill 
the conditions of another argument for the justification of punishment, 
that is, reform of the criminal himself, for such a person is unlikely 
to repeat the crime after such punishment and so could be considered to 
be completely 'reformed' •
These arguments are commonly rejected, however, because we have 
a strong notion that the extreme punishments they admit simply do not 
'fit the crime'. Certainly, some measure of deterrence may come into 
our judgement on the matter, but human beings seem to decide the approp­
riateness of punishment largely on basic and non-rational notions of 
desert. The man whose daughter has been murdered does not say of the
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criminal : "I hope that man hangs - it will discourage other people 
from the same offence," He does say: "I hope he hangs - he deserves it," 
This retributivist argument is the principle upon which punishment was 
founded: an individual who is wronged by another and who takes revenge 
against him helps promote the deterrence of future crimes and the reform 
of the transgressor. He is also raising the welfare of the society, 
which benefits from both effects. Unrestrained, of course, his desire 
for revenge may be wholly disproportionate to the scale of the offence, 
and so may become dysfunctional for the society, which is why criminal 
proceedings are (in civilized communities) taken out of the hands of 
the injured party. If the community is unable to administer punish­
ment for the offence, however, then the injured party would be justi- 
fied in taking his own revenge.
It is the task of the first-order moralist to decide which punish­
ments are appropriate for any offence. The simple rule of Lex Talionis, 
favoured by Kant, is often inapplicable today because of the complexity 
of possible offences; what is the appropriate punishment for drug abuse 
or sexual offences? Each society will come to its own conclusions, and 
the severity of their punishments may vary over time. The philosopher 
can do little more than to remind others of what arguments are admiss­
ible in the debate on this matter; a prominent argument will of course 
be the selective significance of the punishments chosen. Of equal in­
terest will be the evolutionary implications of how different character­
istics (such as age or sex) are treated under any system of punishment. 
From this point of view, it seems that the philosopher armed with a 
knowledge of the ethological approach does indeed have a major con­
tribution to make in questions of social ethics - that is, setting out 
the implications of a principle and exploring the limits of its appli- . 
cation,
(f) The role of reason in ethics
'Reason* is a particularly elusive concept, since it seems to take 
on many meanings. If we assume the term to refer to the ability to cal­
culate the implications of our actions and to measure the adequacy of 
those implications against our various desires, then it would appear
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that human reason has a positive evolutionary function with respect to 
ethics. There are many ways in which this function may he valuable, 
but three are of note.
Firstly, the use of reason allows us to reduce problems of pos­
sible action so that we can see whether certain actions will in fact 
satisfy our desires. Human beings may have a natural tendency to co­
operate with others, say, and there may be many other different desires 
which are of stronger or lesser force. If we are to make efficient 
choices, it is important that we can calculate which of our desires 
are likely to be satisfied by any action.
Secondly, we might find that it would be rational for us to take 
some risks in our behaviour, but that there are strong biological in­
hibitions against such risk-taking, Althou^ the inhibitions may be of 
positive survival function in most cases, it might be that on this 
particular occasion, the risk is well justified under cost-benefit an­
alysis, Reason will thus help us to review the biological inhibitions 
or imperatives that we normally rely on to guide our action. In all 
fields of action, including morality, this review would be functional.
Thirdly, when we contemplate the different implications of several 
hypothetical courses of actions, with respect to their evolutionary 
implications, we will be more able to discern which behavioural strat­
egies are optimal and which are not, (in ethics, one mi#it take the 
example of epicureanism; in its original form, this is a suboptimal 
behavioural strateg^^ The most successful morality from the evolution­
ary standard will be one such as Trivers describes, where individual 
acts of altruism are traded against help from others. In the absence 
of cheating, the fitness of all individuals in the system is increased. 
Any philosophy which urges a withdrawal from risk and a rejection of 
potentially cooperative contacts with other individuals is therefore 
less than optimal. Clearly this same method can be used to evaluate 
any aspect of human morality.
Summary
It may be seen that the ethological approach has many implications
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for moral philosophy and moral discourseo Specifically, the method may 
encourage us to review more carefully some practices such as those Kant 
calls the 'unsociable* desires which may have an evolutionary advantage. 
Other questions where the approach may give us guidance include the 
problem of equal treatment of individuals, the correctness of a moral 
principle under different environmental or social situations, the pur­
poses and justification of punishment, and the relationship between an 
individual and his social group with respect to moral practices, rights 
and obligations G A complete volume would be needed to cover these 
questions in the detail which the approach would allow. Some have been 
treated in moderate depth here, and the question of conscience, and of 
the status of 'moral' rules will be examined more fully in the following 
chapter. This should nevertheless be considered as a demonstration of 
the power of the approach to give us new insights on a number of moral 
issues, rather than an exhaustive demonstration of its conclusions.
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Chapter 12
CONSCIENCE, RULES AND ENDS.
"To account for the existence of an instinctive behaviour pat­tern in a species, we must say what survival value it has for
the species." t i • o.- ILeslie Stevenson
This chapter concerns'the natural supremacy of what we.call con-2science, op the ’moral sense’. Thinkers like Justin Gosling have noted 
that there are two common uses for’conscience ,* one rational and ref­
lective, the other basic and immediate. If the sort of ’conscience’ 
which pricks us immediately that we have committed a transgression is 
indeed likely to point us in a different direction from a more detailed 
reflection on some matter, is it then useful at all? Is it not the case 
that our conscience can be quite misleading, and can urge us to do things 
which turn out to be immoral by almost any criterion when we think about 
the circumstances of the situation? To some extent, the answer to such 
questions must be yes; but when we understand conscience, and begin to 
appreciate how and why it'arose_in our species, then its direction and 
influence becomes easier to understand; some sketchy knowledge can be 
gained of where the conscience can be right and where it can be wrong.
Part of the analysis hinges on a discussion of rules. At the mom­
ent there is a school of thought which takes an act-consequentialist 
view of morality, saying that it is the act which is important, and
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a person must be blamed if he follows a rule thereby commits some
act which everyone (including himself, perhaps) subsequently decides 
was morally wrong. Against this, I will argue that human beings are 
necessarily rule-guided creatures, and that we do far better to think 
of human moral judgement and behaviour in terms of rules.
Another thing which is also relevant under this subject is a dis­
cussion of ends and-means, which can-be taken as a continuation of the 
discussion begun in chapter three, and is linked with the ethological 
view of the emergence and function of conscience.
The emergence of the ’moral sense’
Let us first distinguish the two uses of the term ’conscience’. To 
take Gosling’s example, suppose that a man decides to take a holiday in 
Spain, and that a social scientist friend convinces him beforehand that 
begging, which is common in Spain, is a social evil and will only be el­
iminated when people steadfastly refuse to give money to beggars. This 
new philosophy was totally against the man’s former, inclinations. Be­
fore long on his holiday, a beggar asks him for money and he refuses to 
give it on account of his newly-acquired conviction. Now when he returns 
home, he could describe the incident in two ways. First he might say "I 
could not in conscience give him the money, but I felt awful about it," 
or he might say "I couldn’t give him the money, after my talk with you, 
but my conscience bothered me for weeks afterwards." It is the second 
of these uses with concerns us here, the use attached to the moral feel­
ings of the person concerned.
This sort of conscience (at least) has arisen through natural se­
lection, along with .other parts of human moral psychology. In particu­
lar, one would expect conscience to be selected through interdemic and 
kinship selection processes, since it often seems to pull an individual 
in the direction of an altruistic act, althou^ his personal interests 
appear to lie in another. Conscience, if it has the power to change 
the direction of our action, would therefore seem to be a useful feat-, 
ure of social life. Nevertheless, conscience could be selected through
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individual selection mechanisms in a race of individuals who are dis­
posed to reciprocal altruism; conscience may enhance the performance 
of reciprocal altruism and thus "benefit individuals in the system of 
reciprocation.
It is, of course, impossible to establish how ancient is con­
science in evolutionary terms. We are unable to ask animals whether 
they feel the pull of conscience or not, and human prehistory gives us 
no clues about the feelings of conscience in our own early ancestors.
All that we have to rely on is the apparent constancy of some behaviour­
al traits in early human and animal societies, and the everyday attri­
bution of * guilt* to animals which have committed some transgression. 
These, however, do not prove that the feelings of conscience which men 
now profess to feel would have been professed by their prehistoric an­
cestors, or (if they could speak) in animal species prior to them.
Even so, it is not unreasonable to suggest that conscience is a func­
tioning part of human morality and probably emerged along with it in 
the earliest stages of social life.
This is not to say that conscience does not depend on a certain 
degree of learning, Darwin himself, who was probably the first to pro­
pose a genuinely evolutionary root for conscience (although the en­
lightenment philosophers came very near) recognized the importance of 
many developmental influences upon it, including the approbation or 
disapprobation of other individuals, habit, custom, religious beliefs 
and precepts, reason and a measure of self-interest. To function in 
the moral system, conscience does not have to have a purely genetic 
origin; indeed, like many parts of human nature, one of its strengths 
is its adaptability to suit prevailing circumstances.
Conscience as a guide to action
If conscience is indeed the product of evolutionary forces, then 
to what extent is it useful? Gan evolutionary or ethological theory 
actually help us to recognize the merits of conscience, and explain its 
occasional lack of applicability? Some attempt to meet these questions 
is clearly required. Being the product of natural selection, one might 
expect that conscience would be a strong guide to action; follow con-
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science and our duty will be done, deny it and we do wrong. This, of 
course, is not always the case, and words of explanation are needed*
The first objection to conscience as a reliable guide to action is 
this; the conscience appears to allow different people, and different 
societies, to engage in different activities. While western men find 
it difficult to suggest that any major punishment should be exacted for 
shoplifting, for instance, some ancient cultures and perhaps existing 
ones in other parts of the world would not blanch at cutting the hand 
off a thief. Or again, we all know of individuals who have acted in 
ways that we could not bring ourselves to emulate because of the cry 
of our conscience, but who do not seem to suffer a twinge of remorse 
over their actions.
This objection can be dispensed with easily under the evolution­
ary approach. In order for a society to function and to enjoy a sel­
ective advantage over others, complete equality is not required. There 
would be no necessary advantage to a society if everyone's conscience 
placed identical inhibitions upon their actions. On the contrary, it 
can be argued that social groups need two kinds of individual - one a 
law-abiding sort, making up most of the members of the society, and 
the other an individual who is prepared to take risks and to attempt 
innovations, sometimes contrary to prevailing moral norms or rules. 
Therefore if everyone in a society with such divergences of conscience 
followed their conscience, it may well be that the society itself is 
benefitted, despite the inequality between individuals. Inequality 
between persons does not prevent conscience being a reliable guide to 
personal action.
Similarly, it is certainly true that there is a major inequality 
about the application of conscience between societies. But it must 
be remembered that evolution has produced a multiplicity of forms, 
including a multiplicity of possible social organizations. It is 
quite possible for two social systems to enjoy roughly similar sel­
ective fitness, even though one mi^t be vastly different from the 
other. One aspect of the difference may well be conscience, which 
permits actions in one social system that it guards against in the
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other. Within either of the societies, however, it will still he a 
reliable and (in selective terms) advantageous guide to action.
The second objection to the supremacy of conscience as a guide 
is that it appears to admit exceptions at nearly every stage. Even 
the conscientious unwillingness of individuals to take a human life 
does, we admit, have exceptions, and we can imagine circumstances in '
which we will be faced with such a gruesome choice and in which we
will feel obliged to override our conscience, just as Gosling's tour­
ist in Spain feels obliged to override his conscience and not give 
money to the beggar. Closely associated to this objection is a 
third objection, that conscience is frequently not exact enough to
guide us on just those questions that are of major importance - say,
the complicated questions of economic planning in which the interests 
of some individuals have to be sacrificed to the longer-term interests 
of others or of all. That is, conscience is not detailed enough to 
advise us on particular cases.
In answer to the first of these two objections, it must be re­
membered that anything that is embodied in the human constitution as 
strongly as we find conscience is, and which is transmitted genetic­
ally or by childhood leaning and.social reinforcement, necessarily
has to be rather general. A general rule, or disposition, or physical 
feature, can be transmitted from one generation to the next. l-That can­
not be transmitted genetically is a knowledge of how to act in a partic­
ular circumstance. The situation is rather similar to the one cited by 
Oakeshott in Rationalism and Politics: the wheelwright keeps making 
wheels deep into old age, because he can never pass on the particular 
knowledge needed to carve every wheel out of every wood; that, one can 
only leam from experience. Some general outlines of the wheelwright’s 
craft he could write down and transmit; but each situation is different, 
and the knowledge that he gains from handling each situation dies with 
him.4* Translating back to the moral situation, a parent can tell a 
child how to act in cettain general situations - don’t steal, cheat, 
lie, or hurt - but certain complicated cases in which one moral value 
must be weighed against a number of disvalues can never be predicted; 
how is the child to act under these circumstances? And again, were the
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transmission genetic, it would be impossible for the genetic repertoire 
of the species to include transmitted ’knowledge’ or tendencies to act 
in some ways but not others, appropriate to every conceivable situation. 
Where that knowledge does exist, it must be general. Sometimes, it 
might let us down, and cause much hardship and suffering; usually, how­
ever, it promotes group survival and stability.
Returning to the begging example, it can be seen that a general 
disposition, inherited through the interplay of learning and genetic 
forces, to assist others in distress is actually of potential benefit 
to a group-dwelling species. That is why altruistic tendencies exist in 
group-living animals as well as in ourselves. Conscience tends to sup­
port that rather fundamental and primary valuation. Were we to delve 
deeper into our psychology, we might find that there are other values, 
not so immediate, but which, after discussion with others perhaps, we 
might convince ourselves are of greater functional value that the altru­
istic tendency. Consequently, in this particular case, where we make 
the rational calculation that begging is a social evil, we feel able to 
override our natural inclinations, even though our conscience still 
supports altruism and causes us distress.
This is also part of the answer to the third objection to the ap­
propriateness of conscience as a guide to action, that it cannot ad­
vise us in complicated cases. Of course, all that this objection makes 
plain is that conscience cannot guide us in certain circumstances ; 
in most others, however, conscience may be a very useful guide, partic­
ularly in those where some instant decision is required. Certainly, 
upon later reflection we may reproach ourselves; but in general, our 
conscience prompts us in the direction which benefits our social group 
or population. It is true that there might well be complicated instan­
ces in which our conscience would guide us in a direction that is, as 
it may turn out, far from beneficial to the population. But it would 
be unlikely to have survived for long within any species had it not 
been broadly useful to that species. Even the vaguest conscience is more 
useful as a guide to action than none at all. . .Social problems would : / -
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arise if we had to decide each case individually, without any guidance 
from past events. But this guidance is already ingrained in us: as 
Tiger and Fox say , we have the basic ’grammar’ of social life within 
us. The particular'words and phrases'must be learned, as must the dif­
ferent applications of conscience in different cultures. Like grammar 
and language, however, our natural morality is formidably resistant to 
change. Those moral schemes in which conscience is ignored (and this 
might be said of some of the social contract philosophies discussed in 
chapter ten), not only risk trying to suppress something which is wide­
spread and so deeply held as to defy sudden change, but ignore something 
which is, for the most part (and certainly in situations where there is 
no time for detailed reflection on the alternatives) a good guide to 
action.
So important a guide is conscience in actual fact, and so much 
stead comes from it^ that it is found in even the most rationalistic 
philosophies. Bentham's four sanctions of the utility principle - 
nature, law, public opinion and religion - were widened by Mill to in­
clude conscience, for example (although in this case it might be pos­
sible to argue that Bentham had conscience covered already under ’nat­
ure* or even ’public opinion’) From what we know of the relative per­
manence of the conscience in most of us, it would appear to be a great 
risk for a moralist to devise a moral system in which the most common
dictates of conscience were not recognized.
In sum, then: we have in conscience a functional part of social 
life which is common to nearly all human beings, although which is not 
necessarily uniform in each of them. Despite the vagueness of the pull 
of conscience, and the chance of it leading two people to disagree on
what it right and what is wrong, it is nevertheless a prime motive for
action, and is a general guide to morality. Its importance and its 
power to guide should not therefore be overlooked in our rationalistic 
or idealistic moral systems.
The biological selection of rules
Conscience is a biological foundation upon which we build our 
concepts of moral rules. Hence the general nature of moral rules them­
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selves. If a general rule leads to a situation where on balance, every­
one gains, then to follow that rule might well be a good way of acting, 
even though on occasion, harm might be done to one or two individuals.
It is as Hume says of justice : the laws of property and justice are 
very general, and "must be fix’d by general rules. Tho’ in one instance 
the public may be a sufferer, this momentary ill is amply 
compensated by the steady prosecution of the rule, and by the peace and 
order, which it establishes in society. And even every individual 
person must find himself a gainer, on balancing the account..."^ For 
this reason, it is unwise to dispense with rules as readily as some 
modern philosophers such as Smart. Rules are the basis of an inher­
ited morality which is the foundation of rational morality, not its an­
tithesis .
In Hayek’s words, "only a society of omniscient individuals could 
give each person complete liberty to weigh every particular action on9general utilitarian grounds," and the point would be true whatever 
grounds were advocated. If, for example, I have a copy of my late bro­
ther’s will, which leaves his entire estate to one of the meanest misers 
in town, am I to tear it up and leave only an earlier will in which the 
money was left to several charitable groups that are. known for their 
good work and their help to the unfortunate? Under an act-consequential­
ist view advocated by Smart, I would be; but in real life few people 
would take that step. It would be to transgress a deeply-held rule 
about the honoring of a person’s will and testament. Also, were it 
known that people felt able to break these rules upon their own valu­
ation of the situation, there would be little point in setting down one’s 
wishes anyway, because it would be obvious that they would not with­
stand against another’s conscience. As Hume says, in general, everyone 
gains by the observation of the rules, though in the particular case, 
the ’public’ might not benefit. There would, for example, be no limit 
to the excuses of ’I only did it because I thought it was the right 
thing’ were criminal activities to be justified in an act-consequentialist 
system. Only by adopting, and sticking to, the general rule, can our 
society be stable and predictable.
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Let us take one more example, cited by Smart. Suppose that there 
is a severe drought and that a rule has been drawn up to prohibit people 
from watering their gardens. Now, he says, if one person were to break 
the rule, it would not matter very much; in fact, no-one would notice. 
And if one person broke the rule, a great deal of public benefit could . 
follow. The person might secretly raise begonias in his back garden, 
out of the view of others, and donate them anonymously to the local old 
folks’ home, where they bring a great deal of pleasure. How, asks Smart, 
can such action ever be held wrong on the utilitarian grounds which 
many people support?
Smart overlooks the possibility that the person watering his 
back garden might not be the only one doing so. Other people might 
have the same idea; and if they indulged themselves, the result for 
local water supplies could be disastrous. We are not omniscient beings, 
and we do not know what other people are doing. Therefore, when a rule 
is instituted, we have to be consistent in its enforcement. Were the 
man to be caught, it is right that he should be punished, despite the 
pleasure that he has brought into the lives of many people; for were we 
not to enforce the rule, we would not have a rule at all. Our obedience 
to rules is ensured to some extent by conscience. Not even the man wat­
ering his garden is likely to escape a twinge of guilt; but we have 
other sanctions which we do (and should) deploy in similar cases. Were 
we not to, then we stand the risk of our social environment being made 
completely unpredictable by the large number of individual choices of 
individuals in different circumstances. That, as I have already- said, 
would be detrimental to human welfare.
The act-utilitarian (and Smart can be taken as an example again) 
believes that as a rule of thumb, certain general proscriptions are 
necessary - for instance the rule not to water one’s garden, or rules 
against killing or breaking promises. But were one to do the ’long- 
hand calculation’ and find that, in some particular case, a greater 
degree of good, however defined, was done by breaking the rule then it 
would, he says, be right to break the rule. Rules, if you like, 
’collapse into acts’ when we consider each case on its own merits.
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But this argument is implausible; how, for one thing, do we know 
when to make the 'longhand calculation*? How do we suspect that a rule 
might, on this particular occasion, be inadequate unless we have already 
made the calculation? And once more, how do I know what other people 
are going to do in this same situation, given that I am not omniscient; 
the consequences of my action will depend upon the actions of others, 
and unless I can rely on them not to make the longhand calculation and 
not to deviate from the general rule, then I cannot predict the con­
sequences of my own deviation and measure my action with respect to the 
utility criterion. Or furthermore, it is possible to argue that any 
calculation of whether or not to water one's garden in a drought, say, 
or any moral choice at all really boils down to a calculation between 
rules, not acts. On the one hand, it is accepted that one should in­
crease the happiness of others; that is one rule. On the other, it is 
accepted that the water shortage requires us all to make sacrifices; 
that is another, perhaps conflicting. Other general rules will impinge 
upon our decision at various points. In making our decision, we must 
weigh the consequences of all the general rules which are relevant to 
such cases. Acts, therefore, dissolve into rules, and not the other 
way around.
This is far from being a distinction not justified by a genuine 
difference. On the contrary, the 'rule* doctrine gives us a much bet­
ter description of human moral psychology than the 'act* point of 
view. Not only is it possible to inherit behaviour genetically only if 
it is rather general in its application, but learning of any behaviour, 
including the appropriate moral behaviour for some general circumstance, 
also proceeds through rules. A child learns a general rule of behaviour 
first and then the qualifications afterwards. The prevalence of moral 
regularities in human and in animal societies strongly suggests the 
transmission of moral traits from one generation to the next, in which 
case it must proceed by means of general principles of broad applica­
tion, It is possible that on any particular occasion, harm will result, 
but in devising a code of conduct we are interested in the results of 
its steady prosecution over a series of many cases,
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Men are rule-guided creatures; not only do we have a considerable 
tendency to comply with rules and with social norms, and even with 
authority, but more complex moral principles could not be transmitted 
from one generation to the next. Men would never be able to live in 
social groups if we did not have these rules and norms; the adherence to 
certain rules is morally right and biologically prudent, even where in- 
some particular case, more harm than good seems to be done.
Ends and means
From what has been said, it is apparent that a number of pieces of 
behaviour can, under the pressure of conscience and through our adher­
ence to rules of action, become ends valued in themselves, even though 
they might help to promote the social regularity of the species, and 
can therefore be valued as means to another goal. The example of the 
good Samaritan would be an instance of this; his action of caring for 
and aiding a less fortunate member of society is undoubtedly an action 
which promotes the survival prospects of a group. Hence, similar traits 
and co-operative tendencies are found in animals, and primitive human 
societies are no different. Yet it is not because of our rational ref­
lection of the evolutionary consequences of such action that it comes to 
be valued; rather, it is valued in itself, without reference to the 
social benefits, particularly the long-run social benefits, which em­
erge from it. Helpfulness, compassion, and any other social virtue are 
recognized as good and valuable in themselves; as far as evolutionary 
survival is concerned, it is not necessary that we should understand the 
selective advantage of such traits before we can value them.
Even those philosophers with the clearest view of human nature 
often overlook this natural valuation of what happens to promote human 
survival, and assume that the valuation of any action must derive from 
conscious reflection upon its f u n c t i o n . I t  is, however, quite poss­
ible for us to value something in Itself, because the tendency to value 
a certain action is selected in us as part of a functioning system of 
which we mi^t be unaware.
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Summary
Human beings are guided by rules. As far as morality is trans­
mitted between the generations, whether by instinctive or by learned 
means, it has to be transmitted in a general form. Specific cases 
must be learnt subsequently by an individual. For the most part, the • 
pull of conscience does promote the welfare of our species, because 
it is a part of such general functional moral systems, although in 
certain instances, harm can be done by following conscience. When we 
realise that conscience has use as a general guide, we can incorpor­
ate it more successfully in our moral codes, instead of trying to sup­
press it and change its pull upon us, as some rationalistic theories 
attempt to do. This is inefficient, and could be harmful.
Where general rules guide our action, and are valued because of 
the good they do on balance, we should not be inconsistent about the 
enforcement of those rules. Although harm might occur in some situa­
tions, it does not make a rule harmful that on occasions it causes harm, 
provided that on balance, men and society gain. As far as rules of 
property and other fundamental values are concerned, rules must be 
quite general, so that they can be widely known and therefore more 
readily accepted.
Finally, it can be said the rules of conscience and of reflective 
morality attach themselves more to specific pieces of behaviour than to 
the functional content of any beheviour. We have rules to punish 
criminals because we think that punishment is right, not because we are 
concerned about the social implications of punishment. Our conscience 
prompts us to altruism, and our valuation.of.altruism derives from the 
fact that concience does prescribe it to us, not that it is of some 
further use to our species. Therefore, the distinction between ends 
and means in philosophy is still a useful one.
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Chapter 13
THE THEORY AND MODERN MORAL PHILOSOPHY
"A thing might look specious in theory, and yet be ruinous in practice." ^
Edmund Burke
Armed with these principles of the ethological roots of morality, 
and with the subtle but important implications they have for the origin 
of moral determinants such as conscience and our obedience to rules, 
let us now make our way through modern moral philosophy, so often crit­
icised for its abstract nature and so far divorced from first-order 
moral discourse. What contribution may we not make? For in our analysis 
rests a firm foundation of human morality, an explanation of why our 
values come to be the way they are, of what is the application of those 
values, and of how they guide our action in a way compatible with the 
welfare and survival of our species. Let us begin with a considerat­
ion of intuitionism, particularly as it relates to other comments which 
have been made in chapter 12. concerning conscience, and then continue 
through this century’s most important philosophical movements.
Intuitionism
Perhaps the most significant contribution to intuitionism was that 
of G.E.Moore in his Principia Ethica. The reason that it is proper to 
classify Moore as an intuitionist is because he conceived of goodness as
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a non-natural quality, which could be directly apprehended by individuals, 
like the colour of ’yellow’. A detailed outline of Moore’s thought is 
unnecessary here, primarily because of its familiarity to most people, 
but two points might be mentioned. The first is that in Moore’s scheme 
of things, questions of ’good’ are put in the lap of the personal intu­
ition of each separate individual. There is no consideration of the 
fact that reason, experience, authority and rational reflection should 
come into moral arguments and judgements. The second is that Moore, 
believing that it is usually impossible to test the consequences of any
particular action, urged an adherence to the existing rules and conven-2tions of society. The intuitionist line of thought was taken up by 
Prichard in his famous essay ’Does Moral Philosophy Rest on a Mistake?’, 
in which he claimed that duty was very much like Moore’s goodness; that 
is, it was a simple, non-natural thing which could not be explained in 
other ways; No explanation could be given of why one ought to do one’s 
duty other than the fact that it was one’s duty. Yet, this outlook of 
Moore and Prichard that obligations and goodness were, in a sense, self- 
evident and obvious is unsettling. In fact, there is a good deal of 
dispute and it is to take a trite view of the world to say that no argu­
ment or doubt is ever possible on moral questions.
This scepticism was raised by Sir David Ross. There are, he bel­
ieved, certain kinds of action whose goodness could be ’immediately ap­
prehended’ , for example the action of keeping a promise; but there is 
no action (contrary to Prichard) which one can know without qualificat­
ion that it is one’s duty to do, because there always exists the poss­
ibility of a conflict of duties.
There are some other problems which are associated with the intuit- 
ivist position. Although the writings of Moore, Prichard and Ross are 
enlightening and interesting, they do not really answer the fundamental 
question of why we should do one thing and not another. To their minds, 
it is obvious what is good and what is bad, what it is one’s duty to do 
and what it is not: therefore, why explain something that is obvious? 
Furthermore, to the intuitionists, moral qualities seem to be attached 
'to certain acts and objects without apparent correlation with any other 
characteristic of the acts or objects themselves. The doubt can be
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3raised, whether moral qualities really are like this, whether some things 
can be called moral and some not, without any reference to their other 
qualities, and without their other qualities being important to any 
moral discourse. And lastly, it can be asked, if one person intuitively 
apprehends a certain act as good, and another as bad, how can a resol­
ution ever take place between them, except possibly by weight of opin­
ion on each side?
The ethological view can offer some suggestions on how these prob­
lems can be reduced and settled. In the first place, it will be noted 
that Ross’s view has much in common with the version of conscience 
sketched in chapter twelve. That is, there are certain kinds of action 
which most people, quite naturally, believe to be right or believe to be 
wrong. If they act in other ways, they feel guilt and the pain of
conscience. But these moral qualities which we find ’intuitively’ good 
are far. from unrelated to other qualities. For one thing, they are 
usually supportive of the social pattern and conducive to the survival 
of the group or species. The actions which are most conducive to the 
social pattern are the ones which are most deeply embedded in our con­
science; these are the ones against which the most strict proscriptions 
hold and the ones which are most widely accepted. They can, therefore, 
be called ’intuitive’ and we should expect a large measure of agreement 
about them. Nevertheless, like disputes about ’the right thing to do’ 
which arise through incompatible pulls of the consciences of two differ­
ent people, disagreement upon the intuitive apprehension of good is cer­
tainly possible, particularly where the point in question is not one of 
the simple and general principles (promise-keeping, abstaining from 
theft, etc.,) which are necessary for social life to exist at all. Where 
two of these general principles conflict will be another region of 
doubt and uncertainty. In this way, Ross's intuitionism is explicable 
in 'terms of the ethological heritage of human conscience.
Secondly, we have formulated a theory of why moral qualities turn 
up in discusssions about certain actions but not in discussions about 
certain others. The inutitionists offered no explanations of why moral 
discourse should apply in one case but not another; they treated moral 
qualities as though they are completely independent of other qualities,
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and were therefore denuded of a theory to explain the occurrence of 
such things. We see now that morality is, broadly speaking, some­
thing associated with things and actions which have some importance 
to the survival of the species and to the preservation of the social 
pattern of a group. This is at once a reason why morality should occur 
in certain contexts, and why intuition of moral qualities should have 
any psychological foundation in human beings at all.
Thirdly, the ethological approach explains why moral judgements 
should be important for our actions - simply, they are important bec­
ause human welfare, which we as human beings who have evolved in a 
particular way consider valuable - hinges on them. The classical intu­
itionists, however, were unable to give an answer to this simple and 
penetrating question.
Lastly, let us consider the question of disagreement in the intuit­
ive appraisal of actions or objects. Where human beings share a common 
evolutionary past, one would expect a measure of agreement in their 
values and actions. In a species selected as a group, one would expect 
all disruptive values and characteristics to have been selected out, 
since a society could only operate and could only leave successive gen­
erations given a measure of internal order. Furthermore, the need of 
human beings to be attracted to the same.things (food, comfort and so 
on) and to be averse to other things (discomfort, parasites) has left 
each individual with a roughly similar valuation of many things that 
are important to the individual but are not exactly relevant to the 
furtherance of the social order. So not only is there a measure of ag­
reement within any particular society upon moral rights and wrongs, 
there is also, perhaps .more limited in iscope and definition, some agree­
ment between societies which may have completely different social org­
anizations, Relativism is advocated under this scheme, in that the 
moral ’intuitions' of members of different societies could be quite dif­
ferent and fundamentally incompatible; and yet there must be a certain 
objectivism in human morality, since certain broad principles of action 
(and not others) are necessary for human survival from generation to 
generation.
This allows us to speculate more fully than most modern philosophers
24?
have been able to do on the precise object of a moral code or pre­
scription: what is covered by morality, and more importantly, who is 
covered. On the former q^uestion, the whole of this investigation is an 
attempt to find the answer. This answer is given in terms of the 
actions, values and dispositions which are necessary for the preserva­
tion, and therefore the evolutionary selection of, a particular social ■ 
order or pattern of actions. Concerning the matter of who is covered 
by any moral code or prescription, some further comments are in order, 
bringing us to the question of universalisability of moral terms and 
principles.
Universalisation
The principle of universalisation was formulated by Kant, who used
it as a sufficient criterion to distinguish moral from immoral prin- j
ciples, and has been revived vigorously by P.M.Hare, who sees it as a 4
necessary device to -distinguish the moral from the non-moral. To take |
an example from Hare, if I say "Shut the door! " to Jones, then I am is- |
suing an imperative, amounting to "Let Jones shut the door here and ’j
now! " which is clearly not universalised since it refers to a particu- il
4 ilar time and place, and which does not need to be uni versali s ed, On 1
the other hand, if I use a prescriptive term, such as "Jones really iIought to shut the door: it's a standing invitation to thieves to leave ij
it open as he' does," then I must, for consistency, commit myself to |
some universalised judgement of the form "Let everyone in Jones's cir- |
cumstances (say, with valuables in their room) shut the door," What I |
take to be good for Jones must be good for everyone in Jones's cir cum- 
stances, according to me, if I am to be logically consistent in my use |
of the language, |•1According to Hare (and before him, Kant) this principle of uni- |
versalisation offers a test of the moral; one's volitions, says Hare, 4
must be universalised for them to be moral prescriptions or ideals and |
not just personal desires. An individual must be prepared to accept 'j
the consequences of any principle he espouses for that to be called a |
moral principle."^ In a somewhat similar vein, Mayo notes that when }I248
someone remarks "This is a good spade," he is not just saying that he 
prefers it to most others, but is suggesting that any other rational in­
dividual with some rough knowledge of gardening would have the same 
preference, and would have to admit that it was a good spade too.^
This judgement is to be distinguished from a judgement of purely per­
sonal sentiment (or appetite or desire), which might be the case if 
the person in question had some particular emotional attachment to that 
particular spadeo Such sentiments cannot be universalised; but moral 
judgements must be.
It has, in fact, become a common criticism of Hare that universal­
isation is not a distinguishing feature of morality alone, but is nec­
essary feature of any rational judgement, D.H.Munro, in his perceptive 
book Empiricism and Ethics, points out that ordinary descriptions must 
be uni versali sable. If this is a good Siamese cat, according to the 
judge, then he would have to admit that another, identical to the first, 
would also be a good Siamese cat. This is descriptive uni versali sabil- 
ity, Munro also distinguishes social uni versali sability, say that if 
something is right for X to do, then it must be right for others in the 
same circumstances. When Mayo says that to describe a spade as 'good' 
is to mal^ e (at least implicit) reference to an accepted, conventional 
set of standards which are applied to distinguish good things from 
others, he is using this social uni versali sability; and when ■
Hare says that "Jones ought to shut the door," he is doing the same.
But it is not necessarily true that only moral terms have this brand 
of universalisability, although any consistent application of language 
certainly must.
When talking of universalisation in ethics, it is usually this 
social universalisation which is meant: that what is right for one per­
son must be right for any other. But this principle of social univer­
salisation is fraught with difficulties, since universalisation is not 
the same as general application in the logical sense, "Everyone with 
no source of income and serious war-wounds ought to be admitted free" 
is universal, since it refers to every member of a class, but it is 
nonetheless highly specific in its deliniation. of the class. The fam­
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iliar problem thus arises; is it not possible to describe some cases in 
such a way that only a very small class of individuals (perhaps a 
class which, upon examination, may be found to have only one member) 
is covered by some uni versali sable principle? Can not an egoist, by 
formulating principles of sufficient exactness, put forward principles 
which are uni versali sable, but which are designed to benefit only him­
self, even though these principles might be universalisable? It is 
easy to propound the view that any principle which applies to others 
must apply to oneself, or that any principle which applies to oneself 
must apply to all others like oneself in the same circumstances. But 
what are the 'same* circumstances, and what counts as being ’like’ one’- 
self?
The problem is no less serious if uni versali sability is taken to 
mean the standard under which whatever is a reason for one person to 
do a certain thing must be a reason for anyone else in the same cir­
cumstances to do the same. Once again, this does not define morality, 
since it is a feature of any consistent actions, and any consistent 
use of language. If the possibility of loose ground is a reason for 
me to stay away from the edge of a cliff, it is, undoubtedly, a reason 
for any other individual similar to me also to stay away from the edge 
of the cliff. But what counts as 'like me'? Someone who wished to 
commit suicide, although like me in many other respects, might reject 
my reasons for being cautious, and do quite the opposite from what I 
do in the same circumstances. What counts as 'similar' circumstances 
might also be debated in an identical way.
It is possible to maintain that universalisation, as a method for 
distinguishing moral from non-moral principles, or for distinguishing 
the moral from the immoral, is too wide to do the job. It may dis­
tinguish logically consistent actions and use of language from others, 
but does not appear to be a special feature of morality. When we at­
tempt to apply it, we face further questions - 'which actions are sim­
ilar?*, 'who is like me?' and so on. Some other principle appears to 
be necessary to answer these questions, and it would seem that a prin­
ciple of impartiality, particularly a principle of not favouring one­
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self has been mixed up with the logical consistency element of uni- 
versalisability, at least in the formulation of the doctrine by Hare 
and his adherents.
Impartiality, however, is itself a moral principle and cannot^ be 
made to distinguish moral from non-moral principles. In Hare's analy­
sis, this principle of impartiality is taken to be inextricably bound . 
up with logical consistency, suggesting that it has a far greater power 
than it actually has. The analysis seems to suggest, in fact, that the 
principle of impartiality is an over-riding principle and therefore 
necessary in all moral judgements.
The issue of whether we accept the principle of impartiality is 
open to debate; it is separate from the issue of logical consistency. 
Undoubtedly, many people would accept impartiality as a way of dis­
tinguishing moral from immoral principles, but the impartiality prin­
ciple is itself not easy to formulate, since it can be argued that in 
a complex and changing world, no two circumstances are exactly identi- 
cal, and no two individuals exactly alike. So what does impartiality 
really mean? Moreover, there is not necessarily any compulsion upon us 
to accept impartiality as a general principle if we are committed to 
some other moral goal. The utility principle, for example, will con­
flict with impartiality in many cases.
On the first point, the fact that the impartiality principle is 
difficult to formulate, the ethological approach offers examples and 
lessons. When the moralist does not recognize differences between 
situations which are, in fact, crucial to the preservation of social 
institutions, many unexpected difficulties can arise. From the simple 
and widely-accepted principle that killing is wrong in nearly all cir­
cumstances, for instance, the Australian government once outlawed the 
tribal hostilities which had separated some highland tribes living in 
areas where survival was just barely possible.^ As a consequence, 
these hi 11-dwelling people found that they were able to move to more 
settled parts without the constant fear of raids from other tribal 
units (although one doubts whether the legislation alleviated the feel­
ings of hostility between these units!) Overutilization of the re-
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sources of the new settlements, overpopulation and eventual starvation 
was the sad result; the tribal hostilities had served as a spacing- 
out mechanism that prevented the population from becoming too large to 
be supported by the capacity of the land to yield food. Here is an in­
stance in which it was thought, by a national government with vast re­
search materials at its disposal, and with much experience in dealing . 
with tribal conflicts, that a proscription of killing in these cir­
cumstances would have the same (beneficial) consequences as the same 
proscription in most other circumstances. This application of the 
principle of impartiality was seriously mistaken, a point which must be 
admitted by anyone interested in the consequences of a moral judgement. 
If a national government is unable to discern relevant from irrelevant 
characteristics of a situation, it might well be doubted that indi­
viduals have the ability. Certainly, it is theoretically possible to 
vary the principle of impartiality to accommodate various differences 
in circumstance, in the same way that the general rules of our natural 
morality are qualified when they conflict with other general rules 
which we accept; indeed, this rule element of morality and the doctrine 
of impartiality are much the same thing. Yet it must not be thought 
that these qualifications and specifications are at all easy to con­
struct, Innovations in morality and law, such as those imposed by the 
Australian government, require detailed consideration before they are 
applied, and an attempt to apply them without any empirical information 
about the functionality of the existing morality may lead to results 
which are wholly unintended by the authors of the change.
Although within the realm of possibility, it is unlikely, .given 
what we know of human nature, that a moral system founded on rigid im­
partiality principles could operate at all for any length of time. 
Differences of age, sex, and even status are taken into account in any 
moral decision we make, are there are, as has been shown, strong evo­
lutionary reasons why these determinants should be important. To treat 
women identically with men, for instance, could forge a society in 
which women would face the various hazards of male life - being called 
to serve in battle, being awarded equal status as men in some rescue 
effort, and so on - which would, in turn, threaten the survival pot-
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e ntl al of the society (and with it, the moral code) due to a small hut 
persistent diminution in the fertility rate and the increased chance of 
behavioural abnormality in infants deprived of maternal care. The prin­
ciple of impartiality, specious in theory, may be, to use Burke's 
phrase, 'ruinous in practice®.
When moral principles are adjusted to take account of these per­
sonal differences, we are still not in a position to apply them gener­
ally with confidence. What is appropriate in one social group could be 
destructive in another; customs vary between societies, at least in 
their overt expression if only rather little in their functional im­
portance. The use of some particular set of behaviours that are accepted 
in one culture might cause outrage in another. Similarly, as the case 
witnessed by the Australian government showed, unintended consequences 
may result when we attempt to extend the rules governing behaviour in 
a social group to cover individuals outside the group. All societies 
have different standards of ethics pertaining to strangers as opposed 
to their own members. Superficially, this seems to be the cause of 
much hatred and conflict between societies; but its evolutionary func­
tions must not be overlooked before pious judgements are made concern­
ing the unacceptability of such a dual standard.
Acceptance of this rather small point helps us to escape from the 
problems of a utopian formulation of morality such as that proposed by 
John Rawls.^ Rawls seems to be so anxious to treat his moral agents 
equally that he leaves no room for possible differences between societ­
ies that rational calculation alone is unable to remove. The rules 
which are educed are, one must take it, supposed to be binding oh all 
human beings, and differential treatment of persons outside one's own 
local population is inadmissible. One mi^t ask of Rawls, who ex­
cludes so much of the empirical basis of human nature in order to form­
ulate his moral system, why the species of an individual, never mind 
his society, his time-period, or his social position, should colour 
our judgements; but clearly, this is not what we take morality to be 
about. We do recognize a difference in moral value between men and 
animals, and we do recognize a difference between members of our own
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society and those of others. A utopian morality which does not take 
account of these empirical aspects of human personality will be dif­
ficult or impossible to apply.
In summary, we see that uni versali sability seems to confuse con­
sistency with impartiality, and assumes that impartiality is an over­
riding concern in morality, that moral principles must be applied 
equally to all individuals in similar circumstances. The ethological 
approach, being based in the empirical observation of human nature and 
the recognition of the functional aspects of social institutions, re­
quires that these empirical features be accounted for in any moral sys­
tem. Particularly, utopian social engineering, which would replace ex­
isting moral principles with major innovations on a holistic scale, is 
likely to produce disaster on a holistic scale unless amply supplemented 
by experience about the effects of reforms, learned through the etholo­
gical method and through small-scale social experiments,
Emotivism
The emotivism of Stevenson and others has come under attack be­
cause it does not seem to agree with what we commonly think of as moral 
discourse. While I am no emotivist, I think that the ethological view 
can offer a few considerations that would shore up the emotivist pos­
ition, if the members of that particular school chose to develop them.
The first criticism is that the doctrine, that the purpose of a 
moral statement is to change the attitude of the person to whom it is 
made, is actually quite rare in ethics. Ethics, it is alleged, is not 
done with the major purpose of influencing the attitudes of another. But 
fhis argument might be handled as follows. . Men naturally have a dis­
position to comply with the prevailing norms and rules, even with the 
prevailing authorities. That has been shown in human societies, and 
also in animal social groups; it seems to be a natural tendency in soc­
ial species. The more people that try to convince you that you are 
wrong, then, the more are you likely to actually change your attitudes 
toward some moral statement or position. In arguing with you, one is 
merely attempting to put a subtle pressure on you to come round to my 
way of thinking. This argument is all the more sound when one considers
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our tendency to agree with others is heightened if we have mutual res­
pect or personal admiration for them; psychologists know what twisted 
reasoning the human mind will employ in order to come to agreement with 
one we like. That is why moral argument between friends usually con­
vinces one of them to change his ground, however slightly, whereas ar­
gument between enemies tends to be a more difficult process through 
which to reach agreement.
The second thing which might be said against emotivism is that it 
has no strength when the other person agrees with one’s position anyway. 
Yet moral discourse is still possible in such circumstances, particul­
arly when one of the parties is not arguing seriously, or does not care 
about the subject, or knows that he is unable to influence others. But 
against this it can be said that the consolidation of opinions, not only 
in an individual, but between individuals, is an important part of human 
psychology. Tliat is why political parties spend so much time and effort 
convincing and keeping in touch with their own members; the reinforcement 
effect of discourse, moral and otherwise, cannot be overlooked. Were 
the emotivists to incorporate this into their system, saying for ex­
ample that the characteristic object of moral discourse is to convince 
others to change their attitudes, or to reinforce acceptance of one’s 
own attitudes, or to reinforce the confidence of others in their own 
attitudes which the speaker agrees with, then under this definition, 
the doctrine would have more weight.
Prescriptivism
Prescriptivism, the doctrine introduced and largely developed this 
century by P.M.Hare, has largely been dealt with in this chapter, since 
the universalization hypothesis is one of its main implications. Our 
comments here will be restricted to the claim of prescriptivism that it 
escapes the conclusion that moral discourse is fundamentally non-rational, 
an implication of the schools of intuitionism and (to some extent) emoti­
vism. This particular claim arises because the problem of getting a
person to do something is simply the problem of using an effective method 
to do so. When any means can be deployed, the solution to that problem 
need not be rational - I could force you, or feed you drugs, or trick 
you into acting a certain way - but according to emotivism, any effective
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means of changing someone’s mind and influencing his actions can be 
used, no matter whether it is irrational or not. For the prescriptiv- 
ist, since his attention is limited to the issuance of guides to action, 
the guides themselves must be intelligible to the other party, must be 
associated with good reasons (not necessarily explicit) and need not in 
fact be acted on by the person to whom the advice is given. Since it 
is a process between rational beings, and takes the form of rational 
answers to practical questions, it cannot be (say the prescriptivists) 
a non-rational activity.
Yet it is. When I ask someone ’’What ought I to do," and receive 
the answer "You ought to do X," what is really going onX Quite simply, 
your advice to me is predicated on your own particular values. These 
values might be shared by many people, or everyone, but insofar as a 
prescription is offered to me, my action must be seen to you as an ob­
ject of those values. Hence, by offering me a certain piece of advice, 
your own notions of how the world ought to be will be recommended to me, 
with the hope and intention that I should accept the advice. If I fol­
low your advice rather than the advice of another, I will be acting in 
such a way that will be in accord with your values, even though your 
desire for my happiness (or other emotion) is included. What weight 
there is behind a prescription does not lie in any logical link between 
the words you use and the actions which are recommended under them.
The weight of the prescription lies in its correspondence with the val­
ues which I happen to have. If you offered a prescription which was 
at odds with my fundamental values, for example, then it would not be 
taken; it is only when I am doubtful about my own valuation of the 
situation (say, because several deeply-held values are in conflict) 
that such advice will be useful to me in the resolution of that doubt. 
This activity of recommendation, then, is not by any means a rational 
activity; the prescription is based on irrational values held by one 
person, and directed at irrational values held by another. It is quite 
possible that the prescriber will not be fully aware of the value-system 
of the person being addressed, or will say one thing, not realizing 
that purely contingent qualities of the action prescribed will appeal to 
the values of the other person. At bottom, all moral discourse is 
about values, and no moral system can claim that it is rational because
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those values are themselves non-rational.
Utilitarianism
Utilitarianism is an example of a rationalistic philosophy which, 
although it is persuasive in its.recommendations, nevertheless divorces 
itself from real human institutions and values. I take it that we are 
not talking about an extreme brand of utilitarianism which would so ex­
tend the definition of ’pleasure’ or ’happiness’ that whatever one does 
is alleged to have occurred through motives of pleasure, such that even 
the martyr who dies at the stake does so because he is caused less pain 
than had he betrayed his principles. As Sidgwick remarked, by such an 
extension it is possible to make the theory accommodate any one of our 
traditional values and institutions - and indeed Mill went to great 
lengths to demonstrate that utilitarianism was compatible with popular 
notions of justice.
Such adjustments are post hoc modifications of a theory which is 
too insensitive to incorporate the multiplicity of institutions: and 
human values which are necessary for a society to survive. For example,
I have said that the institution of retribution or punishment, whether 
enacted by some legal authority or by the relatives of a victim, is a 
rather basic and natural value which, incidentally, achieves a stable 
social situation and which therefore generates a great deal more
happiness than the anarchy surely resulting, were the institution
to be dissolved. The utilitarian might accept the consequence, and 
therefore say that it is clear, on notions of utility, that retribution 
is a good institution. In that he is justified; but it would have been 
impossible to predict from his theory itself, that this particular in­
stitution would yield such consequences. A utilitarian might be quite 
determined to promote the general happiness, and may recognize that the 
preservation of the species is the way to do it; but without an evol­
utionary social psychology, his philosophy is, as Herbert Spencer described 
it, "no more than a statement of good intentions," some of which might 
have been disastrously wrong. The statute book in such a world would be 
"a record of unhappy guesses."
Furthermore, it is far from certain that our values are in accord-
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ance with principles of utility. Our values have been shaped by the 
past events that have caused our species to be selected in one way and 
not another. If we accept that to follow a certain value is not the 
same as to follow the pleasure principle, then it is clear that our 
actions and values are merely rules for survival, not necessarily rules 
for pleasure (although in many everyday circumstances, such as eating 
and drinking, the two go together). Survival is not a question of 
pleasure and pain. It is possible for a species to go into very pleas­
urable extinction; but the traits which precipitated that decline will 
not be seen after that date. When the utilitarians urge us to promote 
happiness, it suggests that survival has little to do with morality, 
and that happiness here and now is the important thing, the survival 
of the species being important only in so far as its contemplation 
brings us pleasure. Nature, however, does not build men in this way.
Like other rationalistic approaches, utilitarianism does not dis­
tinguish who and what it is that moral codes apply to. Most people 
agree that animals are able to experience pleasure and pain. They act 
in ways that are identical with human beings when experiencing pleasure 
and pain, and indeed we can be motivated by the obvious enjoyment or 
displeasure of a pet animal. Are animals to be included under our util­
itarian principles like other humans? There is no clear answer until 
we examine the other facets of human nature which determine where and 
when moral principles are applied.
In fairness to classical utilitarianism, it might be said that of 
all moral doctrines it has enjoyed the most widespread acceptance, 
except perhaps a very few other doctrines that are reinforced with a 
principle of religion. Each of them, however, is simple and general in 
the prescriptions they make - ’love thy neighbour’ or ’promote the great­
est happiness’ - which is, as has been said, one of the most important 
characteristics of any moral system if it is to survive the test of 
time, and be spread by transmission from one individual to another. 
Nevertheless, when a rule is so general as these, one can derive only 
general prescriptions from it. The utilitarian philosophy is made much 
more useful and much more of a guide to our actions when it is supplem­
ented with information about human nature, a supplement which can be
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gained very readily from a brief consideration of the implications for 
human action of the mechanisms" 6f2 naxbuxal_ selection.
Summary.
As well as being able to make some positive prescriptions about 
human action in the social sphere, the ethological approach to ethics 
is useful as a means of justifying, or attacking, positions taken by 
modern moral philosophers. The principles of classical intuitionism, 
for instance, can be much improved when we consider the source of moral 
values in human beings, that is, evolution by natural . selection as it 
affects the moral constitutions of men. Furthermore, the tests com­
monly employed to distinguish moral from non-moral statements can be 
subjected to closer scrutiny when the group selection approach is used; 
for morality must produce workable solutions to human problems if the 
consequences of moral prescriptions are to have any merit at all, by 
whatever standard normally accepted in men. Universalization, for ex­
ample, is seen as a fruitless construct when the heterogeneity of human 
life and institutions is considered. Human roles must be complementary 
and not necessarily uniform or equal; the same action, practised upon 
different people, and in circumstances which might look superficially 
similar but which are crucially different, could have greatly different 
results.
Other rationalistic doctrines can be improved by injection of a 
dose of human nature as revealed by the ethological method. This can 
be done in two ways : firstly, the examination of the evolutionary found­
ation of our morality can yield prescriptions which could not have been 
contemplated were our ethics free from any empirical content about human 
nature. Secondly, our attempts to draw up successful moral codes can 
be usefully limited by a notion of human psychology with its implic­
ations about what is and what is not possible. This latter point will 
be referred to in the final chapter.
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1. Edmund Burke, Impeachment of Warren Hastings, 19 Feb., 1788.
2. For a presentation of these points, see Warnock, Contemporary MoralPhilosophy, chapter 1. For original source, see Principia Ethica, page 167.
3. When dealing with intuitionism, it is almost inevitable that one should talk in terms of ’qualities’. Certain comments on this sub­ject have, however, been made already in chapter 3.
4. See The Language of Morals, chapter 2.
5. Freedom and Reason, chapter 10.
6. Bernard Mayo, Ethics and the Moral Life, pages 24-26.
7. For an interesting and original analysis of this, see Hayek,’The Theory of Complex Phenomena’ in Hayek, Essays in Philosophy, Pol­itics and Economics.
8. This incident is recorded in the New Guinea edition of the American Anthropologist (1965) and is recounted by Eibl-Eibesfeldt in Ethology, 
chapter 20.
9. This has been discussed in chapter 10,
10. The rationalistic nature of prescriptivism is made explicitly by Warnock in Contemporary Moral Philosophy, chapter IV.
11. Herbert Spencer, Social Statics (see J.Barrow, chapter 6 for comm- en^ .
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Chapter 14
THE ORIGINS AND LIMITS OF MORALITY
"True law is right reason in agreement with nature; it is of universal application, unchanging and everlasting... We cannot be freed from its obligations by Senate or people... And there will not be different laws at Rome or Athens, or different laws now and in the future, but one eternal and unchangeable law will be valid for all nations and all times
Cicero^
This chapter will review some of the main concepts of the theory 
of the ethological roots of morality. Our knowledge about animal and 
human social behaviour is presently expanding very rapidly; but the 
comparative recency of the scientific study of such behaviour leaves 
any attempt to specify the exact connections between human evolution 
and human morality open to subsequent argument and qualification. The 
attempt of Herbert Spencer to formulate an egoistic morality on Dar­
winian lines, and its subsequent discredit in the hands of the etholo­
gists is an instance of an evolutionary theory which subsequent obser­
vation proved to be inadequate: our ideas about human nature today will 
no doubt be revised by further findings in ethology and the new science 
of 'sociobiology*, which makes use of population genetics theory in the
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study of comparative social behaviour. At this stage in science and in 
philosophy, the theory of the ethological roots of morality cannot pre­
tend to be a series of answers ; it is more a set of guideposts for a 
field of enquiry that has just opened. It promises to be one of the 
most refreshing and productive adventures in ethical philosophy.
Selection mechanisms
The main concept linking ethology to moral philosophy is not really 
the study of other species, nor even primitive human cultures, but the 
concept of evolutionary selection of functioning social orders. From 
the simple axioms of the theory of evolution by natural selection, it 
is possible to propose that groups of individuals, and the pattern of 
social activity in which they participate, may evolve by natural sel­
ection, ' Although transmission of behavioural traits, whether it be 
genetic or through learning, must take place from individual to indi­
vidual, the selection process may operate on the whole group of organ- 
i sms.
In terrestrial species, there is evidence that many advantages ac­
crue from living in social groups. Even the Hobbesian egoist derives 
some benefit from being part of a functioning society. In men no less 
than in the social insects, selection on the basis of breeding popu­
lations is a workable explanation of social behaviour, and the condit- 
tions (stringent as they are) for the operation of this mode of be­
havioural selection were satisfied during our own evolution.
Group selection may be supplemented by, or in some cases opposed 
by, kinship selection processes, in which the inclusive fitness of a 
set of relatives will determine the survival rate of some genetic char­
acter or behavioural trait that is inherited. Like the process of 
interdemic selection, that is, selection of breeding populations, it 
can explain the emergence of altruism and self-sacrifice by individuals 
with respect to evolution. In interdemic selection, the functioning 
pattern of activity of the whole population is the factor which deter­
mines the survival of a genetic characteristic: in kinship selection, 
the survival of the characteristic within a kinship group, where it is
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shared to a greater or lesser extent hy relatives, may he improved hy 
actions which promote the survival of relatives even at personal cost 
or self-sacrifice for an individual.
The third mechanism of selection is that proposed by Trivers, the 
reciprocal-altruism model. Any number of individuals who enter (in­
tentionally or otherwise) into a reciprocal altruism bargain will en­
joy selective advantage provided that the acts of altruism by one part­
ner are indeed reciprocated. Hence, this sort of selection process 
will operate most effectively in small societies where movement of the 
individuals away from each other is limited, where lifetimes are suf­
ficiently long to allow reciprocation and detection of the 'cheaters* 
who do not reciprocate, and where altruistic aid is dispensed to any 
member of the society, not merely an individual who is owed recipro­
cation, Once again, this mode of selection explains the emergence of 
a complicated network of inter-related acts of altruism, obligations 
and debts. Perhaps more fully than interdemic and kinship selection, 
it explains the emergence of various points of moral psychology, in­
cluding guilt when an individual does not behave altruistically, moral 
disapprobation from others in the same circumstance, gratitude to and 
praise for the altruist, methods to identify and expose non-altruists, 
and so on.
Each process of selection represents a process in which a num­
ber of individuals are selected as a unit. Social Darwinist notions of 
the 'survival of the fittest' individual do not explain the presence 
of human and animal societies in which some individuals sacrifice them­
selves in circumstances where advantage will accrue to the rest of the 
population. Sometimes, individuals who are very far from fit in 
evolutionary terms - the sterile worker castes of social insects, for 
instance - but who bring other benefits to the community, are represen­
ted in every new generation of the species, another feature of animal 
societies that Social Darwinism would find it difficult to explain.
Populations or societies that have been selected under these 
various mechanisms are enabled to survive because of their power to 
meet the conditions of the environment. They are self-regulating
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orders, and if they have survived through the long reign of evolutionary 
selection on Earth, then it can he assumed that they are able to accom­
modate most of the conditions that the environment is likely to present 
to them. One feature of this self-regulation of societies which inter­
ests the moral philosopher is the fact that different social patterns 
of action may be conducive to survival in different circumstances, A 
behavioural trait, or a conscious rule of action, may be appropriate in 
some environments (say, a low-population frontier society) but highly 
dangerous in another (say, in a highly populated city or state). To 
formulate abstract moral principles without reference to the environ­
mental conditions would be a practice that could not be conducive to 
the prosperity of any community.
Selection and the source of obligations
Human values can easily be equated with human appetites, provided 
that sufficient specifications and qualifications are made about the 
meaning of the terms. Hence the evolutionary selection of values is 
no mysterious phenomenon; in the same way that likes and dislikes of a 
certain kind can have a bearing on the survival of the individual who 
has them, so might values of a certain kind determine the survival • • 
of an individual or group of individuals sharing them. A society which 
valued altruistic or benevolent acts, for instance, would probably en­
joy a selective advantage over other societies which did not share such 
values, A society with little valuation of life would face, most prob­
ably, an imminent extinction.
This being so, there may be found an evolutionary , explanation of 
the source of the feelings of obligation and justice upon which our 
morality is founded. Where such values confer an advantage to the 
population or kinship group, it is quite possible that they would be 
selected, Hume was correct to note that our sentiments of morality 
are precisely those sentiments which are directly or indirectly useful 
to ourselves or others; in fact, the morality which nature has given 
us is useful to us in the sense that it promotes the survival poten­
tial of our population. The call of conscience, feelings of guilt, 
sympathy and obligation are all explicable in this way,
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The primacy of this biological, self-regulating social order makes 
superfluous any explanation of human moral obligation solely in terms 
of an overt, rational contract between individuals. Social order and 
the moral behaviour which, goes with it can be found in many thousands 
of animal species, even though we would not wish to credit animals with 
any ability to come to a contractual agreement with each other. Human 
societies, and the morality which made them possible, were likewise 
prior to an advanced power of calculation or contractual bargaining.
The suggestion of the social contract as the source of all moral 
obligation, all authority and all duties is not merely unnecessary; it 
is also misleading. From the concept of a fictitious 'original posit­
ion* in which free and equal individuals discuss the possibility of 
forming a just society, it is easy to argue that moral rules will be 
devised in which all individuals are treated equally. In John Rawls's 
presentation of the contract theory, this equality would hold regard­
less of age, sex, race or any other characteristic. Because individu­
als in such a contract would devise these rules, however, is no reason
why we should be obliged, or even willing, to accept them, unless per­
haps our commitment to social equality is particularly great, which ;human history suggests is not the case. But the most important point '4
is that this contractual hypothesis, which has to eliminate a part of |
human nature and a number of widespread human desires and aspirations ij
before it can be formulated, overlooks the complexity of animal and |
human social life. Societies are able to continue only because they |
have a complicated but self-regulating morality, a morality which de- j
pends on different actions in different circumstances, and the differ- :jiential treatment of individuals within a society for its survival. If j
children were not excused many of the obligations of adult life, if 
the injured were not"assisted by others, and if selfish individuals 
were not discouraged, then the foundations of society itself would have 
crumbled, and the prospect of long life for our species would have 
vanished. It is doubtful that any human social contract or written con- |
stitution could ever match the functional potency of our natural mor- J
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ality, built as it is upon the biological experience of thousands of 
generations.
The natural selection of human values helps to explain a number 
of moral institutions that would be difficult, or impossible,to ex­
plain under a contractual theory. The complicated proscriptions on 
sexual behaviour, which are a feature of any human society, are a 
case in point. Could a body of contrac tari ans, ignorant of human 
attitudes and human genetics ever forsee or condone a proscription 
upon incest? Could the same men, ignorant of the environmental con­
ditions of a society, ever determine whether it should be polygamous 
or monogamous? Only with respect to the selective advantage of such 
institutions can they be explained; elaborate deductions from a non- 
empirical foundation of supposed human nature (or human equality) 
are insufficient for the task. Another institution which is help­
fully explained by the evolutionary approach is that of positive law, 
including punishment. The classical contractarians were divided upon 
the individual’s obligation to submit to punishment, especially capi­
tal punishment. Evolutionary theories, starting from the point of 
view of the functioning society instead of from the point of view of 
the individual, can accommodate punishment and legal institutions as 
a means of preserving the overall social pattern of actions, and main­
taining the behavioural regularity within a society which makes social 
living feasible at all.
Unsociable sociability
A contractual approach to ethics is similarly unable to predict 
or account for many of the parts of human nature that, despite their 
apparent unsociability, serve to make social life possible. Aggres­
sion, for example, is a necessary part of human life; without a cer­
tain degree of it, overpopulation could well result, and without its 
power to regulate the social order through the pervasive but subtle 
system of human dominance, the stability of society would be shaken. 
Personal ambition and competition between individuals are other fea­
tures of human nature that may seem divisive but which account for 
a large part of human progress, as Kant rightly knew. Differential
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treatment of individuals on account of personal differences between 
them might also promote the selective fitness of a whole society, as 
has been mentioned, and it is therefore scarcely surprising that such 
inequalities are seen in nearly every human group. The differential 
treatment of individuals from outside one’s own society is a case in 
point. It has, unquestionably, a certain evolutionary function, al­
though the problems which it raises for a modern industrialised society 
are manifest. It is the source of racial conflict, and even warfare.
But it would be a callous and unsuccessful philosophy which attempted 
to suppress such differential valuation of individuals by law, and it 
is by no means certain that the consequences of such a suppression, 
even if it could be successful, would be wholly beneficial to mankind. 
The evolutionary, ethological approach to morality advises us that if 
we are to deal with such problems, caused by the inadequacy of our 
natural behavioural repertoire to adjust to certain feature of the mod­
ern world, we must find ways to channel our behaviour into more harm­
less tribu to ries, rather than to pin our hopes upon damming up that be­
haviour completely.
We cannot exclude from moral discourse those desires which appear
to be unsociable but which are essential to social life. For example,
it is one of the more persistent fantasies of men that aggression can
be eliminated: 'The lion shall eat straw like the ox,’ predicts Isaiah;
the Isle of the Blessed was a Greeek creation; Ovid’s Golden Age, des-2cribed in Metamornhoses is another instance of it. Yet, as Anthony 
Storr observes,' ’’it is impossible to believe that there could ever be 
a society without strife and competition... For this same aggressive im­
pulse which can lead to strife and violence also underlies man’s urge to 
independence and achievement. Just as a child could not possibly grow 
up into an independent adult if it were not aggressive, so an adult 
must needs continue to express at least part of his aggressive potential 
if he is to maintain his own autonomy. ’’
This warns us of the dangers of utopian social engineering. It is 
very recently that we have begun to understand the functional role 
played by these 'unsociable* traits, and it may well be hoped that we
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learn from that knowledge. Where such traits are a vital part of the 
social order, or of the regulation of population numbers between human 
societies, then it would be disastrous to eliminate them: this is, of 
course, precisely the problem which arose in the case of tribal hostil­
ities that were suppressed by the Australian government, mentioned in 
a previous chapter. In other words, the limits of moral debate are 
perhaps rather more tightly drawn than many Utopians would care to 
admit.
Stabilizing features of social life
As it has been argued, social life is possible only where the act­
ivities of individuals are not random, but are steady and predictable. 
This condition, for example, is one of the reasons why promise-keeping 
and truth-telling are essential to any society; without the predictabil­
ity that they bring to human life, no agreement or planning for the 
future would be possible. Fortunately, human beings do conform to 
prevailing norms to a large extent, and their behaviour is indeed modi­
fied by criticism from other members of society. That conformity is 
probably an object of natural selection, along with other social val­
ues, and it explains the remarkable persistence of traditional, received 
morality, even in the most enlightened cultures. Traditional morality 
is often encased in religious belief, which is itself highly resistant 
to change. The psychological authority of political leaders or family 
members adds its own weight to the solidarity of traditional moral 
standards. Of course it is possible for morality to change, either by 
force or by slow development. Yet it is recognized that force, although 
it may change a person’s actions, does not necessarily change men’s be­
liefs and values, and that these, if they are to change, change slowly 
over the generations. In a complex society, where changes in structure 
are likely to be destabilizing, this resistance to sudden change is to 
be expected. The theory of evolution, whether it be of the evolution 
of physical or behavioural structures, gives us a theory of change, but 
it is a theory of slow change, not of revolutionary change,
A prominent feature of moral psychology which exemplifies this 
permanence of human morality is the conscience. Again, one assumes 
that most of the moral rules upon which the conscience dictates to us
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are learned in early socialization, but once they are learned, it be­
comes very difficult for us to act against them because of the pull of 
this psychological force. Even this can be viewed in evolutionary 
terms, and Darwin himself remarked that "Ultimately, a highly complex 
sentiment, having its first origin in the social insticts, largely 
guided by the approbation of our fellow men, ruled by reason, self- 
interest and in later times, by deep religious feelings, confirmed by 
instruction and habit, all combined, constitute our moral sense or 
conscience,
Like religious sentiments, the pull of conscience may operate to 
different degrees in different people. It can also vary widely between 
different societies. These differences, however, are quite compatible 
with an evolutionary hypothesis, which does not require complete con­
formity in behaviour, either within or between groups, provided that 
the pattern of behaviour within each group is conducive to group sur­
vival, The ethological approach can help solve some of the philosophi­
cal problems with conscience; for example, of its appropriateness.
We must recognize that conscience is, ultimately, an evolutionary con­
struct which has to be somewhat general in its application. It would 
be impossible for any moral sentiments to be inherited, whether by 
genetic endowment or by learning, and yet be applicable in every 
possible circumstanceo Consequently it is often the case that our con­
science pulls us in one direction, but that our reason dictates another 
course. When we calculate the details of some situation, we might in­
deed find that our values are best satisfied by a course of action op­
posite to that prompted by conscience, an opposition which may stem from 
the multiphase evolution of human morality and moral psychology; but 
the conscience offers us a ’rule of thumb’ guide to morality of aston­
ishing strength. It is a feature of our psychology which resists a 
change away from traditional morality, while not preventing such a 
change completely, and leads to a regularity and permanence in human 
moral conduct.
Received morality
Complete submission to the preaching of received morality could,
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however^prejudice the long-term survival of any community. Traditional 
morality and the moral codes of most religions aver that it is better 
to give than to receive, that selfishness is bad, that the use of 
force over others is wrong, and so forth. Nevertheless, unless a 
certain degree of selfishness, or self-assertion, or other of the 
’unsociable* aspects of sociability were in fact present in men, the 
survival of the society and the individuals themselves would be less 
likely, A society of perfect altruists could not exist, because every­
one would refuse to accept the benefits of the altruism; a society of 
perfectly and equally meek individuals could similarly not endure, 
because there would be no structure to or basis of agreement in such a 
social order. Traditional morality is often thought to be rather one­
sided; ’do no violence*, 'be generous’ and ’do not force your will on 
others* being typical examples of traditional moral codes. They appear 
to be one-sided, since we can normally rely on an individual to be 
somewhat selfish, somewhat aggressive and so forth, and therefore need 
only a rule to curb the opposite, destabilising extremes of his be­
haviour, In fact, however, received morality is generally two-sided, 
and for every maxim such as *do not force your will on others* there 
is a complementary prescription to the individual to protect his own 
interests and to ’stick up* for himself. Excessive generosity, simi­
larly, is popularly considered to be strange or questionable behaviour. 
The biological social optimum is neither one extreme nor the other, 
but somewhere between.
It is interesting to speculate upon the question of how social 
preaching and teaching of moral precepts accords with or complements 
the innate morality of our species. Preaching, of course, prompts us 
toward complete altruism and continual performance of certain rules.
Our inherited tendency to observe that preaching and perform those rule- 
guided actions is less than perfect. Individual selection and kinship 
selection may prompt us away from traditional moral acts on occasions, 
inclining us to be selfish self-preservationists rather than socially 
optimal altruists. In a species like ours, comparatively free from sel­
ective competition with other species, such sub-optimality may endure 
for a long time. If moral preaching can raise our actions from that
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sub-optimal state, then provided that our actions do not advance beyond 
the optimum, the social order may be preserved longer (and the
pattern of moral and social actions will be preserved with it). This 
effect of traditional moral preaching, and of approbation and disappro­
bation of individuals with respect to their moral behaviour, gives us 
a useful evolutionary starting-point for a systematic study of the dis­
tinction between ’perfect’ and ’imperfect’ duties, first formulated by 
Kant, Perfect duties appear to be those which are necessary for the 
preservation of the social order and for the continued life of the 
group or society adhering to those principles. Imperfect duties, al­
though they may increase the survival potential of the society, are 
not necessarily essential to it. Although this is a somewhat broad 
summary of the distinction, it is fair to argue that the distinction, 
if it is to be useful, must be made in terms of evolutionary con­
cepts.
Traditional morality is sometimes confused by the desires which 
appear to be unsociable but which are in fact necessary for social 
life to exist. Nevertheless, the two-sided nature of most traditional 
moral codes does accommodate, to some extent, these features. Further­
more, the codes of most cultures support precisely those virtues which 
the ethological method suggests are necessary to animal social life.
The ancient complex civilizations all preached against selfishness and 
cowardice; bravery is rewarded in every society even today. The seven 
deadly sins of Christian belief are seen, in one form or another, in 
nearly all other religious and moral systems. Disobedience is punished, 
particularly in children, and nonconformists are either punished or 
persecuted in most societies (either legally or otherwise). In relig­
ious cultures, blasphemy, which shakes the firm foundations of rel­
igious thou^t and the moral regularities which are bound up in 
religious doctrine, is considered a serious sin. It might be said that 
nonconformity in non-religious cultures is thou^t to be similarly 
heinous.
Yet there are other features of human morality which are not so 
easily explained in evolutionary terms. The frequent proscriptions
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against gossip or 'backbiting* may be a case in point; it is plausible 
to argue that gossip is a means of promoting the spread of information 
about the moral attitudes of other members of society, which would, in 
evolutionary terms, be advantageous, for in would inform individuals 
about the behaviour appropriate towards others. Can proscriptions 
upon it then be explained? Possibly they can, but the solution to 
this and many other difficulties will be possible only after lengthy 
cooperation between philosophers and biologists at the mutual frontier 
of their disciplines.
The limits of moral debate
The ethological approach to morality is primarily a descriptive 
approach; it helps us to establish what human attitudes and goals act­
ually are by understanding their origin. As a prescriptive morality, 
however, the ethological approach is certainly of use, although it is 
confined to answering the more important questions about human conduct, 
and is comparatively powerless in trivial moral questions. The approach 
could not, for example, say what would be the appropriate punishment 
for a naughty child; but it would give us important insights into the 
nature and function of punishment generally and the consistency in 
application or in the matching of the severity of the punishment to the 
offence which is necessary to sustain a functioning punishment system 
in any society or subset of society.
The approach does give us an empirical tool to distinguish between 
a number of quasi-empirical moral systems. The Social Darwinist system, 
for instance, is easily defeated once we have some elementary grasp of 
the workings of animal social systems; we find in these circumstances 
that animal nature is not a case of * survival of the fittest individual* 
as the Social Darwinists made it out to be. In fact. Social Darwinism 
would not be conducive to high rates of survival in any local popu­
lation. Similarly, a number of rationalistic approaches, which almost 
by definition have to suppress or deny the importance of many traditional 
moral rules and many parts of the present, functioning human nature that 
is common to men, can be attacked for a misleading abstractness which 
makes them an inappropriate foundation for human morality, and which
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prompts the adoption of moral principles which would be either unforseen 
in their consequences or impossible for men, because they are men, to 
accept and act in accordance with,
A number of other social philosophies can be criticised under the 
ethological approach because of their sub-optimality in an evolutionary 
sense. This is not necessarily to assert that continued survival of our 
own or any other species is necessarily good, but if we value that con­
tinued survival, and as products of the evolutionary system we would be 
unlikely to think otherwise, then such criticism of sub-optimal social 
philosophy is useful. It is often possible for us to assume that a 
certain moral system would be laudible in practice, when in fact the 
reverse could be true. By giving us some empirical information about 
the probable results of social practices, the ethological method can 
assist in this criticism,
A simple case in point might be epicureanism. One variant of 
this appealing doctrine would encourage a hermit-like existence, away 
from the possibility of pain caused by others, except perhaps a few 
close and trusted friends. Yet in evolutionary terms such an arrange­
ment is sub-optimal; individual and group interests would be served by 
a system in which the gains from reciprocal altruism and the division 
of duty and responsibility between individuals could be enjoyed. Al­
though this observation is not a conclusive argument against such 
philosophies by any means, it is a useful one for the critic to possess.
The most important aspect of the ethological approach, then, is 
perhaps best formulated as this: it allows us to draw the limits for 
moral debate. In the first place, it helps us to discern what types 
of behaviour and which values are likely to be thought of over-riding 
importance in a culture, or which qualify under most definitions of 
morality^. That is, we can achieve a better idea of what is covered by 
morality than would be possible under a non-empirical approach to the 
subject. Secondly, the approach enables us to say which individuals . 
are covered by a moral code; as we have seen, it is mistaken for the 
moralist to assume that his codes can be applied to all individuals, 
regardless of their social group or personal characteristics. For a
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moral system to be workable, it has to function within the limits of 
human behaviour. The more certain we are of those limits, the more 
workable will our.moral codes be. This point is clearly of use to the 
first-order moralist. In the third place, we are given useful inform­
ation about the way in which environmental or other circumstances affect 
the moral practices of a society. From experiments with social animals 
we may infer that practices applicable and beneficial to a society 
under one set of conditions can be disastrous under another. This im­
plication of the approach warns us against moral codes which purport to 
follow a unitary, general principle of conduct or set of principles of 
conduct, alleged to be valid under all circumstances. The same behav­
iour may, however, have completely different effects in different con­
ditions, and it is unlikely that we would be able to devise a single 
rule of action (except one with many qualifications) that would suit 
the requirements of a working morality.
The exception might be a consequentialist doctrine, like classical 
utilitarianism, which specifies the ends of morality, but which leaves 
us somewhat ignorant of the best way to achieve that end. Once again, 
in these circumstances the ethological approach, with its empirical 
foundation, will be able to help us decide precisely what sort of 
human action will achieve the proposed ends. Therefore it would seem 
to be an indispensible tool to many systems of ethics.
The importance of rules, however, should not be forgotten despite 
this qualification. Men are guided by general rules, and some very 
broad rules are probably rooted in the genetic foundation of human nat­
ure, Certainly, general rules of conduct are learnt in the social 
situation, and children are eager to accept their authority almost 
without qualification. In adult life, however, the simple rules of 
childhood are qualified to suit particular circumstances, like an 
artist's filling in of a sketch. The essential point about human be­
haviour is that it must be governed by general principles, and not by 
highly specific 'act* formulations of ethics; for only in a society of 
omniscient individuals could such deviation from general principles be 
of overall advantage to the social group. Our morality, like many
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other things, cannot he perfect, because it has to operate within the 
less than perfect boundaries of human nature. Adherence to general 
principles is perhaps the most advantageous strategy for beings that are 
not omniscient.
In summary, the ethological approach to morality offers a promis­
ing new tool for both the moralist and the moral philosopher. For the 
former, it constitutes a means for guaging the probability of success 
or failure of any new system or rule of morality. For the latter, it 
makes possible a clearer understanding of many of the persistent issues 
in ethics. For both, it uncovers a fascinating new field of enquiry 
with insights and issues of its own.
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FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER FOURTEEN
1, Cicero, De Republica, III, xxli, 33»
2. For further examples, see N.Cohn, The Pursuit of the Millenium,
3t Storr, Human Aggression, chapter 6,
4. Darwin, The Descent of Man, I, p. 139*
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